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Abstract 
Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is 
constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation to 
mind-independent objects. Although relationalism provides what seems to be 
the most straightforward and intuitive account of how experience strikes us 
introspectively, it is very often believed that the argument from hallucination 
shows that the view is untenable. The aim of this thesis is to defend 
relationalism against the argument from hallucination. The argument claims 
that the phenomenal character of hallucination and perception deserves the 
same account, and that relationalism cannot be true for hallucinations, 
therefore relationalism must be rejected. This argument relies on the 
Indiscriminability Principle (IND), the claim that two experiences that are 
introspectively indiscriminable from each other have the same phenomenal 
character. Before assessing the plausibility of this principle, I first consider 
and dismiss versions of the argument which wouldn’t depend on IND.  
Although widely accepted, no satisfactory support for IND has been 
presented yet. In this thesis I argue that defending IND requires that we 
understand the notion of ‘indiscriminability’ employed in IND in an 
impersonal sense. I then identify what underwrites IND: the intuition that, in 
virtue of its superficiality, the nature of a phenomenal character must be 
accessible through introspection, together with the claim that it is not possible 
to deny IND without denying the superficiality of phenomenal characters too.  
I argue that the relationalist can deny IND while preserving the 
superficiality of phenomenal characters. This can be done by adopting a 
negative view of hallucination and an account of introspection whereby the 
phenomenal character doesn’t exist independently of one’s introspective 
awareness of it and where having introspective access to our experience 
depends on our perceptual access to the world. 
Relationalism in the Face of Hallucinations 
 
ix 
 
 
You have led me, it seems, step by step, till I 
am got I know not where. But I shall try to get 
out again, if not by the way I came, yet by 
some other of my own finding (Berkeley, 
Alciphron sec.10). 
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Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is 
constituted by the obtaining of a non-representational psychological relation 
to mind-independent objects. It provides what seems to be the most 
straightforward and intuitive account of how experience strikes us 
introspectively.  
Some relationalist commitments have long been a feature of the 
philosophy of perception, most often as part of so-called ‘naïve realism’, a 
view attributed to the unsophisticated ordinary person and used by 
philosophers as their target against which they frame their positions. 
However, only in recent years have we seen attempts to systematically 
present the commitments, merits and implications of relationalism, chiefly 
thanks to the work of Martin (1997; 2002; 2004; 2006), Snowdon (1980; 
1990), Campbell ( 2002), Brewer (2011), Fish ( 209), and Soteriou (2013).  
The recent debate over relationalism has primarily focused on one of 
its implications: disjunctivism. Disjunctivism claims that the phenomenal 
character of hallucination shouldn’t be accounted for in the same way as we 
account for the phenomenal character of perception. This is a corollary of 
the relationalist view that the phenomenal character of perception is partly 
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constituted by the mind-independent objects to which perception seems to 
relate us, together with the observation that in hallucination the object to 
which one seems to be related doesn’t exist. The term ‘disjunctivism’ 
derives from Hinton’s discussion of a particular range of propositions that 
he calls ‘perception/illusion disjunctions’ (Hinton 1967a; 1967b; 1973). 
Hinton argues that there is no reason to believe that the general category of 
experience under which philosophers lump together perception and 
hallucination really captures an event that happens whenever one either 
perceives or hallucinates. Hinton claims that expressions like ‘I have an 
experience as of a flash of light’ or ‘I seem to see a flash of light’ is simply 
‘a more compact way of saying’ that a disjunctive claim is true: ‘Either I see 
a flash of light, or I have an illusion of a flash of light’ (Hinton 1967b: 217).  
Disjunctivism can take different forms, depending on the aspect with 
respect to which perception and hallucination are claimed to be distinct. 
There is a disjunctive position about the fundamental nature of perception 
and hallucination (which leaves open what determines their respective 
fundamental nature), that Byrne and Logue (2008b) call ‘metaphysical 
disjunctivism’. This version of disjunctivism is attributed to Snowdon 
(1980; 1990), who presents it in the context of a criticism of the causal 
theory of perception. An epistemic disjunctive claim, stating that perception 
and hallucination put the subject in different epistemological positions, was 
famously introduced by McDowell (1986; 1982; 1995). Finally, a 
disjunctive claim about the phenomenal character of experiences—
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sometimes called ‘phenomenal disjunctivism’—was introduced by Martin 
(1997; 2002b; 2004; 2006).  
I will focus on the latter, because this is the disjunctive claim that is 
entailed by relationalism. Accordingly, in what follows I will use 
‘disjunctivism’ to refer exclusively to disjunctivism about phenomenal 
characters, and I will bracket all other versions of disjunctivism. There are 
interesting questions regarding how disjunctivism about phenomenal 
characters relates to the other forms.1 However, I will leave these questions 
aside, as they are not relevant to the aim of this thesis, which is to defend 
relationalism from the argument from hallucination.  
Beyond being an unavoidable corollary of relationalism, disjunctivism 
plays a crucial role in the strategy rationalonalists adopt to counter the most 
prominent argument against it, the argument from hallucination. The 
argument seeks to establish that, since hallucinations that are 
indiscriminable from perceptual experience are possible, and since 
hallucination cannot be constituted by the obtaining of a relation to the 
                                                 
1
 Phenomenal and metaphysical disjunctivism are generally thought to help the 
cause of epistemological disjunctivism and some have suggested that they entail it 
(Byrne and Logue 2008b), although it is not clear that either is required to maintain 
a coherent epistemological disjuncitivsm (see Thau 2004; Snowdon 2005; 2009; 
Byrne and Logue 2008b; Millar 2007; 2008; Haddock and Macpherson 2008 for a 
discussion). Some assume that phenomenal disjunctivism entails metaphysical 
disjunctivism (Conduct 2011), although this is not obvious. Phenomenal 
disjunctivists may reject the essentialist assumption implied in the metaphysical 
disjunctivist claim that there is a fundamental nature of experiences, or they might 
not identify the ‘fundamental nature’ of an experience with its phenomenal 
character and what constitutes it. 
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mind-independent object one seems to be experiencing, perception cannot 
be a relation to the mind-independent object its seems to relate us to either.  
A large part of the recent debate over relationalism has developed 
along the following dialectic. Opponents of relationalism present the 
argument from hallucination; relationalists rebut that the argument relies on 
an unjustified assumption: that the phenomenal characters of perception and 
hallucination deserve the same account. But this is exactly what 
relationalism, with its commitment to disjunctivism, denies. So, unless the 
proponent of the argument provides a motivation for prescribing a non-
disjunctive account of experiences, the argument begs the question against 
relationalism. The proponent of the argument, then, points to the fact that 
perception and hallucination may be introspectively indiscriminable as a 
motivation for their belief that perception and hallucination have the same 
phenomenal character.  
Often it remains unclear whether, in the intentions of proponents of 
the argument, the appeal to the possibility of hallucinations that are 
indiscriminable from perception is meant to introduce an inference to the 
best explanation or an indubitable principle. Sometimes, disjunctivism is 
rejected right from the start and not even taken seriously. This suggests that 
the claim that the indiscriminability of experiences is to be accounted for in 
terms of sameness of phenomenal characters—what I will call the 
indistiguishability principle—is taken to be an undeniable principle (see 
Siewert 1998; Siegel 2011; Kriegel 2013; Deutsch 2005). 
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However, there is very little discussion of the underlying intuitions 
that supposedly make this principle undeniable. Sometimes, it is motivated 
on the basis of a commitment to internalism (see Farkas 2003)—that 
relationalists are bound to reject. Some relationalists have identified the 
source of the indiscriminability principle in an overly optimistic view of 
introspective powers (see Hinton 1967; 1970; Martin 1997; 2004; 2006). 
Some rare explicit arguments to the effect that the only coherent way to 
understand the indiscriminability of experiences is in terms of the sameness 
of phenomenal characters have been proposed (see Farkas 2006), but they 
left relationalists unmoved. The debate over relationalism may start to look 
like one that cannot be adjudicated on its own terms, but only by resolving 
much broader controversies such as that between internalists and 
externalists in the philosophy of mind, discussions on the nature of 
consciousness, and on what being self-aware of mental occurrences amounts 
to.  
A wide-ranging look at the current debate on the philosophy of 
perception leaves the impression of a field divided into two hermetic camps: 
those who take the indiscriminability principle to be undeniable and those 
who ask why this should be so. The relationalist is certainly right in 
lamenting the drastic lack of explicit considerations in favour of the 
indiscriminability principle and demanding better and explicit arguments for 
it. However, this complaint is likely to leave those who are already 
committed to the indiscriminability principle’s truth unimpressed. 
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Dialectically, relationalists can say very little to convince the opponent that 
their commitment to disjunctivism is benign, unless they identify the exact 
underlying motivations of the indiscriminability principle and respond to 
them. The only way to advance the debate, then, is to identify the 
assumptions that underwrite the indiscriminability principle, decide whether 
they should be accepted and, if so, whether the relationalist has the 
resources to accommodate them.  
On the other hand, some recent discussions of relationalism tend to 
present the alleged indiscriminability of perception from some 
hallucinations as a datum that any theory of conscious perception should 
account for and which relationalism allegedly fails to accommodate, 
presenting the argument from hallucination as relying on an inference to the 
best explanation (see Sturgeon 1998; 2006; Fish 2005; 2009; B. Millar 
2014; Tye 2007). This might be an effect of having metabolized 
relationalists’ complaints that not enough motivations for the 
indistinguishiability principle are available. However, the ambiguity 
between these two approaches has always been present in formulations of 
the argument from hallucination and still is. This has pushed the debate on 
relationalism away from evaluation of the validity and soundness of the 
argument from hallucination towards a focus on establishing whether 
relationalism, with its disjunctivist commitment, can provide a satisfactory 
account of hallucinationone that accounts for the possibility that it could 
be indiscriminable from perception (see for instance Johnston 2004; Smith 
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2008; Siegel 2004, 2008; Fish 2008, 2008; Hellie 2007, 2013; Schellenberg 
2014; Tye 2007; Pautz 2010; Vega-Encabo 2010; Logue 2012; 2013). 
Even framed in these terms, however, the debate seems stuck at a dead 
end. Many considerations go into an account of perceptual experience. 
Some of these are phenomenological considerations; others aren’t. The 
relationalist might contend that her theory provides an overall better account 
of perceptual experience, even if it doesn’t provide the best explanation of 
the indiscriminability datum; while her opponents seem to work with the 
assumption that providing the best account of the indiscriminability datum 
should be the priority of any account of perception.  
This led Fish (2005) to suggest that the debate between disjunctivists 
(and hence relationalists committed to it) and their opponents is ‘grounded 
in an underlying methodological disagreement’ (Fish 2005: 121), creating a 
situation ‘not dissimilar to that of competing research paradigms’ (Fish 
2005: 125).2 The opponent of relationalism reasons that, ‘even if there are 
other differences between a perception and a hallucination, as long as they 
are indiscriminable from the first-person point of view, then in any case 
there is a common ontological core—the core that the subject is in a 
‘sensory state’ of the very same kind’ (Fish 2005: 122; italics in original). 
                                                 
2
 A similar suggestion is made by Nanay (2014). He recommends that we frame 
the debate between relationalists and representationalists in terms of a 
disagreement about what the necessary conditions for individuating perceptual 
states are, where the relationalist claims that two experiences/two perceptual states 
must be different if their objects are different, even if the properties attributed to 
these objects are the same, while the representationalist claims that if two 
perceptual states are the same, then the properties perceptually attributed to the 
perceived object must also be the same. 
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Relationalists, on the other hand, ‘look past the first-person similarities 
[and] find an important difference between perception and hallucination—
the presence or absence of a seen object’ (Fish 2005: 122; italics in 
original).  
Both diagnoses of the debate are unsatisfactory. There is something 
deeply troubling in the thought that the viability of an account of the 
phenomenal character of perception cannot be decided on its own terms or, 
worse, that decisions over the truth or falsity of relationalism come down to 
a methodological choice where no approach shows significant merits over 
the other. The present work aims to solve this impasse and provide the tools 
for advancing the debate, by refocusing on the argument from hallucination, 
identifying what one can say to make the argument compelling and what 
intuitions underlie its premises. This will allow us to appreciate where the 
fundamental disagreement between relationalists and their opponents lie and 
what the relationalist can say to satisfy the constraints. Understanding where 
the disagreement lies first requires determining where agreement stands and 
what constraints are imposed on any account of the phenomenal character of 
experience. 
I will argue that at the core of the argument from hallucination—and 
the crucial acceptance of the indistingushability principle—lies the intuition 
that phenomenal characters are superficial properties and that there is no 
way for the relationalist to accommodate this feature. The aim of this 
research is to argue that relationalists can indeed accommodate the 
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superficiality of phenomenal characters, although this will prove more 
difficult than it might initially appear. The thought that relationalists are 
committed to violating the superficiality constraint is tied to a misleading 
view of superficiality, whereby superficial properties are properties for 
which there is no seem/is distinction. Against this account, I will argue that 
reflection on colour properties shows that superficial properties can appear 
different than they are. However, colours can be understood as superficial 
inasmuch as working out that something is not the colour it seems to be can 
only be done through a distinctive source of information—in this case 
vision. I then present an understanding of superficiality whereby if a 
superficial property seems different than it is, this cannot come down to the 
property having a real nature that is inaccessible through the dedicated 
source of information—in the case of phenomenal character: introspection. 
The real nature of the phenomenal character, then, must in principle be 
accessible though introspection, although not at all times. 
This poses a serious challenge for relationalists: how can they 
maintain that the phenomenal character of hallucination is different from the 
phenomenal character of perception without maintaining that the real nature 
of the phenomenal character of hallucination is hidden to introspection? Ex 
hypothesis, at least some hallucinations are indiscriminable through 
introspection from perception—which seems to imply that it is not possible 
to distinguish one from the other through introspection.  
Introduction 
 
 
10 
 
This challenge, however, holds only if certain hallucinations are 
indiscriminable from perception in an impersonal way, in a way that rules 
out that the subject’s failure to discriminate can be explained in virtue of the 
presence of interfering factors that prevent one from picking up on a 
difference that would otherwise be accessible through introspection. The 
opponent of relationalism, then, has to prove that either there are some 
hallucination that are indiscriminable through introspection from perception 
in the impersonal sense, or that such hallucination are metaphysically 
possible. An inquiry that utilises both conceptual tools and empirical data on 
the psychopathology of hallucination will conclude that there is no 
empirical support for the claim that impersonally indiscriminable 
hallucinations actually exist. Moreover, the arguments generally proposed to 
support their metaphysical possibility—including the argument from local 
supervenience and the argument from the ‘same proximate cause, same 
immediate effect’ principle—fail, even though ultimately I will grant that 
we can accept, on different grounds, their possibility.  
This challenge, I will argue, can be met by adopting a negative view 
of hallucination of the kind proposed by Martin (2004; 2006), whereby the 
phenomenal character of hallucination is solely determined in terms of its 
being indiscriminable from the phenomenal character of perception. 
Relationalists need to embrace this account of hallucination if they are to 
avoid committing themselves to denying that phenomenal characters are 
superficial.  
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Focusing on the idea that phenomenal characters are superficial and 
exploring what constraints their superficiality imposes on an account of 
perceptual experience provides a novel approach to the argument from 
hallucination and the debate over relationalism. It allows one to put some 
order into a debate where, as it stands, it is difficult to understand what 
motivations drive the proponents of competing views, where the common 
ground and the disagreements stand, and in which directions the various 
intuitions at play pull the actors in the debate. I will argue that the proponent 
of the argument from hallucination is motivated by an intuition that should 
be taken very seriously: phenomenal characters are superficial, and it is not 
clear that relationalists can claim that a perception and a hallucination which 
is indiscriminable from it have different phenomenal characters without 
denying their superficiality.  
The present enquiry will show that the relationalist can meet this 
challenge and that the various versions of the argument from hallucination 
fail to prove relationalism untenable. Other arguments may succeed in what 
the argument from hallucination fails to do (see Noordhof 2002; Siegel 
2011; Brogaard 2015 for some arguments that do not rely on hallucinations). 
However, I am confident that my examination of the notion of phenomenal 
character, the nature of superficial properties, the workings of introspection, 
and the notion of indiscriminability will prove fruitful for future work 
assessing further arguments against, but also in favour of, relationalism.  
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Chapter 1: The Relational View of Perception 
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will introduce relationalism, the view that the 
phenomenal character of perception is to be accounted for in terms of the 
obtaining of a relation of acquaintance between the subject and the object. I 
will identify its fundamental commitments and explain how it accommodates 
the way in which the phenomenal character of perceptual experience strikes 
us through introspection.  
First, I will discuss how we should understand the notion of 
phenomenal character and what we should expect from a theory that aims to 
account for it. I consider Snowdon’s scepticism about the utility of the notion 
of phenomenal character and the cognate expression ‘what-it-is-likeness’. I 
will explain why I do not share Snowdon’s scepticism and why I think it is 
valid to use the notion of phenomenal character, although only as a 
placeholder, to identify certain aspects of perceptual experience that call for a 
better understanding: the specific way in which perception strikes us 
introspectively. I will argue that giving a substantial answer to this question is 
controversial. The phenomenal character of an experience, then, is not 
obvious to us—contrary to what many participants to the debate hold (while 
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still disagreeing with each other as to what the phenomenal character of 
experience actually is).  
In particular, I will counter the idea that it is part and parcel of the 
notion of phenomenal character that it is to be understood in terms of intrinsic 
properties possessed by the experience. This leaves it open that phenomenal 
characters are (in part) constituted by the obtaining of a relation to objects in 
the environment, as the relationalist claims.  
I will then spell out how experience strikes us when we reflect upon it, 
and argue that relationalism seems to have an explanatory advantage over the 
main alternative accounts: sense-datum theory, representationalism, and 
qualia theories of the phenomenal character of experience. Finally, I will 
explore why relationalism is met with great resistance despite its apparent 
explanatory merits. The main problem that relationalism faces takes the form 
of a reduction ad absurdum. This starts with the claim that a limited range of 
experiences cannot be the way relationalism claims them to be and concludes 
that relationalism cannot be true in any case. The aim of this thesis will be to 
assess whether this argument is successful. The present chapter will be 
devoted to presenting how relationalism accounts for the phenomenal 
character of perception in the context of the debate of which it is part.   
 
1.1 Trivial and Not So Trivial Claims about Experiences 
Amidst the numerous controversies about the metaphysics, the 
phenomenology, and the epistemology of perception that occupy 
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philosophers, there is one claim that goes relatively unchallenged, i.e. that 
perceptual experiences are conscious mental occurrences such that there is 
something it is like for one to have them. It seems that having a conscious 
sensory experience amounts to having an experience that is subjectively like 
something for the subject who has it. This distinguishes conscious experience 
from unconscious mental processes and states of which one is not subjectively 
aware. In addition, it seems that what it is like to have a sensory experience is 
different from what it is like to have other mental occurrences, such as 
thoughts or recollections. The locus classicus3 for the idea of a fundamental 
what-it-is-likeness of conscious experience in the contemporary analytic 
tradition is Nagel’s famous paper ‘What it is like to be a Bat’. However, the 
consensus around the idea that there is a subjective conscious character to 
perceptual experience and awareness of this character is what allows the 
subject to distinguish her experience from other mental occurrences goes 
beyond the acceptance of Nagel’s discussion. Nagel claims: 
[…] fundamentally an organism has conscious mental states if and 
only if there is something that it is like to be that organism-
something it is like for the organism. We may call this the 
subjective character of experience. (Nagel 1974: 436) 
                                                 
3
 Nagel was not the first to talk about ‘what-it-is-likeness’. As Snowdon (2010) 
notes in a footnote, Farrell (1950) and Sprigge (1971) had used this expression 
before. Nagel, however, is responsible for the fortune of both this idea and the 
expression. 
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What Nagel calls ‘subjective character’, others call ‘phenomenal 
character’, ‘conscious character’, or ‘sensuous character’. Here I will adopt 
the expression ‘phenomenal character’, most common in recent debates on 
perception.  
Commenting on the above passage from Nagel, Snowdon (2010) makes 
two glosses. First, Nagel attributes conscious experiences to organisms, but 
Snowdon notices that the restriction to organisms should be dropped, as we 
do not yet know whether entities other than organisms (for instance 
computers) may be able to have experiences. Second, and most importantly 
for our current concerns, Snowdon notices that Nagel talks about the fact that 
there is something it is like to be an organism (or an entity) with conscious 
experience. But if this is true, this is presumably in virtue of the fact that there 
is something it is like to undergo a conscious experience. He then suggests 
that the basic claim expressed in Nagel’s passage should be ‘[…] that it is in 
the nature of experiences to be occurrences which it is like something to 
undergo’ (Snowdon 2010: 11).  
Nagel affirms the existence of a double implication: a subject has a 
conscious mental occurrence if and only if there is something that it is like to 
be that organism. Thus, it is meant to give necessary and sufficient conditions 
for having a conscious occurrence and thus an illuminating characterisation of 
its nature. However, one might wonder whether saying that there is something 
it is like to have an experience is an exhaustive characterisation of what it is 
for an experience to be conscious, or even whether we are making any 
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progress at all in our knowledge of conscious experiences by pointing out that 
there is something it is like to have them. Snowdon expresses such scepticism 
and goes further still: he claims that Nagel’s claim about what-it-is-likeness is 
either false or trivial. Implementing the remark, mentioned above, about 
switching the focus from the conscious creature to the conscious experience, 
Snowdon reformulates Nagel’s biconditional as follows:  
Necessarily, an occurrence E is an experience if and only if there 
is something it is like for an entity to undergo or enjoy E. 
(Snowdon 2010: 12) 
But if we read it from right to left, claims Snowdon, it is false. There are 
many things for which there is something it is like to undergo them even 
though they are not experiences, so the fact that there is something it is like to 
undergo an event cannot be an exclusive criterion for identifying a conscious 
experience. He gives the example of ‘travelling on the Big Dipper’, which is 
‘a type of thing that can happen without any experience—say, if one travelled 
on it asleep or unconscious’ (Snowdon 2010: 15). From left to right, on the 
other hand, the biconditional is true, although, Snowdon says: 
[…] it is more or less trivial. Experiences, like anything else, must 
be some way, and being events must be some way for the subject 
of them. Further, the slogan in no way pins down which ways are 
the distinctive ways experiences are. (Snowdon 2010: 25)  
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As there is something it is like for the subject to undergo an experience 
only insofar as there is something it is like for a subject to undergo any event, 
and talk of ‘what-it-is-likeness’ doesn’t do anything to specify what 
distinctively it is like, Snowdon recommends that we should abandon it as 
utterly uninformative. I suspect that, as long as what is dubbed the subjective 
or phenomenal character of perceptual experience is identified in terms of 
what captures the ‘what-it-is-likeness’, he would recommend abandoning talk 
of ‘phenomenal character’ too.  
However, pointing out, as Snowdon does, that simply saying that 
perceptual experience has a phenomenal character is trivial is not itself trivial, 
at least in the context of the current debate on perception. There is in fact a 
widespread tendency to take the simple trivial remark that perception has a 
conscious or phenomenal character for a substantive claim about certain 
phenomenal properties that experience allegedly possesses. And Snowdon’s 
invitation to abandon these expressions is primarily motivated by an attempt 
to avoid such a ‘major and disputable inference’ (Snowdon 2010: 27) of 
which the following quote from Chalmers is an example:  
A mental state is conscious if there is something it is like to be in 
that mental state. To put it another way, we can say that a mental 
state is conscious if it has a qualitative feel—an associated quality 
of experience. These qualitative feels are also known as 
phenomenal qualities, or qualia for short. (Chalmers 1996: 4)  
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 Chalmers asserts that any conscious mental state has phenomenal 
qualities. However, while the claim that there is something it is like to have a 
sensory experience seems trivial and meets the general consensus of 
philosophers working on the subject, the idea that for all conscious states 
there is something it is like to have them is controversial (see Carruthers and 
Veillet 2011). Since my current interest is limited to perceptual experience 
and I will remain neutral on the possibility that for other conscious mental 
occurrences there is something it is like to have them, I shall restrict 
Chalmers’ claim to what matters to the current discussion: perceptual 
experiences. Chalmers assumes that saying that (a) there is something it is 
like to have an experience is equivalent to saying that (b) experience 
possesses phenomenal qualities, or qualia. Qualia are thought to be intrinsic 
properties of the experience in virtue of which an experience is conscious. 
Snowdon correctly notices that (a) and (b) are far from being simply 
two different wordings for the same idea and that the inference from (a) to (b) 
is fallacious. To avoid the risk of erroneously slipping from (a) to (b), and 
because he doesn’t see much use for (a) anyway, he recommends abandoning 
it altogether. However, we may be wary of the kind of fallacy exemplified by 
Chalmers, but still resist Snowdon’s invitation to dismiss any talk of ‘what-it-
is-likeness’ or ‘phenomenal character’.  
Although it verges on triviality, saying that perceptual experience has a 
phenomenal character might prove useful in formulating a problem and giving 
a name to the subject matter under enquiry. Snowdon is right when he says 
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that affirming that there is something it is like for a subject to have the 
experience she has (or that there is a conscious phenomenal character to her 
experience of which she is subjectively aware) ‘in no way pins down which 
ways are the distinctive ways experiences are’ (Snowdon 2010: 25). However, 
saying so is useful in pinning down precisely what needs further explanation, 
or what needs to be characterised in a more substantive way. Thus, we can 
take talk of ‘phenomenal character’ seriously, at least as a placeholder and 
insofar as it provides a useful shorthand to indicate what it is we need to 
account for—i.e. the distinctive way in which experience strikes one 
introspectively.  
Saying something substantial about the phenomenal character of 
experiences requires answering, among others, the following questions. How 
is the way conscious experience strikes us best described? What are we aware 
of when we experience? What are we aware of when we direct our attention 
to the conscious character of the experience? How does conscious experience 
differ from other types of conscious mental occurrences (such as thought, 
recollection, imagination…)? Do experiences in different sense modalities 
have distinctive phenomenal characters?  
That answering these questions is far from trivial is testified by the fact 
that there is a deep disagreement on all of them. The most significant 
disagreement concerns whether the phenomenal character of experience 
should be accounted for in terms of the obtaining of a relation to objects or is 
determined by features of the experience that the experience can possess 
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independently of the obtaining of a relation to the objects perceived. Among 
those who claim that phenomenal character is to be accounted for in terms of 
the obtaining of a relation, there are further disagreements about the nature of 
the relation and about what the objects of this relation might be. Among those 
who contend that it is to be accounted for in terms of features of the 
experience possessed independently of the obtaining of a relation, there is 
disagreement on what these properties are, the main options being 
representational properties or purely qualitative properties (qualia).  
This gives us four main options when accounting for the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience. Relationalism and sense-datum theory 
both agree that phenomenal character is to be accounted for in terms of a 
relation to certain objects, but they disagree about the nature of those objects. 
Representationalists and qualia theorists agree that phenomenal character is to 
be accounted for in terms of properties that the experience possesses 
independently of the obtaining of a relation, but they disagree about the nature 
of these properties.  
Most accounts of the conscious character of perception take either of 
these options, although the four options are not exclusive and do not exhaust 
the logical space.4 Mixed views are also possible. In particular, among those 
                                                 
4
 Martin argues that two questions define the complete set of options for views 
about the nature of phenomenal character:  
‘On the one hand, they are concerned with what can be present to the 
mind: can the presented elements in experience exist independently of 
our awareness of them? On the other hand, they are concerned with the 
manner or mode in which objects are presented to one in having 
experience: can the presented elements of experience be so presented as 
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who claim that phenomenal character depends on non-relational properties of 
the experience, some think that both types of properties (representational and 
purely qualitative) play an explanatory role. Moreover, there might be 
disagreement as to how to classify certain specific proposals that more or less 
explicitly aim to reconcile different views. 5  We couldn’t explain this 
disagreement if, as suggested by Chalmers and others, it was part and parcel 
of the notion of phenomenal character that it is constituted by intrinsic 
qualitative properties of the experience.6  
 
1.2 How Experience Strikes Us 
Far from being an innocuous implication of the obvious fact that 
experiences have a phenomenal character, then, the claim that an experience 
                                                                                                                               
not to require their actual existence for one’s experience to be so’ (Martin 
1998). 
These questions generate four options, but since the type of properties constituting 
phenomenal character are not mutually exclusive, this generates fifteen possible 
accounts of perception.  
5
 McDowell (2013), Schellenberg (2013; 2014), and Logue (2014), for instance, 
argue that perceptual experience can have both a relationalist form, as relationalism 
tells us, and have representational content, as representationalism tells us. Whether 
these proposals really manage to reconcile the fundamental commitments of both 
relationalism and representationalism is a controversy I will not discuss here. 
6
 For those who believe that phenomenal character is, by definition, determined by 
intrinsic properties of experience, the debate over phenomenal characters takes the 
form of knowing whether experiences have qualia in virtue of something else 
(typically, in these debates, this something else is the representational content of the 
experience); or vice-versa, whether the representational content obtains in virtue of 
the purely qualitative phenomenal character. Chalmers (2004) for instance takes for 
granted that perception has both qualitative properties and representational content 
and frames the debate on the nature of phenomenal consciousness in terms of a 
dispute over whether representational content is grounded in qualitative properties or 
vice versa. This way of understanding the debate, however, is partial and, as we have 
seen, there is no reason to restrict it in this way, because nothing in the notion of 
phenomenal character entails that it is to be understood in terms of qualia.  
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is conscious insofar at it possesses certain sensory properties, or qualia, is a 
substantial and controversial theory of how we should understand the 
phenomenal character of experience. According to the qualia theory, the 
phenomenal character of an experience is made up of properties of the 
experience: when I see red, my experience has a sensational property of 
redness. This is made clear in the way Shoemaker defines qualia: 
Qualia, if there are such, are properties of sensations and 
perceptual states, namely the properties that give them their 
qualitative or phenomenal character—those that determine ‘what 
it is like’ to have them. (Shoemaker 1996, 121) 
Similarly, Block (1990; 1996; 2010), who introduces the term ‘mental 
paint’ for the qualia theory, 7  claims that mental paints are ‘qualities of 
perception that are not captured by what one is directly aware of or by 
representational content’ (Block 2010).  
The appeal of this view doesn’t entirely come down to a blatant logical 
fallacy, as Snowdon suggests. The notion of phenomenal character is meant to 
capture that sensory and conscious aspect of an experience that is subjectively 
accessible to one who undergoes the experience. There seems to be a contrast 
between the way one has access to one’s own experiences and how other 
                                                 
7
 Block proudly takes up the term ‘mental paint’ used in a derogatory way by 
(Harman 1990), who, using an argument that refers to the diaphanousness of 
experience noticed by Moore (which I will shortly discuss), claims that introspection 
doesn’t give us access to any ‘mental paint’, meaning by that any intrinsic property 
of the experience beyond those properties that are (re)presented in experience. 
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people have access to them. This contrast seems to amount to the fact only the 
subject who has the experience has access to what it is like to have it 
(although other people may know what it is like to have that kind of 
experience). This privileged access to one’s own mental occurrences is 
customarily called ‘introspection’. In general terms, introspection is simply 
defined as the way one can come to know about one’s own on-going mental 
occurrences in a way that others can’t (I will discuss introspection more 
extensively in chapter 3).  
How introspection should be characterised is very controversial. 
However, it might be tempting to think of introspection as a quasi-perceptual 
monitoring process directed inwards. Locke defines what he calls ‘reflection’, 
by which he means ‘the notice which the mind takes of its own operations, 
and the manner thereof’, as ‘the perception of operations of our own minds 
within us’ and he notices that this faculty, ‘though it be not sense, as having 
nothing to do with external objects […] is very like it, and might properly be 
called internal sense’ (Locke 1690: II.1.iv. Italics in original). Recent 
proponents of a perceptual model of introspection include Armstrong (1981), 
Lycan (1996), Nichols and Stich (2003), and Goldman (2006). 
Other philosophers stress the difference between perception and 
introspection, where the latter is thought to be more immediate than 
perception. Perception, they think, is a mechanism that acts as a mediator 
between us and the object of perceptual awareness; but no such mediation 
exists between us and the conscious mental occurrence when we introspect it: 
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I am aware of the phenomenal character of the experience just in virtue of my 
having it. Either way, both models of introspection invite to think that being 
introspectively aware of the phenomenal character of one’s own experience 
involves attending to certain intrinsic properties that our experience has. 
However, the claim that perception has qualitative properties that 
account for the phenomenal character of the experience and the related claim 
that those properties are accessed when we introspect them have been widely 
criticised. The difficulty for this view is that, if we reflect on our 
introspection, this doesn’t seem to give any support to the view that there are 
intrinsic properties of the experience. When we try to focus introspectively on 
our own perceptual experience, out attentive efforts don’t seem to make us 
aware of any intrinsic properties of the experience. What we seem to be aware 
of are the properties of the objects we perceivethose properties that we 
were perceptually aware of, even before focusing our attention introspectively 
on our experience.  
It is now commonplace in the current literature to refer to these 
observations as revealing the transparency of experience, an expression whose 
introduction is credited to Moore. More, in ‘The Refutation of Idealism’, 
claims:  
[W]hen we refer to introspection and try to discover what the 
sensation of blue is, it is very easy to suppose that we have before 
us only a single term. The term ‘blue’ is easy enough to 
distinguish, but the other element which I have called 
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‘consciousness’—that which sensation of blue has in common 
with sensation of green—is extremely difficult to fix. […] And, in 
general, that which makes the sensation of blue a mental fact 
seems to escape us; it seems, if I may use a metaphor, to be 
transparent-we look through it and see nothing but the blue. […] 
When we try to introspect the sensation of blue, all we can see is 
the blue: the other element is as if it were diaphanous. (Moore 
1903: 446–450).8 
The transparency of experience is invoked by a number of philosophers 
and used to argue for different claims, and it is not always clear whether the 
different descriptions of the transparency of experience describe the same 
feature.9 So we will need to carefully unpick what we can learn about how 
experience strikes us from these remarks.  
Martin notices that, when I stare at a lavender bush, I can do two things. 
I can attend to the colours, shape, and other properties of the lavender bush, 
‘but I can also reflect on what it is like for me now to be staring at the 
                                                 
8
 Moore makes reference to visual perception, but it is implicit in his discussion 
that he aims to extend his remarks to other sensory modalities. In this, he is 
representative of the predominant tendency in philosophy to take visual perception as 
paradigmatic of perceptual experience in general. This might be due to the greater 
importance that normally-abled people seem to attribute to visual perception in their 
daily life, or to the fact that vision seems to directly connect us to surrounding 
objects more than other sense modalities, and thus it is more amenable to supporting 
the kind of view for which philosophical reflection is supposed to cause problems. 
There might be issues with generalizing from visual experience to the other senses, 
but for the purposes of the current discussion I will follow philosophical habit and 
take visual perception to be at least illustrative of perception in general.  
9
 Classic discussions of the transparency of experience are to be found in Harman 
(1990), Martin (2002), Tye (2002), (Siewert (2004).  
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lavender bush’ (Martin 2002b: 380). The shift in focus of attention, however, 
doesn’t seem to bring about any shift in the object of one’s attention:  
When my attention is directed out at the world, the lavender bush 
and its features occupy the centre stage. It is also notable that 
when my attention is turned inwards instead to my experience, the 
bush is not replaced by some other entity belonging to the inner 
realm of the mind in contrast to the dilapidated street in which I 
live. I attend to what it is like for me to introspect the lavender 
bush through perceptually attending to the bush itself while at the 
same time reflecting on what I am doing. So it does not seem to 
me as if there is any object apart from the bush for me to be 
attending to or reflect on while doing this. (Martin 2002b: 380–
381) 
These remarks contain a positive and a negative claim. The positive 
claim says that, when I introspect my experience, I become aware of mind-
independent objects and their properties—the lavender bush out there: the 
very same objects and properties that I encounter when I direct my attention 
to the world. There is, thus, introspective support for the claim that properties 
of the objects I perceive are part of what I become aware of when I introspect 
the conscious character of my experience.  
The negative claim says that, when I introspect my experience, I don’t 
seem to become aware of the properties of my experience independently of 
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becoming aware of the object of my experience and its properties. Notice that 
this negative claim is compatible with saying that there are properties of the 
experience we can attend to. However, we cannot attend to them without 
attending to the properties of the objects we perceive. This suggests that there 
is no positive introspective support for the qualia theory or the idea that 
perception possesses intrinsic qualities.  
Notice that this doesn’t provide a positive ground against the qualia 
theory. It only registers a lack of introspective support for it. The transparency 
of perception is compatible with the claim that, although very difficult or even 
impossible to detect, those intrinsic properties exist. However, any such 
theory will need to explain how it is that the conscious character of an 
experience is constituted by the experience’s possession of certain properties, 
even though we are not aware of them. This is a very serious difficulty, given 
that the phenomenal character is supposed to be the conscious aspect of 
experience, what is subjectively manifest to one when experiencing—and this 
shouldn’t be something that we cannot find in introspection. So, not only is 
the idea that phenomenal characters are to be explained in terms of qualitative 
intrinsic properties of the experience not part and parcel of the notion of 
phenomenal character. There is also lack of introspective support for this 
view.  
Moore makes another interesting remark about how our experience 
strikes us. He establishes that, despite being difficult to fix, there is 
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something, which he calls ‘a sensation’, that is distinctively subjective and 
pertains to the experience one has. He defines this sensation as follows:  
A sensation is, in reality, a case of ‘knowing’ or ‘being aware of’ 
or ‘experiencing’ something. When we know that the sensation of 
blue exists, the fact we know is that there exists an awareness of 
blue. And this awareness is not merely, as we have hitherto seen it 
must be, itself something distinct and unique, utterly different 
from blue: it also has a perfectly distinct and unique relation to 
blue, a relation which is not that of thing or substance to content, 
nor of one part of content to another part of content. […] To be 
aware of the sensation of blue is […] to be aware of an awareness 
of blue; awareness being used, in both cases, in exactly the same 
sense. (Moore 1903: 449) 
In this passage Moore tries to go beyond the transparency of the 
experience and to distinguish some feature of the experience itself. This, 
according to Moore, is something that can be done ‘if we look enough, and if 
we know that there is something to look for’ (Moore 1903: 450). What he 
finds is compatible with the transparency of experience; it is in fact an 
element that is diaphanous (and indeed might explain why experience seems 
diaphanous), but can nonetheless be detected. Moore notices that reflection on 
our experience reveals something about the nature of the ‘sensation of blue’, 
which today we would call the sensory conscious experience: it is an 
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awareness of blue. By attending to my experience I can become aware of the 
fact that experiencing is an awareness of the blueness of the lavender bush, 
the object of my conscious experience. By introspecting, I become aware of 
the perceptual relation of awareness I stand in with the property. Hence 
Moore’s claim that ‘to be aware of the sensation of blue is […] to be aware of 
an awareness of blue’. Moore claims that, in this sentence, ‘awareness’ is used 
‘in exactly the same sense’, but we might want to be more careful and draw a 
distinction here. When I reflect on my experience, I find the object of the 
experiencein Martin’s example, the lavender bush and its properties. I also 
find that my experience of the lavender bush seems to amount to a relation of 
awareness. While I perceive the lavender bush, I do not perceive my relation 
to the lavender bush, but I am nonetheless aware that my experience seems to 
amount to the obtaining of a relation to the lavender bush. So although we are 
aware of the relation of awareness, we are not aware of it in the same way that 
we are aware of the object to which this relation of awareness relates us to 
(see Soteriou 2016: 7 for a similar remark).   
 Some of Moore’s contemporaries make a similar remark and notice 
that, when we reflect on our experience, we seem to become aware of the fact 
that our experience takes the form of a relation of acquaintance (Russell 1992: 
35; Price 1932: 4). Price notes explicitly that the relational nature of the 
experience is supposed to be something for which there is a strong 
introspective support: 
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When I say ‘This table appears brown to me’ it is quite plain that I 
am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness (or equally 
plainly with a pair of instances when I see double). This cannot 
indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and indubitable. 
(Price 1932: 63) 
If we reflect on our experience, what having a conscious experience 
seems to amount to is being acquainted with something. Soteriou stresses this 
point when commenting on Moore’s passage:  
One significant aspect of Moore’s discussion is the way in which 
it brings to the fore the idea that sensory experience somehow 
involves some kind of psychological relation of awareness, and 
not simply some psychological event, process, state, or property. 
In this context, to say that the relation of awareness is a 
psychological one isn’t simply to say that one of the relata of the 
relation is a psychological subject—a bearer of psychological 
properties—for there are also non-psychological relations that 
psychological subjects can stand in to things. The suggestion 
appears to be that when one has a sensory experience there 
obtains a distinctive psychological relation that one stands in to 
some sensory quality, where that sensory quality is not a quality of 
the psychological relation. The awareness of blue is not itself 
blue. (Soteriou 2013: 13) 
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The positive transparency claim points out that, when we reflect on our 
experience, we find objects of our experience. The negative transparency 
claim notes that there is no feature of the experience itself to which we can 
attend though introspection independently of attending to the object of the 
experience. This further remark specifies what this feature of the experience 
seems to amount to: a psychological relation to those objects of perception. 
As it is the case for any relation, its obtaining involves the existence of its 
terms, in this case, the conscious subject and the objects perceived. As per the 
negative transparency claim, this relational feature is not something to which 
one can attend without attending to the object to which one is related.  
 
1.3 Relational Views of Phenomenal Character  
Some philosophers have argued that these remarks about how 
experience strikes us when we try to reflect introspectively on it support the 
claim that perception is indeed, as it appears to be, a relation to those objects 
that we appear to perceive.  
Relationalism—also often called ‘naïve realism’—is characterised as 
follows by some of its most prominent proponents: 
[T]he phenomenal character of your experience, as you look 
around the room, is constituted by the actual layout of the room 
itself: which particular objects are there, their intrinsic properties, 
such as color and shape, and how they are arranged in relation to 
one another and to you. (Campbell 2002: 116) 
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A naïve realist view of (entirely veridical) perceptual experience 
is as that of a relation between the perceiver and objects of 
perception. Taking sensory experiences to be events, these objects 
of perception are to be understood as constituents of the event in 
question. The naïve realist supposes it is an aspect of the essence 
of such experiential episodes that they have such experience-inde-
pendent constituents. (Martin 2006: 357)  
The most fundamental characterization of our perceptual relation 
with the physical world is to be given in terms of a relation of 
conscious acquaintance between perceiving subjects and the 
particular mind-independent objects that are presented to them in 
perception. (Brewer 2011: 94)  
 All the authors claim that the phenomenal character of experience 
amounts to the occurrence of a relation to some mind-independent object. 
Campbell doesn’t mention the obtaining of any relation in the quote above; 
however elsewhere he says that the ‘experience of an object is a simple 
relation holding between perceiver and object’ (Campbell 2002: 115). 
Moreover, he claims that the phenomenal character of experience is 
constituted in part by the mind-independent object perceived, where the 
notion of constitution is to be understood as a consequence of the fact that a 
relation occurs: a relation doesn’t obtain without all its relata being in place. 
Thus, we should take the idea that objects are constituents of the phenomenal 
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character of experience to be as fundamental to relationalism as the very 
claim that it involves the obtaining of a relation. Because of this relation of 
constitution, as Martin makes explicit, ‘one could not have had such a kind of 
event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be 
apprehended’ (Martin 1997: 56). 
The idea that the phenomenal character of a perception is determined by 
the obtaining of a relation in which the mind-independent object is ‘made 
available’ (Campbell 2002: 131), and where external objects and their 
properties ‘shape the contours of the subject’s conscious experience’ (Martin 
2004: 64) explains the introspective datum of Transparency. When we 
introspect, we find the properties of mind-independent objects because 
experiencing them amounts to becoming aware of objects and their properties. 
So, although the redness of the tomato is not a property of the experience, it 
determines what it is like to have the experience (at least in part) in virtue of 
being the relatum of the relation of awareness that is occurring. When one 
introspects, one doesn’t find intrinsic properties because the relation involved 
is, as Brewer says, fundamental: it doesn’t obtain in virtue of something else 
obtaining (e.g. a representational state or the occurrence of a state with 
intrinsic properties).  
By affirming that the phenomenal character of experience is partly 
determined by a relation of awareness to the sort of mind-independent objects 
of which we ordinarily take ourselves to be perceptually aware, relationalism 
differs from sense-datum theories. Sense-datum theories equally maintain that 
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experience is relational and one couldn’t have the conscious experience one 
has if the object one seems to be aware of were absent. However, for reasons 
that will become clear in section 1.5, they do not identify those relata of 
experience with the mind-independent objects of which we seem to be aware.  
 
1.4 Open Questions and Terminological Distinctions 
Invoking the obtaining of a relation to certain objects as constituent of 
the phenomenal character of perceptual experience doesn’t exhaust the 
characterisation of phenomenal character. Many questions remain open, 
leaving scope for disagreement among relationalists over several details.  
One question concerns the kind of ontological entities, if any, that are 
involved in perception, beyond the obtaining of a relation. Most relationalists 
are elusive on this matter, although they generally have implicit underlying 
assumptions about the metaphysics of perception. Campbell (2002) and Fish 
(2009) think that perception is a mental state. Martin, as the quote above 
testifies, thinks perception is an event—although he remains neutral as to 
whether something else is involved. Brewer (2011) seems to think that the 
obtaining of a relation exhausts the ontological status of an experience. 
Soteriou (2013), on the other hand, offers a sophisticated and rich discussion 
of the ontology required to accommodate the conscious character of 
experience, in which he proposes that we see perceptual experiences as 
occurrent states whose obtaining over an interval of time depends 
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constitutively upon the conscious perceptual experiences that one undergoes 
during that time.  
Another open question concerns the nature of the psychological relation 
involved. Generally this is characterised as a relation of acquaintance, of 
awareness, of having the object presented, and so on. The notion of 
acquaintance provides a partial qualification of the nature of the relation. The 
term derives from Russell's (1910) distinction between knowledge by 
acquaintance and knowledge by description and it thus suggests that the 
relation to the object in question is not discursive and is more primitive and 
explanatorily basic than propositional knowledge.  
However, Russell maintains that the relation of acquaintance comes in 
different varieties (Russell 1992). So one might wonder whether there is more 
that one can say about the relation of acquaintance involved in perception—in 
case perception were not the only mental occurrence to display such a 
relation, is there anything that distinguishes it from other forms of 
acquaintance? And are there different forms of acquaintance, according to 
different sense modalities? One question is whether there are further relata 
involved in the experience, over and above the subject and the objects and 
their properties. Both Campbell and Brewer argue that we should think of the 
relation in question as a three-place relation involving a point of view and the 
conditions of observation. Soteriou claims that there are ‘structural features of 
perceptual acquaintance’ that contribute to the phenomenal character of the 
experience, on top of the contribution provided by the objects to which one is 
Chapter 1: The Relational View of Perception 
 
36 
 
related. He claims that those structural features are introspectible, although 
they cannot be introspected ‘without focusing on the objects that one’s 
experience is an experience of’ (Soteriou 2013: 111), and that perceptual 
relations in different sense modalities have different structural features.  
A terminological remark is in order at this point. The terms 
‘relationalism’ and ‘naïve realism’ are often used interchangeably, and Brewer 
uses the term ‘object view’ for a position that, as we have seen, is importantly 
similar to relationalism. Despite the prevalence of the use of the term ‘naïve 
realism’, I prefer ‘relationalism’ and I will use this term consistently from 
now on.  
There are two reasons for this preference. One is that the term 
relationalism better conveys what is crucial to the view: that the phenomenal 
character of perception involves the obtaining of a relation to the objects we 
take ourselves to perceive. The second reason is to avoid possible confusions 
of the view at hand with either naïve realism understood as the purported 
common sense view of perception or direct realism, with which the term 
‘naïve realism’ is often associated. The term ‘naïve realism’ was first 
introduced by proponents of sense-datum theory as a disparaging qualification 
for a view that they attributed to ‘ordinary folk’ (or, as Broad says, in yet 
another instance of philosophical condescension, ‘the unsophisticated’), and 
against which they framed their own positions. The term was subsequently 
proudly rehabilitated by proponents of relationalism such as Martin (1997; 
2000), to mark a continuity with the view attributed, for better or worse, to 
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ordinary folk, in polemic with the traditional philosophical assumption that 
ordinary folk can’t be right.10 However, the association with common sense 
realism, whatever that means, is potentially misleading.  
First, it is doubtful that anything like a coherent view of perception can 
be attributed to common sense. If there is a common sense view of 
perception, it is likely to be a nebulous amalgam of possibly conflicting 
intuitions about various aspects of a subject matter—which is precisely how 
pre-theoretical intuitions about things are, and precisely why we need to 
theorise about them to see through them and reach a coherent picture. On the 
contrary, relationalism employs sophisticated philosophical notions that are 
far from naïve. Moreover, the idea that one can identify some neutral pre-
theoretical intuitions held by non-philosophers that are somehow not already 
influenced by the theoretical framework prevailing in the scientific and 
philosophical community and which permeate mass culture relies on a very 
simplistic understanding of belief-formation among the general publica 
view that has long been challenged by historical and anthropological studies 
and by recent psychological studies showing the cultural variability of 
people’s intuitions.11  
                                                 
10
 Martin also introduces the term ‘naïve realism’ as an alternative to the prevailing 
‘direct realism’, which he finds confusing and inadequate to capture the relevant 
matter of disagreement among competing views (see footnote 13).  
11
 The cultural variability of reported intuition across different groups is often used 
by proponents of experimental philosophy as an argument against armchair 
philosophy (Machery et al. 2004; Weinberg, Nichols, and Stich 2001). For responses 
to this line of argument, see Sosa (2007) and Deutsch (2010). Whatever one thinks of 
the merits of Sosa’s and Deutsch’s defences of armchair philosophy, we shouldn’t be 
worried about cultural variations in intuition undermining the kind of philosophical 
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Secondly, abiding to whatever ‘unsophisticated folk’ think about a 
subject matter shouldn’t be a reason to take pride (nor shame, contrary to 
what many philosophers, Hume and Descartes in primis, imply) in 
philosophical theoriesand certainly relationalism doesn’t aim to do so. 
Relationalism rather aims to provide an account of experience that ‘best 
articulates how sensory experience seems to us to be through reflection’ 
(Martin 2006: 254). But providing an account that bests articulates how 
experience strikes us should be the aim of any account of the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experiencethis is almost tautological. The 
relationalist’s proposal is that it does so better than its opponents, and the 
arguments it uses to show this largely rely on evidence that is available to the 
‘unsophisticated’ as well as to the smartest of philosophers. In this sense, 
relationalism is closer to common sense than the competing views: it is 
primarily concerned with getting phenomenological, intuitive, and 
introspective data right, rather than reflecting on alleged problems arising 
from philosophical reflection, and hence it is less revisionary, avoiding the 
need to claim that the way our experience strikes us is fundamentally 
misleading with regard to its nature—although relationalism also has some 
                                                                                                                               
project with which we are preoccupied here—clearly an instance of armchair 
philosophy. Relationalism doesn’t rely on intuitions of the kind tested by 
experimental philosophers, such as intuitions on Gettier cases and on reference. What 
relationalists take as motivations for their position is reflection about how experience 
strikes us, which relies on introspection, rather than intuitions.  
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counterintuitive implications, as we shall see later in this chapter and in the 
next.12  
Sense-datum theorists often used the term ‘naïve realism’ as an 
equivalent of ‘direct realism’, the view that in perceptual experience we are 
directly aware of physical objects, as opposed to non-physical entities that 
mediate our perceptual contact with those objects. Although relationalism 
might be seen as committed to direct realism—provided that one accepts the 
terms of the debate between direct and indirect perception13—, this view is 
not specifically a view about the phenomenal character of perception, so it 
can be held by proponents of competing views of what accounts for the 
phenomenal character of experience, such as representationalism.  
 
 
                                                 
12
 Martin concedes that relationalism also has to be revisionary to some extent and 
claims that ‘we are mislead about the nature of some of our experiences by 
introspection’ (Martin 2002: 421), but it is less revisionary because it is in a position 
to maintain that introspection is right most of the time and does not fail us 
systematically.  
13
 Austin (1962) famously argued that the contrast between direct and indirect 
realism is spurious and misleading and should be rejected. Many have accepted 
Austin’s criticism and have advocated the distinction, others have kept using it as if 
the criticism had never appeared (and are largely responsible for the conflation of 
direct realism, naïve realism and relationalism. Others have tried to rehabilitate the 
distinction, showing that there are coherent and significant ways of understanding the 
contrast between direct and indirect objects of perception. Among the latter are 
(Snowdon 1992) and Martin (2006; 2016). Although he argues that the debate over 
the direct object of perception is an intelligible and interesting one, Martin does not 
recommend that philosophers keep using the contrast direct/indirect realism, as the 
same concerns at the core of that debate—how to account for the way in which 
experience strikes us—are better addressed in other terms. The contrast between 
direct and indirect objects of perception is useful as long certain assumptions that 
motivate the sense-datum theory are in place (as I will discuss in the next chapter), 
but as soon as we question those assumptions, the contrast becomes void (Martin 
2016). 
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1.5 A Problematic Reasoning 
Despite this initial appeal, relationalism has emerged as an articulate 
philosophical option only recently—while sense-datum theories, 
representationalism, and qualia theories have dominated the debate over the 
last century—and still meets strong resistance. The resistance arises from 
what Valberg (1992a; 1992b) calls ‘the puzzle of experience’, which takes the 
form of an antimony. According to Valberg, there are two apparently perfectly 
adequate ways in which we can reflect on our experience. 
On the one hand, we can be ‘open to our experience’, as we have done 
so far: we can reason on how experience strikes us introspectively and 
consider the best way to accommodate the phenomenology thus revealed. As 
we have seen, if we are open to how experience strikes us, we are led to think 
of experience as a relation to the objects that surround us: the lavender bush 
down the street, the computer on the desk, and so on.  
  On the other hand, we can also adopt another—according to Valberg 
equally adequate—approach to our experience. We can reason about it and the 
possibility entailed by what we know about experience. If we follow a certain 
line of reasoning, we find ourselves compelled to deny that perception 
amounts to a relation to the objects that we ordinarily take ourselves to be 
perceiving. For the time being, we can abstract away from the specific line of 
reasoning that leads Valberg to this conclusion—I will say something more 
about it in chapter 5—and focus on the general structure of the argument, an 
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argument that has been proposed in many versions since Hume (although 
precursors of it date back to Phyrronian scepticism).14 
This reasoning works as a reductio ad absurdum of the idea that one is 
perceptually related to the objects one takes oneself to be perceiving. The 
argument has two steps: a base case and a spreading step (see Snowdon 
1992). The base case establishes that, in a limited range of experiences, one is 
not related to the object one takes oneself to be perceiving: the lavender bush 
at the end of the street and the computer on my desk. The range of the 
experiences considered are cases of illusions and hallucinations, often treated, 
as we shall see in the next chapter, in very similar ways (and sometimes 
phenomena that are not illusory at all, such as cases of conflicting 
appearances and phenomena of refraction, which are lumped together with 
illusions). The spreading step generalises this conclusion to all cases of 
experience, including those in which the object we take ourselves to perceive 
is indeed present. So, even in the case where the bush is in front of me and my 
experience strikes me as an experience of a lavender bush, it cannot be the 
case that my perception amounts to being related to the lavender bush.  
As Valberg notices, what makes this reasoning so problematic is not 
simply that it compels us to reject a view, namely relationalism, to which we 
might be attracted. The problem is that it leads to a conclusion that contradicts 
what we have always known to be true of our experience. One is faced with 
an argument that forces one to concede that that thing that one sees is not the 
                                                 
14
 See  Martin (2016).  
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lavender bush. But that one sees a lavender bush is a very basic part of what 
one takes experience to be, something that one has always known, even 
before starting doing philosophy, before reflecting on one’s experience and 
what one can know about it through introspection.  
This puts one in a paradoxical situation: if one accepts the conclusion of 
this problematic reasoning, one is prevented from believing what one already 
knows about one’s experience: that it relates us to those objects that 
experience seems to present to us. One would be forced to accept that what 
one sees is not that very object that one takes oneself to be perceiving and 
with which one seems to interact in one’s daily life, but something else,15 
another object whose properties are still mysterious to one—or maybe nothing 
at all. But this, according to Valberg, is unacceptable: as soon as one considers 
the conclusion of the problematic reasoning, one is bound to protest:  
But wait, this object is a book. The object present to me when I 
look at the book on the table is the book on the table. There is 
nothing else there. Now I realize that, as a contribution to 
philosophy, thoughts of this sort may appear a trifle quick and 
simple-minded; yet it is precisely such thoughts that come over 
me when I reach the conclusion of the problematic reasoning. And 
when they come over me, they totally overcome the conclusion. 
                                                 
15
 In the version of the argument presented by Valberg, it is assumed that one is 
aware of mind-dependent objects. But there are versions of the argument that do not 
make this assumption.  
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The reasoning establishes that this is an internal object [or, in a 
less committal way, not the book]. But it is not. It, this object, is a 
book. What gives me the right to say this? Where is the argument? 
There is no argument. The arguments are all on the other side. I do 
not conclude that the object present to me is a book, but that is all 
I find—the book. (Valberg 1992a: 22. Italic in original).  
While one accepts the conclusion of the problematic reasoning, 
according to Valberg, one also knows that the conclusion is unacceptable, 
because it conflicts with what one knows. But by accepting the conclusion 
one is nonetheless prevented from believing what one knows: one ‘becomes 
closed off from what we know’ (Valberg 1992b: 37). At the same time, one 
both has to accept and cannot accept that what one sees is the book in front of 
one. 
Valberg notes that there are two possible stances that one can take 
towards the antinomy, once it comes into light. One may try to solve it and 
‘demonstrate that the conflict in which it consists is merely apparent’ (Valberg 
1992b: 42). This involves exposing a fallacy in the problematic reasoning. 
Alternatively, one may try to explain the puzzle, in order to explain why 
‘there really is a conflict such as we have described’ (Valberg 1992b: 42). 
 
1.6 The Relationalist’s Commitment to Disjunctivism 
We can see relationalists as trying to solve the puzzle of perception. 
Relationalists are obviously not blind to this problematic reasoning, which has 
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played a central role in shaping the philosophical debate for centuries. On the 
contrary, they are aware that one implication of their view is that ‘one could 
not be having the very experience one has [when genuinely perceiving], were 
the objects perceived not to exist, or were they to lack the features they are 
perceived to have’ (Martin 1997: 93). It is a corollary of relationalism that the 
phenomenal character of perception and that of hallucination, although 
indiscriminable, are different. This view is often called ‘disjunctivism’, as it 
recommends a disjunctive account of experiences: when one has a conscious 
experience, one is either in a psychological relation to mind-independent 
objects, or it only seems to one that one is in a psychological relation to the 
object one takes oneself to be perceiving.  
According to relationalists, when a subject hallucinates, it seems to her 
as if she is having a conscious experience that involves a relation of 
acquaintance to some mind-independent objects and their properties. 
However, she is mistaken: her conscious experience doesn’t have the 
phenomenal character it seems to her to have. When one hallucinates, one is 
not only perceptually misled with respect to the object that perception seems 
to present one with. One is also introspectively mislead with respect to the 
character that one’s experience seems to have. It is in this sense that Martin 
acknowledges that relationalism is to some extent revisionary too. So, 
although relationalists may be seen as solving the antinomy by showing that 
we do not need to accept the conclusion of the problematic reasoning, they 
recognise that there is a tension in the way we think about experience. We 
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need to accommodate both how experience introspectively strikes us and the 
possibility of hallucinations in which one is not related to the objects one 
takes oneself to be perceiving. Accommodating both intuitions cannot be done 
without revising some of the initial intuitions.  
However, Martin thinks that the kind of revision relationalists propose 
is far more innocuous. The revision their opponents propose is committed to 
the claim that we are systematically wrong about how experience strikes us 
introspectively, as it exposes one to Humean scepticism. Hume argues that 
reflections on cases of conflicting appearances lead philosophers to 
‘contradict or depart from the primary instincts of nature, and to embrace a 
new system with regard to the evidence of our senses’ (Hume 1748: 201). But 
when faced with the task of replacing the account immediately suggested by 
reflection on the senses with a new one that takes into account these 
philosophical problems, philosophy finds herself extremely ‘embarrassed’, 
because 
she can no longer plead the infallible and irresistible instinct of 
nature: for that led us to a quite different system, which is 
acknowledged fallible and even erroneous. And to justify this 
pretended philosophical system, by a chain of clear and 
convincing argument, or even any appearance of argument, 
exceeds the power of all human capacity. (Hume 1748: 201) 
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Here Hume introduces a particular form of scepticism about the senses, 
different to the more general Ancient and Cartesian scepticism about 
knowledge of the external world. If philosophical reflection shows us that 
introspection misleads us about the nature of perception and the kind of 
contact to the world that it provides, one can no longer rely on introspective 
reflection on one’s experience to make claims about one’s perception or the 
world we perceive, because the way experience introspectively strikes us has 
been proven erroneous. 
 Martin argues that the revision proposed by the relationalist is 
committed to rejecting the idea that every time experience strikes us 
introspectively as having a certain phenomenal character, then it has it. This 
means denying that introspection of phenomenal characters is infallible, and 
many would argue that this is not revisionary at all, because it was never part 
of our intuitions that introspection is infallible (I will say more about the 
alleged infallibility of introspection in chapter 3). 
Relationalists are primarily concerned with giving an account of 
genuine perceptions that best accommodates how experiences strike us. 
Having to recognise that such an account cannot be straightforwardly applied 
to hallucinations, because other extra-introspective considerations (i.e. 
knowing that no suitable object is present) are to be factored in, seems 
relatively innocuous.  
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1.7 Sense-datum Theories, Representationalism, Qualia Theories 
Those who accept the argument from illusion and hallucination 
involved in the ‘problematic reasoning’ deem this disjunctive corollary of 
relationalism inacceptable. It is part and parcel of the ‘problematic reasoning’ 
that the conclusions reached concerning the base case must spread to all cases 
of perceptual experience. Therefore, most philosophers have sought accounts 
of experience that accommodate the conclusion of this problematic reasoning. 
Thus, they seek an account of the phenomenal character of experience whose 
obtaining doesn’t require the presence of the object. However, by doing so 
they are committed to denying that experience is as it seems to us to be when 
we reflect upon it.  
Some seek to give an account of the phenomenal character of 
hallucination in terms of the obtaining of a relation to sense-data, i.e. objects 
that are different from the objects one takes oneself to be seeing. Although in 
recent debate there is an assumption that sense-data are mind-dependent 
entities (see Robinson 1994; Huemer 2011), when the notion was introduced 
by early 20th century philosophers such as Price, Moore, and Russell, the 
nature of these entities was an open question. The arguments from illusion 
and hallucination were meant to establish only that the objects of which we 
are aware are not objects such as the book, the lavender bush, and the 
computer, that we take ourselves to be perceiving. Whether these sense-
data were mind-dependent, mind-independent, physical (as for Moore 
1926, who considered them to be parts of the surfaces of objects), non-
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physical (Broad 1925; Price 1932), or neither (Russell 1921), was an 
open—often agonizing—question to be adjudicated independently of the 
argument from illusion and hallucination. However they conceived of 
sense-data, these thinkers were committed to denying that perception 
amounted to being related to the object we find when we reflect on our 
experience.  
Representationalists, on the other hand, claim that the phenomenal 
character of the experience is to be accounted for in terms of the 
representational properties of the experience. Representationalists preserve 
the idea that, when one genuinely perceives a lavender bush, one sees a 
lavender bush. However, they forsake the intuition—for which I argued in 
section 1.2—that perception amounts to a relation to the object and as such 
requires the existence of the relata. According to representationalists, we are 
aware of the objects that we find when we introspect our experience, in virtue 
of the structure of perception, which has a distinctive aboutness or intentional 
directedness towards the mind-independent objects. However, the relation of 
intentional directedness—if it is relation at all16—is sui generis, as it doesn’t 
                                                 
16
 Some representationalist deny that perception is relational. Relations, they argue, 
necessarily require the existence of their relata, but intentionality allows an object to 
be ‘present in absence’; hence it doesn’t require the existence of the object presented. 
For instance, Crane recognises that ‘the intentionalist view […] comes with a price. 
For it must deny that perceptual experience is a relation’ and the relationality of 
perception ‘is one of the most obvious and common features of perception.’ (Crane 
2006: 141; see also pages 136–137 for an argument as to why intentionality doesn’t 
involve a genuine relation).  
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require the existence of one of its relata (the object of awareness) in order to 
obtain.  
While sense-datum theorists agree with relationalists in that the 
phenomenal character of perception involves the obtaining of a relation, 
representationalists agree with relationalists that the phenomenal character of 
a genuine perception involves awareness of the objects we seem to perceive 
and nothing else.  
As I briefly mentioned earlier, there are also theories that seek to 
explain the phenomenal character of experience purely in terms of the 
intrinsic qualities of the experience, or qualia. These theories forsake both the 
idea that when we introspect we only find the objects we take ourselves to be 
perceiving and the idea that we seem to be psychologically related to those 
objects.  
Relationalism, by attributing different accounts to the phenomenal 
character of perception and hallucination, has an explanatory advantage over 
these competing views. It doesn’t have to claim that we are systematically 
wrong about how experience strikes us. It remains to be seen if this is a view 
that one can coherently hold or whether the arguments from illusion and 
hallucination succeed in proving it untenable.  
Before proceeding, however, a few further terminological clarifications 
are in order. So far I have used ‘perception’, ‘experience’, and ‘perceptual 
experience’ somewhat loosely and interchangeably. After the introduction of 
the disjunctive view of experience this is no longer possible. To avoid 
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confusion, I will strictly use ‘perception’ to refer to genuine, or veridical 
perception; and ‘experience’ to refer to any sensory experience, including 
perception, hallucination, and illusion.17 
So far, I have also used ‘representationalism’ and ‘intentionalism’ 
synonymouslyas they are often used in the debate. However, there is a 
distinction to be drawn between the general claim that experience possesses a 
representational or intentional content and the claim that the phenomenal 
character of experience depends on its intentional or representational content. 
This distinction is generally captured in the literature—although not 
consistently so—by introducing the following terminological distinction. 
‘Representationalism’ is used for the claim that the phenomenal character of 
experience is to be accounted for exclusively in terms of the experience’s 
representational content. This view is also called ‘pure representationalism’ or 
‘pure intentionalism’. ‘Intentionalism’ is used for the broader claim that 
experience possesses a representational content. For simplicity, I will stick to 
the prevailing convention of calling ‘representationalism’ the claim about 
phenomenal character and ‘intentionalism’ the more general claim.  
This distinction emerged in the context of a debate internal to 
intentionalism. Representationalists argue that the phenomenal character of 
                                                 
17
 Some relationalists, following Travis (2004), deny that perception is evaluable 
for accuracy and hence they refuse to classify experiences as veridical and non-
veridical. Doing so would be a categorical mistake. In this work, I will remain 
neutral as to whether it is possible to evaluate perception for accuracy. Accordingly I 
prefer to avoid commitments to the veridicality of perception and talk instead of 
‘genuine perception’. Nothing of what I say will hinge on this, which is simply a 
terminological choice to avoid commitment to a claim to which I don’t need to 
commit. 
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experience is exhausted by its representational content (see Tye 1992; 1995; 
2002; Thau 2002; Byrne 2001), while others argue that there are some aspects 
of the phenomenal character of perception that are not determined by the 
representational content that should be accounted for in terms of the 
experience’s possession of qualia (see Peacocke 1983; Block 1996; 2003; 
2010; Shoemaker 1990; 2001). However, it is worth noticing that 
relationalism is compatible with intentionalism: relationalists may accept that 
representational content has some explanatory role to play in perception. This 
explanatory role might contribute to other aspects of experience, like its 
functional role. It is also in principle possible to maintain that representational 
contents contribute to some extent to the phenomenal character of the 
experience, provided one preserves the main relationalist claim that the 
phenomenal character of an experience is partly constituted by some mind-
independent object and would thus not be what it is in the absence of suitable 
objects. It is not clear, on the other hand, that relationalism is compatible with 
representationalism, as the latter seems committed to the idea that the 
phenomenal character of experience is solely determined by its 
representational content, in such a way that two experiences can have the very 
same phenomenal character whether or not the relevant object is present.  
 
1.8 Conclusions 
I have argued that relationalism provides a straightforward and non-
revisionary account of certain features of perceptual experience, while the 
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main competing views have to provide a revisionary account of some aspects 
of how experience strikes us. This doesn’t mean that they fail to accommodate 
it—although they ought to provide an explanation of why experience seems to 
be systematically different from how it is and why reflection on experience 
throws us into the paradoxical situation described by Valberg, once we accept 
the consequence of the problematic reasoning. On the other hand, the viability 
of relationalism will depend on their ability to resist the conclusion of the 
problematic reasoning.  
In this chapter I have only sketched the general lines of this problematic 
reasoning: since there are certain experiences for which relationalism is false, 
and we have compelling reasons to apply the same account across all cases of 
perception, relationalism should be rejected. As we shall see in the next 
chapter, proponents of the argument do not always present it in a detailed and 
clear manner. Reconstructing the forms of reasoning and the assumptions 
underlying the problematic reasoning and identifying a version of the 
argument that really poses some threat to relationalism will occupy us for the 
entirety of the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2: The Argument from Hallucination 
 
 
 
 
In the previous Chapter we have seen that, despite its initial appeal, 
relationalism is often considered a non-starter in virtue of what Valberg 
calls the ‘problematic reasoning’, featuring one or another version of the 
argument from illusion or hallucination. Towards the end of the last chapter 
I observed that, although the argument has been presented in various forms 
throughout several centuries, it is often difficult to understand precisely 
what the premises involved are supposed to be and what form the reasoning 
takes, so much so that Dummett suggested that the so-called ‘argument’ is 
not an argument at all, but rather a starting point indicating the need to 
explain how illusions are possible, how it is possible for things to appear 
other than they are.
18
  
However, although often incomplete and unsatisfactory, 
reconstructions of the argument abound both among early modern 
proponents of mental representations (Hume 1748) and the sense-datum 
                                                 
18
 ‘We commonly employ a distinction between how things appear and how they 
really are; and it is therefore natural to push this distinction to its limit. This seems 
to me the best way in which to view the so-called ‘argument from illusion’. If this 
is regarded as an argument, properly so called, with premisses and a conclusion, it 
is difficult to make out what are the premisses and what the conclusion. Rather, it 
is a starting-point’ (Dummett 1979: 2).   
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theorists (Russell 1912, Ayer 1940, and more recently Robinson 1994 and 
Foster 2000), as well as among those who have reconstructed the argument 
in order to respond to it (Snowdon 1992; 2005a; French and Walters 
forthcoming among others).  
In this chapter I will unpack the argument, by spelling out its structure 
and its not always explicit premises. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the argument has two steps: a base case and a spreading step. Those 
steps need to be carefully examined separately. First, I will ask whether we 
can establish that, in some cases, a relationalist account cannot be true, and 
if so, what the cases are for which this can be established. Then I will 
consider the arguments put forward to spread this conclusion to all cases.  
Before starting assessing the argument, a clarification is in order. 
Traditionally, the argument was not directed against relationalism, rather 
direct realism. Because of the prevalence of epistemological concerns in 
those debates, asking whether perception really puts us in contact with the 
objects that we take to exist in the world around us had priority over the 
question of whether objects play a role in determining the phenomenal 
character of perception. This is not to say that the two questions are not 
connected, and that concerns about the characterization of the conscious 
character of experience did not feature in these debates. Early sense-datum 
theorists, at least, were very concerned with how experience strikes us, as 
my discussion in the first chapter, largely indebted to Moore, shows. 
However, the argument can be turned against relationalism. If we are not 
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directly aware of physical objects, it cannot be the case that the phenomenal 
character of perception is constituted by those objects. This explains why 
the relationalist account of experience failed to emerge until very recently, 
when many objections to this traditional argument from illusion emerged.19 
Moreover, the argument didn’t only aim to show that we do not 
directly or immediately perceive material or physical objects around us. It 
also concluded that instead, we are only aware of mental representations of 
them (Hume) or sense-data (Moore, Russell, Broad, Price). So there is a 
negative and a positive conclusion to the argument. The negative conclusion 
claims that the direct object of perception is not what we initially take it to 
be. The positive conclusion claims that what we are in fact related to are 
sense-data or mental representations. For our present purposes, we are 
merely interested in the negative conclusion.  
The aim of this chapter is to formulate a compelling argument that 
targets specifically relationalism. Unpacking the structure of the argument to 
make it valid and unpacking what underwrites the different assumptions will 
require a considerable amount of exegesis. However, I will conclude the 
chapter with a formulation that, it seems to me, seriously threatens to 
                                                 
19
 Early criticism of the argument, pointing out a number of problems in the 
structure of the argument and its implicit and problematic premises, can be found 
in Prichard (1906), Hicks (1912; 1938 Chapter 2), Paul (1951), Barnes (1945), 
Austin (1962), Anscombe (1965) Mainly under the influence of Austin, from the 
Seventies onwards philosophers became quick in dismissing the argument from 
illusion (see for instance Pitcher 1971: 13–20, Jackson 1977: 107; Searle 1983: 61; 
Harman 1990; Tye 1992; Millikan 1991). 
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overturn relationalism. Whether the assumptions involved really are to be 
accepted will be a question for the rest of this thesis. 
 
2.1 The Base Case: Conflicting Appearances, Illusions and 
Hallucinations 
The first part of the argument seeks to establish that, for some base case, the 
phenomenal character of experience cannot be accounted for in terms of the 
obtaining of a psychological relation to the objects we seem to perceive. 
Traditional presentations of the argument lump together different cases, to 
which the term of ‘illusion’ is often applied indiscriminately: (1) cases of 
conflicting appearances, (2) optical illusions, and (3) hallucinations.  
 I will consider these three groups separately and examine how, for 
each case, the argument attempts to demonstrate that relationalism is 
untenable.  
 
2.1.1 Conflicting Appearances and Paradigmatic Looks 
Most of the examples featuring in presentations of the argument from 
illusion by sense-datum theorists are cases of conflicting appearances: cases 
in which an object appears to have different properties to different subjects 
or to the same subjects in different conditions. These experiences are very 
common and involve ordinary optical phenomena such as refraction, 
perspectival changes, and changes in lighting conditions. For instance, in his 
presentation of the argument from illusion, Ayer mentions: a coin which 
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looks circular from one point of view and elliptical from another; a straight 
stick which appears bent when it is seen in water; mirror images; mirages; 
change in the experienced taste of food due to the condition of the palate; 
subjective change in perceived temperature; and a coin which seems larger 
when it is placed on the tongue than when it is held in the palm of the hand 
(Ayer 1940: 3).  
Hume also presents the argument from illusion using a case of 
perspectival change: 
The table, which we see, seems to diminish, as we remove 
farther from it: but the real table, which exists independent of 
us, suffers no alteration: it was, therefore, nothing but its image, 
which was present to the mind. (Hume 1748: 201) 
For simplicity, and to avoid problems that are not central to the 
argument from illusion, we may replace Hume’s dynamic property with a 
static property, such as having a certain colour.20 So we can use the example 
of seeing a white table under a light that makes it appear yellow. I will also 
focus only on the negative conclusion that we do not perceive the table, 
disregarding the positive proposal that Hume aims to establish: i.e. that what 
we perceive instead is a mental image. This gives us the following, very 
simple, argument (see Snowdon 1992: 70):  
                                                 
20 
As Snowdon notices, the assumption that there is a persistent external object 
seems to depend on the thesis that we directly perceive an external object—a thesis 
that the argument is designed to reject (see Snowdon 1992: 74).  
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1. Whatever I perceive is yellow; 
2. The physical table is not yellow; 
3. (from 1 and 2) What I perceive is different from the physical table.  
Robinson claims that the argument is valid, as the conclusion follows 
from the two premises in virtue of Leibniz’s Law (Robinson 1994: 32). 
However, in a forthcoming paper, French and Walters (forthcoming), 
drawing on a remark by (Snowdon 1992: 74), argue that the argument, as it 
is presented, is invalid. The conclusion doesn’t follow from the two 
premises only in virtue of Leibniz’s law. What follows from Leibniz’s Law 
is simply that the yellow object is not the physical table, but this is 
compatible with one seeing the yellow object and the table. In order for the 
argument to be valid, one needs to add a further premise, which Snowdon 
calls the ‘Uniqueness Assumption’. The ‘Uniqueness Assumption’ claims 
that:  
(UA): ‘there is, in a particular direction of attention, as it were, a 
unique, single, [directly] perceivable thing’ (Snowdon 1992: 
74). 
 Snowdon finds the principle quite plausible, but French and Walters 
argue that the Uniqueness Principle, as it stands, is clearly false, because it 
entails that if one seems to see a wall behind a table that appears yellow 
when it is in fact white, one should conclude that one doesn’t see the wall 
either, which seems hard to defend. The Uniqueness Principle also claims 
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more than what the base case aims—and needs—to establish, for the base 
case seeks only to establish that one is not aware of the object one putatively 
sees as yellow (the physical table), not that one is not aware of any physical 
object. Craig and Walters replace the Uniqueness Principle with a principle 
in the vicinity, the ‘Exclusion Principle’:  
(EP): If in an illusion S is aware of an object which is non-identical to 
the ordinary object O that the subject is putatively perceiving in an 
illusory way, then S is not aware of the ordinary object O.  
Contrary to the Uniqueness Principle, this principle is not obviously 
false, but—Craig and Walters argue—it is not obviously true either. They 
consider possible justifications for the Exclusion Principle, including the 
idea that the object one directly perceives spatially excludes or occludes the 
physical object, but they conclude that none of these reasons is conclusive.21 
In this context we don’t need to establish whether the ‘Exclusion Principle’ 
should be accepted. It is enough to notice that the argument, as it is 
generally presented, is invalid, and that the further premise that needs to be 
added is far from obvious and a satisfactory justification for it has yet to be 
provided. Due to the widespread failure to recognise the need of such a 
further premise little or no attempt has been made to justify it yet.  
Even if one accepts the Exclusion Principle, one might still take issue 
with the first premise. It is not obvious—a relationalist may say—that the 
                                                 
21 
See O’Shaughnessy (1984; 2000) for another argument for the claim that seeing 
sense-data doesn’t exclude seeing other entities.  
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first premise is true. It is not clear that, when I look at the white table 
showered with yellow light, I see something yellow, and I do not see 
something white. Austin (1962) famously pushed this line. He argued that 
describing phenomena of refraction, perspectival changes and changes in 
illumination as ‘illusion’ is misleading. The ordinary notion of ‘illusion’ 
suggests the idea of being mislead by experience,22 while most of these 
cases are ‘too familiar’ (Austin 1962: 3-26) to be misleading. Beyond the 
critique of the terminological choice, there is a substantive point in Austin’s 
critique. The argument describes the experience of seeing the white table 
under a yellow light as a case where one sees a yellow table and doesn’t see 
a white table. But this is not how things look to us. This description is 
misleading, as it ignores completely the very well established phenomenon 
of perceptual constancy. Throughout the day, I see my white desk under all 
sorts of lighting conditions: under the bright white daylight, under the 
yellow light of my desk lamp, in the dusk, and so on. On all occasions, the 
table looks white to me. Also, when the table in unevenly illuminated, all 
                                                 
22 
Austin is not committed to the claim that the ordinary notion of illusion entails 
the idea of perception deceiving us. On the contrary, he criticises the extensive use 
of the metaphor that perception misleads us, while stressing that it is a misleading 
metaphor, because the senses do not tell us anything, either true or false (see 
Austin (1962: 11) and Travis (2004) for a discussion). The point here is that the 
proponents of the argument not only take the metaphor of being mislead by the 
senses too seriously, but they also trade on an ambiguity, applying it to cases where 
the metaphor certainly doesn’t apply. Paradigmatic cases of appropriate use of the 
metaphor of being misled by the senses are cases of optical illusions and illusions 
produced by professional illusioners (Austin 1962: 22). Austin sees the attempt to 
extend the (already possibly misleading) metaphor to all cases of conflicting 
appearances as a disingenuous rhetorical device.  
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parts of it still look white. Additionally, it is a well-known fact that coloured 
light casts shadows of a complementary colour.  
The same phenomenon of perceptual constancy applies to many other 
properties: size, shape, volume of sounds, etc. Consider the example used 
by Hume. When I look at the table from different distances, the table 
appears the same size, even though the retinal image of the table varies in 
size as I move back and forth. It doesn’t look as if the table changes size as I 
move around it. If it did, the world would appear a buzzing, blooming, 
incoherent flux of ever changing colours, shapes and sounds, and it 
wouldn’t seem to us in the first place, as Hume admits, that we see a table, 
an object that seems to be independent of our perceiving it and which 
doesn’t constantly change size. So there wouldn’t be a tension between how 
experience strikes us—as an experience of the table, which doesn’t 
constantly change size—and what we learn about it after reflection on 
perspectival variations—that it is an experience of an ever-changing storm 
of properties, something different from the table we seem to perceive.     
Thus, relationalists claim that they can provide an alternative and 
better account of these experiences than that suggested by the proponents of 
the argument. Brewer, for instance, claims that perceptual experience is a 
triadic relation where the third relatum is made up by the circumstances 
involved in experience, including the subject’s point of view. As we have 
seen in the previous chapter, this is a very widespread way of conceiving the 
relation in place in perception among relationalists. For instance, although 
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Campbell (2002) doesn’t explicitly engage with the argument from illusion, 
he equally commits to a similar triadic relation. This triadic relation 
accounts for the fact that in some sense the table appears yellow, and still 
appears white in some other sense. The way the table appears is a function 
of the colour property possessed by the object, the colour of the light, and 
my position relative to it.  
Brewer’s account of illusions builds on the idea that there are looks 
that are attributed to objects relatively to the conditions of observation. 
When one experiences a table as yellow, when it is in fact white, the table 
one is perceptually related to presents the look of paradigmatic yellow 
things, given one’s viewpoint and relevant circumstances. A white ball in 
red lighting conditions looks red because it looks the way paradigmatic red 
objects look in ordinary conditions. A straight stick halfway submerged in 
water looks crooked because it looks the way paradigmatic crooked objects 
look in ordinary conditions (Brewer 2008; 2011). 
Martin gives a similar account of the immersed stick that looks bent:  
In a circumstance in which one did confront a bent stick in good 
lighting, a paradigmatic circumstance for encountering the shape 
of being bent, one would be inclined to recognize the object as 
being bent; it would strike one as similar to bent things, and one 
would find in it an obvious similarity with bent things and a 
contrast with other shapes. If the psychological situation a 
subject is in when he or she truly utters [‘The stick looks bent to 
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me’] is relevantly similar to this paradigm kind of circumstance, 
then the subject is inclined to find the shape before one as 
similar to the paradigm of bent things—as more like being bent 
than anything else. (Martin 2010: 214–215) 
For Martin, when we see a straight stick submerged in water, the 
visually basic properties (what he calls its look) that the stick really 
possesses are manifest to us. The stick looks bent because, in the current 
circumstances (when the stick is half-submerged in water), the visual 
properties that the stick possesses are similar to the characteristic look of 
bent things. The stick looks like straight sticks look in water, which is in 
many respects like bent things look. However, they do not look exactly like 
typically bent things.  
 
2.1.2 Optical Illusions and the Phenomenal Principle 
At this point the proponent of the argument from illusion may concede that 
the cases presented above are not cases of illusion, and that by saying that 
one doesn’t see the whiteness of the table, but sees the instantiation of 
yellowness, one misdescribes the phenomenon. However, there are genuine 
cases of illusion, cases where something really looks to have a property it 
doesn’t have and doesn’t seem to have the properties it actually has. This is 
something even Austin acknowledges: there are genuine cases of illusions, 
such as optical illusions (Austin 1962: 22). These cases might involve the 
same kind of phenomena involved in the cases mentioned above, such as 
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perspectival change, but are situations artfully created in order to mislead 
the observer. An example is the class of anamorphic trompe-l’oeil: 
anamorphic bidimensional pictures that, seen from a certain angle, look like 
tridimensional objects. Another example is the class of anamorphic 
sculptures, where a tridimensional object looks to have a certain shape that 
in fact it doesn’t have (say, that of a cube, or a human face, or a telephone) 
only when seen from a certain perspective.
23
 Another example is the class of 
optical illusions like the Müller-Lyer diagram, in which there are two lines 
of the same length, one with hashes at the end of the line directed inwards 
and the other with hashes directed outwards. The line with the hashes 
directed outwards looks longer than the one with the hashes directed 
inwards.  
In cases of optical illusion, it is not possible to reject the first premise 
by saying that it relies on a misdescription of the phenomenon. The 
argument can then be restated with the proper kind of case: 
1. When I look at the Müller-Lyer diagram, I am aware of some 
things that are different in length; 
2. In the Müller-Lyer diagram the lines are not different in length; 
3. What I am aware of are not the lines of the Müller-Lyer diagram. 
However, it has been argued that the first premise is still suspect. Why 
should one accept that I am aware of things that are different in length? As 
                                                 
23
 Among the many artists who exploit anamorophosis in their sculptural work, 
see the work of Jonty Hurwitz and William Kentridge for examples.  
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we saw in the previous section, it seems possible to account for something's 
looking F without assuming that something actually instantiates the property 
F. Some relationalists apply the account sketched above to cases of optical 
illusions. Brewer, for instance, applies his account to optical illusions such 
as the Müller-Lyer diagram. Here one cannot say that the lines in the 
Müller-Lyer diagram seem to be in one sense of the same length and in 
another sense of different lengths. One line just looks longer than the other, 
even if we know that the lines have the same lengths. But for Brewer this 
misleading appearance can be explained, like the cases discussed above, in 
terms of a triadic relation, where the way the object look is a function of the 
property of the object, the subject perceiving it, and the subject’s position 
relative to the object and other factors concerning the conditions of 
observation:  
The [Müller-Lyer] diagram is visually-relevantly similar to a 
pair of lines, one longer and more distant than its plane, one 
shorter and less distant—a paradigm of inequality in length. It is 
therefore perfectly intelligible how someone seeing it might take 
that very diagram as consisting of unequal lines, regardless of 
whether she does or not. In this sense: they look unequal in 
length. (Brewer 2008: 172).
24
  
                                                 
24
 It should be noticed that not all relationalists think that this type of relational 
account can be applied to illusions. Some relationalists suggest that we should 
understand illusions in the same way as hallucinations, as experiences that doesn’t 
Chapter 2: The Argument from Hallucination 
 
 
66 
 
 But why, many have wondered, should we accept that there are some 
things that have different lengths? All we know is that the two lines look of 
unequal length. But things, the relationalist can say, can look a certain way 
without being that way. The relationalist can claim that accepting the first 
premise relies on a fallacious inference from ‘The lines seem to differ in 
length’ to ‘there are two things which differ in length’.  This is a very 
familiar objection to the argument from illusion. Many philosophers have 
attributed the acceptance of the first premise to a failure to recognize the 
intentional nature of perceptual experience, which can present properties 
without them being instantiated in any object (see in particular Barnes 1944; 
Anscombe 1965; Harman 1990). This objection led to abandoning the 
sense-datum paradigm in favour of an intentional paradigm in the second 
part of the last Century, together with the dismissal of the argument from 
illusion.  
                                                                                                                            
possess a relational nature, but which only seem to have one. In an early paper, for 
instance, Martin seems to be committed to the idea that relationalism cannot apply 
to illusions, when he claims that: 
 naïve realist account of perceptual experience […] cannot be directly 
applied to any case of delusive experience, such as illusions where one 
does perceive an external object, but misperceives it as other than it really 
is. (Martin 1997: 95) 
The disagreement entails different ways of classifying experiences on one or the 
other side of the disjunction. Whether one embraces a perception/illusion versus 
hallucination or perception versus illusion/hallucination version of disjunctivism 
largely depends on how one spells out the relationalist commitments, for instance 
whether one allows other factors beyond the object and its properties to contribute 
to the phenomenal character of experience, or whether one conceives of the 
relation of acquaintance involved in perception as multi-dimensional (see previous 
chapter for a discussion of some open questions). If one has a definition of 
relationalism that rules out its application to illusions, one should accept the base 
case for illusions and try and block the argument at the level of the spreading step. 
In this case, illusions will pose the same problem that hallucinations pose to 
relationalism, and should be treated in a similar way.  
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However, Robinson argues that it would be wrong to treat acceptance 
of the first premise ‘as little better than a howler’ (Robinson 1994: 54). The 
first premise relies on a principle that its proponents find very intuitive and 
phenomenologically well-motivated. Robinson calls this principle the 
‘Phenomenal Principle’:  
(P): If there sensibly appears to a subject to be something which 
possesses a particular sensible quality then there is something of 
which the subject is aware which does possess that sensible 
quality. (Robinson 1994: 32) 
Although he doesn’t subscribe to the Phenomenal Principle, Martin 
also notices that the Phenomenal Principle shouldn’t be dismissed as the 
sign of the failure of the sense-datum theorists to realise that mental states 
are intentional and thus do not require the existence of the object they refer 
to. This diagnosis of the acceptance of this principle is explnanatorily 
inadequate, for it doesn’t take into account the fact that the sense-datum 
theorists recognise the intentionality of beliefs and the like, while denying 
it, on introspective ground, for the case of perception (Martin 2000: 208). 
Sense-datum theorists think that the Phenomenal Principle is required as 
part of an account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience that 
best accommodates how experience strikes us introspectively. 
So, although some proponents of the argument present the 
phenomenal principle as obvious, something that ‘cannot indeed be proved, 
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but [which] is absolutely evident and indubitable’ (Price 1932: 62), it is best 
understood as motivated on the basis of its explanatory power (see Snowdon 
1992: 73; Martin 2000: 209). The aspect of experience that calls for an 
explanation is tied to an aspect of perceptual experience that I have 
considered in the previous chapter as a motivation for relationalism. I 
noticed that perception strikes us an occurrence that relates us to what we 
seem to perceive, and that the obtaining of a relation involves the existence 
of the terms involved. Sense-datum theorists notice that experience strikes 
us as relational in this way even when it is illusory.  
In the passage by Price that I quoted in the previous chapter, Price is 
implicitly defending not only a relational account of perception, but also the 
Phenomenal Principle: 
 When I say ‘This table appears brown to me’ it is quite plain 
that I am acquainted with an actual instance of brownness (or 
equally plainly with a pair of instances when I see double). This 
cannot indeed be proved, but it is absolutely evident and 
indubitable. (Price 1932: 63) 
Whenever something appears brown to me, there is something which 
is brown that I am aware of, irrespective of whether the object that seems 
brown to me is really brown. The argument against relationalists here could 
take the form of a tu quoque: how can relationalists, of all people, deny the 
Phenomenal Principle, when they are the first to insist that experience 
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strikes us as relational and that this is best explained in terms of experience 
involving the obtaining of a relation?  
The relationalist’s response to this objection could be twofold. First, 
as we have seen in the previous chapter, relationalists admit that they cannot 
provide an account that is entirely non-revisionary. When one undergoes an 
illusion, one precisely has an experience that seems to be different than it is: 
it seems to present an object that instantiates a property, which in fact it 
doesn’t have. But this is precisely what makes them illusions. The 
relatiaonlist, however, preserves the idea that we are perceptually related to 
the object we seem to perceive: in the case of the Müller-Lyer diagram, the 
two lines drawn on the piece of paper in front of me. However, the two lines 
do not instantiate the property that they seem to instantiate.  
Second, the relationalist can argue that, if the sense-datum theorists 
claim to defend the Phenomenal Principle on the grounds that it provides an 
entirely non-revisionary account of illusions, they are deluded. When they 
say that we ought to understand illusion as a case of being related to an 
object that instantiates the property that the object doesn’t have, they might 
well preserve the apparent relationality of illusion (something that, despite 
denying the Phenomenal Principle, the relationalist accommodates too). 
However, they commit themselves to the conclusion that what I am aware 
of when I see the Müller-Lyer diagram are not the lines I see in front of me, 
but some other mysterious entity—be it mind-dependent, mind-independent, 
physical or not. With this commitment, they violate another fundamental 
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aspect of how experience strikes us: it is this object (these lines jotted on the 
piece of paper) that I seem to be related to, not something else, not a sense-
datum. So, at best, they are on a par with relationalists in terms of the 
explanatory power of their respective theory. They are at least equally 
revisionary—although denying that the object I seem to see is the object I 
am really aware of is arguably more revisionary (and more dangerously so) 
that denying that the object I see instantiates the property it seems to 
instantiate.  
Much more needs to be said about a relationalist account of illusions 
in order to make it compelling. The aim of the present discussion is not to 
provide a relationalist account of illusions, but rather to identify how the 
opponent can establish the negative conclusion for the base case. It seems 
that there are a number of problems with trying to establish it for illusion, 
even if cases that are unambiguously illusory, such as optical illusions, are 
selected. The structure of the argument is invalid unless we introduce 
certain assumptions. But these assumptions, namely the Exclusion Principle 
and the Phenomenal Principle, are far from obvious.  
This weakens significantly the force of the argument. As Martin 
(2000: 211) notices, the suasive force of a reductio ad absurdum is 
conditional on the fact that the assumptions made in the argument are more 
convincing and appealing than the claim to be rejected, in this case 
relationalism. So far, it has emerged that, in order to establish the negative 
claim about the base case, a much more complex argument than that 
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initially proposed is required, and that this more complex structure involves 
commitment to assumptions that do not have nearly as much suasive force 
as the thesis the argument is designed to overturn.  
Moreover, with its commitment to the Phenomenal Principle, the 
argument depends on acceptance of the sense-datum theory, a view that is 
largely discredited. We want an argument against relationalism that can also 
be accepted by those who explicitly reject the Phenomenal Principle, such 
as representationalists.  
 
2.1.3 Hallucinations 
When we turn to hallucinations, on the other hand, the base case 
seems very easily established. We do not need the Uniqueness Assumption 
or the Phenomenal Principle to establish it. In the case of hallucination, 
there is no need to introduce any argument at all to establish the negative 
claim of the base case. It is a definitional feature of hallucination that one is 
not aware of a mind-independent object, as hallucinations are conscious 
sensory experiences occurring in the absence of the relevant object. Based 
on this premise, one can also easily establish the truth of a negative claim 
targeting relationalism specifically:  
(NC): The phenomenal character of one’s hallucination is not 
(even partially) determined by the obtaining of a psychological 
relation to the mind-independent object one seems to see. 
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 This simply follows from the fact that, when one hallucinates, there is 
no suitable object in the environment to which one can be related. The 
problematic reasoning, then, should focus on the argument from 
hallucination, as it is the only version of the argument for which the base 
case can be straightforwardly established. Contrary to the argument from 
illusion, the relationalist cannot hope to block the argument at the base case: 
she can only hope to block the spreading step, which is, thus, what we need 
to focus on now. 
 
2.2. The Spreading Step 
The spreading step in the argument from hallucination aims to extend the 
negative conclusion for the base case (that in hallucination the phenomenal 
character of one’s experience is not partly constituted by the mind-
independent object one seems to be presented with) to cases of genuine 
perception. How can the proponent of the argument secure this move?   
The motivation that is generally given for the spreading step is that 
perception and hallucination are phenomenologically alike: both are sensory 
conscious experiences that seem to present objects as if they were in front of 
one. Ayer, for instance, claims: 
When people whose legs have been amputated continue to feel 
pressure upon them, their experience is qualitatively as if 
pressure really were being exerted upon their leg. But, it is 
argued, if, when our perceptions were delusive, we were always 
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perceiving something of a different kind from what we 
perceived when they were veridical, we should expect our 
experience to be qualitatively different in the two cases. We 
should expect to be able to tell from the intrinsic character of a 
perception whether it was a perception of a sense-datum or of a 
material thing. But this is not possible, as the examples that I 
have given have shown. (Ayer 1940: 6) 
We can apply Ayer’s reasoning to spreading the negative interim 
conclusion targeting relationalism. If the phenomenal character of a 
hallucination were constituted by completely different things than the 
phenomenal character of a genuine perception, one should be in a position 
to notice. But one is not: when one hallucinates, one has the same kind of 
experience one would have if one were having a corresponding genuine 
experience. The idea here is that perception and hallucination are 
phenomenologically alike and this phenomenological similarity is supposed 
to ground a unique account of their respective phenomenal characters.  
However, Ayer doesn’t explain why, in the absence of a 
phenomenologically noticeable difference between perception and 
hallucination, one should assume that they merit the same account. As 
common sense tells us, and as Austin (1962: 50) pointed out, mere 
indiscriminability doesn’t entail identity. A lemon and a lemon-shaped soap 
might be indiscriminable without being identical. Why should it be 
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otherwise, when it comes to events like perceiving a lemon and 
hallucinating one?  
Proponents of the argument from hallucination are not so unwary as to 
miss the obvious fact that indiscriminability doesn’t entail identity. Broad, 
for instance, grants that it would be logically possible to admit that 
hallucinations do not put one in a relation to any physical, mind-
independent objects and yet to maintain that in the perceptual case a relation 
of acquaintance to a physical, mind-independent object obtains—which 
wouldn’t be a possibility if the entailment held. However, he still maintains 
that ‘such a doctrine would be utterly implausible and could be defended 
only by the most desperate special pleading.’ (Broad 1952: 9). 
Unfortunately, however, when it comes to explaining why this view is 
implausible, he doesn’t provide any further reason than their resemblance 
and a ‘continuity between the most normal and the most abnormal cases of 
seeing’ (Broad 1952: 36–37). 
Because the simple indiscriminability of perception and hallucination 
is not enough to justify the idea that perception and hallucination involve 
the same kind of experience and deserve the same account, there must be 
some other assumption that motivates the spreading step. Hinton (1967b; 
1967a; 1973) argues that the idea that perception and hallucination deserve 
the same account derives from a misunderstanding of the implications of the 
quite trivial linguistic fact that there are what he calls ‘perception-illusion 
disjunctions’.  
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Although Hinton uses the term ‘illusions’, what he really has in mind 
are hallucinations, his favourite example being that of phosphenes, which he 
defines as ‘an illusion of a flash of light, which you get when an electric 
current is passed through your brain in a certain way’ (Hinton 1967b: 65). 
To avoid confusion, then, and to conform to the discussion of the argument 
from hallucination, I will systematically replace ‘illusion’ with 
‘hallucination’ when reporting Hinton’s view. 
Perception-hallucination disjunctions are sentences like:  
(a) I see a flash of light or I (only) seem to see a flash of light; 
(b) I see a flash of light or I have a hallucination of doing so; 
(c) I see a flash of light or I have a hallucination of seeing one.  
 (a), (b), and (c) are equivalent. 
According to Hinton, that there are perception-hallucination 
disjunctions is ‘certain’ (Hinton 1973: 37) and innocuous. Hence, Hinton 
accepts that the truth of ‘I have an experience of x’ is entailed by both the 
truth of ‘I see an x’ and ‘I hallucinate an x’. Perception-illusion disjunctions, 
like any disjunctive claim, are true if either one or the other of the disjuncts 
is true. 
This gives them a relative incorrigibility that the two disjuncts taken 
in isolation do not have. We can say for instance:  
d) I am inclined to believe that I see a flash of light.  
By this I mean that I believe that I see a flash of light but it is possible 
in fact that I am hallucinating one.  
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We can also say:  
e) I am inclined to believe that I hallucinate a flash of light.  
A subject undergoing an experimental test in a psychological 
laboratory during which alternatively she is presented with flashes of light 
and electric currents are passed through her brain, might claim (e), implying 
that she thinks she now has a phosphene, but without excluding the 
hypothesis that a real flash of light is being presented to her. By contrast, it 
doesn’t make sense to claim ‘I am inclined to believe that (a) I see a flash of 
light or I (only) seem to see a flash of light’. I can doubt whether I am in the 
situation described by either the first or the second disjunct, but I cannot 
doubt whether I am in either one case or the other.  
That perception-illusion disjuncts are relatively incorrigible, Hinton 
notices, is a platitude. However, many philosophers take the relative 
incorrigibility of these disjunctive claims to show that, whenever one 
perceives, the same type of psychological event is going on: an experience, 
whose occurrence makes true the disjunctive claim. Many philosophers 
assume that whenever a perception-illusion disjunction is true, something 
happens, something that occurs when I either perceive or I hallucinate: I 
have an experience whose occurrence makes true the disjunctive claim.
25
 
                                                 
25
 Hinton also notices that this way of using the notion of experience as a 
shorthand for a perception-illusion disjunction is a piece of philosophical jargon 
that differ significantly from the ordinary use of the term ‘experience’, which 
normally stands for either one of two things:  
a) ‘the transparent, colourless, or empty verb, akin to “undergo” or “do”’ (Hinton 
1973: 13), as in ‘Mary experienced many difficulties in her life’, or ‘I will never 
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2.3 The Indiscriminability Principle  
Hinton doesn’t clearly explain why he thinks that the relative incorrigibility 
of a perception-hallucination disjunctive claim is taken as a reason to 
postulate the occurrence of a common event. Obviously, the simple fact that 
we accept a perception-hallucination disjunction shouldn’t commit us to 
accepting it. In order to make sense of a disjunctive claim, one does not 
need to assume that one single kind of happening makes the two disjuncts 
true: two different kinds of event can make a disjunctive claim true. ‘Either 
Tom is having breakfast or he is jogging’ is not made true by a special 
‘having-breakfast-or-jogging’ event. It also doesn’t seem that the idea that a 
common event makes the disjunctive claim true arises from the relative 
infallibility of such a disjunctive claim. Many other disjunctive claims have 
the same relative infallibility (such as ‘Either it is raining or it isn’t 
raining’), but we do not take them to be made true by the same kind of 
event.  
However, I think that what Hinton has in mind is the following. 
‘Either it rains or it doesn’t rain’ is different from ‘I see a flash of light or it 
only seems to me I see a flash of light’ in the following respect. In the case 
of the perception-hallucination disjunction, the event that makes the first 
                                                                                                                            
forget the experience of swimming with dolphins’, where one is the subject of 
the event that one experiences;  
b) ‘a verb of which a very rough paraphrase would be “witness”’ (Hinton 1973: 
13), where one is not the subject of the event or object one experiences, rather a 
‘detached observer’ (Hinton 1973: 16). This is when one, for instance, 
experiences the great firework display, the carnival flowers, a murdering (when 
one is not involved in the murdering).  
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disjunct true is introspectively indiscriminable for the subject from the event 
that makes the second disjunct true. By contrast, if one utters ‘Either it rains 
or it doesn’t rain’, in ordinary circumstances, one is able to distinguish 
whether the event that makes the disjunctive claim true is an instance of 
raining or of not raining.  
The introspective indiscriminability of what makes the two disjuncts 
true calls for an explanation. The sameness of their phenomenal characters 
provides such an explanation. Notice that this is more plausible than the 
initial suggestion we found in Ayer. Ayer claimed that, if perception and 
hallucination involved different kinds of experiences, we should be able to 
notice. Since we do not notice, we should conclude that they are the same 
kind of experience. As we have seen, it is simply false that we should expect 
to notice a difference between any two things different in kind, and thus that 
if two things or events are indiscriminable that they must be the same kind 
of thing or event.  
The reasoning suggested by Hinton is an inference to the best 
explanation, and it doesn’t rely on the fallacious inference from 
indiscriminability to identity. It states that an obvious explanation for the 
fact that a perception and a hallucination are indiscriminable is that they 
share certain properties. The lemon and the lemon-shaped soap are not the 
same kind of object. However, they are visually indiscriminable, and this is 
so because they share certain observational properties (colour, shape, 
texture). A perception and an introspectively indiscriminable hallucination 
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must equally be accounted for in terms of their sharing certain properties. 
Those shared properties are their phenomenal characters.  
This puts the finger on what seems prima facie a forceful intuition to 
support the spreading step. It is plausible to think that indiscriminability of 
two things or events needs to be explained in terms of their sharing certain 
properties. It is also plausible that those shared properties, in the case of 
perception and hallucination, are their phenomenal characters. What else 
could they be? But if this is so, this is conclusive reason for accepting the 
spreading step and the success of the argument against relationalism: if the 
indiscriminability of a perception and an hallucination must be explained in 
terms of their sharing the same phenomenal character, the phenomenal 
character of the former cannot be accounted for in terms of being related to 
a mind-independent object, as this is not available in the latter case.  
Following Martin (1997), I will call this assumption IND: 
(IND): If two experiences are indiscriminable for the subject of 
them, then they have the same phenomenal characters.  
It is because we think that the indiscriminability between perception 
and hallucination should be explained in terms of their possession of the 
same phenomenal character, that we think that there is an event that occurs 
both in perception and hallucination: this event is the occurrence of an 
experience with a certain phenomenal character.  
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We are now in a position to reformulate the argument from 
hallucination in standard form, spelling out the implicit premises, as 
follows:  
1. Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of conscious 
perceptual experiences is to be accounted for in terms of the 
obtaining of a psychological relation with the mind-independent 
objects one is perceptually presented with;  
2. In some cases of hallucination, one has an experience which is 
introspectively indiscriminable from an experience one may have 
in a genuine perception;  
3. In the hallucinatory case, the object one seems to perceive doesn’t 
exist; 
4. (from 3) In the hallucinatory case, the phenomenal character of 
one’s experience is not accounted for in terms of the obtaining of a 
psychological relation with the mind-independent objects one is 
perceptually presented with; 
5. If two conscious experiences are introspectively indiscriminable, 
they have the same phenomenal character (IND); 
6. (from 1, 4, 5) Relationalism cannot be true even in the genuine 
perceptual case. 
It should be clear by now that the argument hinges on IND and that 
this is the premise the relationalist needs to challenge if she wants to block 
Chapter 2: The Argument from Hallucination 
 
 
81 
 
the argument. Premise (1) simply states the relationalist position. Premise 
(2) and (3) seem undeniable. Is (5) equally compelling? 
I said that the sameness of phenomenal character is introduced by 
proponents of the argument from hallucination as an inference to the best 
explanation. It better explains an aspect of how experience strikes us: 
perception and hallucination strike us as indiscriminable and this datum 
calls for an explanation. However, the relationalist can make a similar 
objection to that addressed to the proponent of the Phenomenal Principle. 
Accepting IND might look like the best explanation for the local datum that 
perception and hallucination can be indiscriminable. However, it commits 
one to denying that the phenomenal character of genuine perception is what 
it seems to be. So it this respect, it doesn’t provide the best explanation. At 
best, relationalism and the proponent of IND are on a par.  
If she wants to avoid this obvious objection, then, the proponent of 
IND should argue for something stronger than the claim that IND provides 
the best explanation for the indiscriminability of perception and 
hallucination. She should argue that their indiscriminability can only be 
explained in terms of the sameness of their phenomenal character. The 
argument is secured only if the proponent can claim that IND is a necessary 
principle: that no other coherent explanation of the indiscriminability is 
available. This also explains the ambivalence in the recent debate 
surrounding disjunctivism mentioned in the introduction, between 
Chapter 2: The Argument from Hallucination 
 
 
82 
 
presenting IND as resulting from an inference to the best explanation and 
presenting IND as an undeniable principle.  
But if one frames IND as a necessary principle, it becomes less 
plausible. Why should an appeal to the sameness of phenomenal character 
of perception and hallucination be the only plausible explanation for their 
indiscriminability? Hinton expresses his bewilderment about it:  
Why […] should events have to have properties in common in 
order to be mistaken for one other? Why should it not just seem 
as if they had properties in common? Seeing a flash of light and 
having that illusion seem, but only seem, to have in common the 
property ‘when x occurs a flash of light occurs’. (Hinton 1967b: 
225).  
Hinton challenges the idea that if two experiences are indiscriminable, 
they must have a ‘worn-on-the-sleeve property in common’ (Hinton 1967b: 
225). Although in certain occasions two things might be indiscriminable 
because they share some properties, like in the lemon and the lemon-soap 
case, it is not obvious that this must always be the case. In many cases we 
take one thing for another because they share certain properties. But in some 
cases, we take one for the other only because they seem to share certain 
properties. Two towers seen from a distance might seem to be qualitatively 
identical, in as much as they seem to have the same shape and size. In fact it 
might well be that one is closer than the other and one has a round base, and 
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the other an octagonal base. Although they seem to have the same size and 
shape, they do not have any such shape in common. The colours of two 
objects might be indiscriminable for a subject, they might both, for instance, 
look red to one. However, it might merely be the case that one is red, while 
the other only seems to be red in virtue of being showered with red light. 
Equally, with experiences, it is not clear that if a perception and a 
hallucination are indiscriminable this is because they share the same 
phenomenal character. It might just be the case that one is a relation to an 
object, while the other only seems to relate one to an object.  
This helps us identify exactly what claims the relationalist needs to 
challenge and hence what disjunctivism is committed to. In some sense, the 
relationalist can accept that the term ‘experience’ captures something that is 
common to perception and hallucination. The problem arises from the way 
we conceive of this common experience. There is a common event in 
perception and hallucination only in a ‘very unambitious sense’ (Hinton 
1973: 46), inasmuch as this common event is understood in disjunctive 
terms, by what is picked up by the perception-hallucination disjunction. 
Nothing more specific than a perception-illusion disjunction can ‘answer the 
question as to what is happening to the subject’ (Hinton 1973: 46) when one 
either perceives or hallucinates a flash of light. The problem arises from 
thinking that the only way to make sense of the idea that both in perception 
and hallucination an experience is going on is to think that this experience is 
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individuated by the possession of certain properties, i.e. by a given 
phenomenal character.  
As Hinton puts it:  
Nothing prevents us from introducing some such general term as 
‘flash-experiencing’, stipulatively defined as ‘perceiving or 
being illuded that you perceive a flash of light’, and nothing 
then stops us from saying that the statement, ‘Bob flash-
experienced’, or ‘Bob had the experience of a flash’, or 
whatever form of words we choose to define in that way, 
‘answers the question as to what happened to Bob’. It does so in 
the sense that it reports an event of which Bob was the subject. 
(Hinton 1973: 46). 
According to Hinton, what perception and hallucination have in 
common is only that one is what the other merely is like. One is the reality 
and the other one is the illusion of that reality. The fact that one is the reality 
and the other its illusion doesn’t need to be explained in terms of shared 
phenomenal properties. Or at least it isn’t immediately evident why it 
should be so. Hinton’s strategy consists in shifting the burden of the proof 
onto the proponent of the argument, who should provide a more compelling 
motivation for accepting IND. This helps us understand that disjunctivism is 
better understood as a purely negative claim. It denies that we ought to 
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explain the fact that a hallucination can be indiscriminable from a 
perception in terms of sameness of phenomenal character.  
The disjunctivist strategy for resisting the sameness of phenomenal 
character of perception and hallucination is to point out that no sufficiently 
compelling motivation has been provided for it yet. Hinton does not provide 
any positive argument to reject IND, but he contends that it is often simply 
taken to be obvious, (‘in a sense, so obvious that it is part of our basic 
understanding of the world within which […] our concepts are embedded’, 
as says Snowdon (2008: 54) in his discussion of Hinton’s book 
Experiences). So Hinton sets a challenge for the proponent of the argument 
from hallucination: she must provide justification for IND.  
In the next chapter I will discuss what one might say to support IND. 
In particular, we will have to make clearer what makes experience so special 
with respect to entities for which the inference from indiscriminability to 
identity is clearly invalid. In order to do so, we will need to have a closer 
look at the notions of indiscriminability and phenomenal character.  
 
2.4 Conclusions  
As we have seen in this chapter, the problematic reasoning that is supposed 
to reject relationalism is a reductio ad absurdum of the view, and requires 
two steps. First, one needs to prove that, for a certain range of base cases, 
the relationalist account is not applicable. Second, one needs to show that 
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the unsuitability of the relationalist account spreads from the base case to 
genuine perceptions.  
In its traditional form the argument uses as base cases quite different 
phenomena, ranging from cases of perspectival change and refraction, 
understood as cases of conflicting appearances, to complex hallucinations, 
and tends to treat all of them indiscriminately as cases of illusion. I argued 
that the base case does not succeed when we focus on illusions and cases of 
conflicting appearances. I indicated two contentious assumptions that are 
required for its success: the Uniqueness Assumption and the Phenomenal 
Principle. I have argued that the Uniqueness Principle is clearly false, while 
another principle in the vicinity of it—the Exclusion Principle—is not 
obviously false, although it is also not clear that it is true. More importantly, 
I have argued that relationalists can resist the Phenomenal Principle. The 
principle cannot be presented as the best way to account for how experience 
strikes us in the case of illusion, because it forces us to reject a very 
important aspect of how experience strikes us: that what we seem to see is 
that object that looks to me yellow, not another object that instantiates the 
property of being yellow that the object doesn’t have.  
While adjudicating the base case for illusions proves problematic, it is 
straightforward and uncontroversial that relationalism cannot apply to 
hallucinations. However, it is not easy to understand what motivates the 
spreading step. Proponents of the argument motivate it in virtue of a 
phenomenological similarity between perception and hallucination—or, in 
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some versions, their indiscriminability. However, this is puzzling because in 
the case of ordinary objects indiscriminability doesn’t entail identity. I 
argued that what really motivates the spreading step is not a fallacious 
inference from indiscriminability (an epistemic claim) to identity (a 
metaphysical claim), but rather that the indistinguishablity of perception and 
hallucination calls for an explanation and this explanation is given in terms 
of the occurrence in both cases of an event (an experience) with the same 
phenomenal character.  
Relationalists can retort that IND cannot be the best explanation of 
how experience strikes us, because it commits us to a revisionary account of 
genuine perception. The proponents of the argument must then aim for a 
stronger claim: that accepting IND is the only coherent way to explain the 
indiscriminability of hallucinations from perception.  
Hinton challenges this assumption, but doesn’t provide motivations 
for rejecting it either. In subsequent chapters, we shall explore 
considerations both for and against IND. In the next chapter I will explore 
what one may say to motivate IND.  
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Chapter 3: How to Be Superficial  
 
 
 
 
In this chapter I will explore the rationale for subscribing to the 
Indiscriminability Principle. The Principle runs as follows: 
(IND): If two experiences are introspectively indiscriminable, 
they have the same phenomenal character. 
In the previous chapter, I identified IND, following Hinton and 
Martin, as the key and most vulnerable premise of the argument from 
hallucination. Hinton shows no less than bemusement at the thought that so 
many philosophers are persuaded that if two experiences are 
indiscriminable, then they have a ‘worn-on-the-sleeve property in common’, 
as Hinton (1967: 225) puts it. When it comes to ordinary objects, the fact 
that they are indiscriminable for someone does not need to be explained in 
virtue of some property that they share. Of course, this is sometimes the 
case: a lemon and a lemon-shaped soap can’t be told apart because they 
have certain properties in common—observational properties such as shape 
and colour. However, their sharing those properties does not entail their 
identity, as they can have other, more fundamental properties that 
distinguish them from one another. Sometimes objects ‘just seem, but only 
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seem, to have [properties] in common’ (Hinton 1967: 225). Two towers 
might look equally round from a certain distance, when in fact one is 
square. Properties can look different than they are and this explains why 
things can be indiscriminable without having to share certain properties.   
In this chapter I will identify what the proponent of the argument 
needs to commit to in order to justify her acceptance of IND. I will suggest 
that the most compelling motivation for IND relies on the intuition that 
phenomenal characters are superficial. There is one way of thinking about 
superficiality that would make IND necessarily true. According to this 
understanding, superficial properties are properties for which there is no 
seem/is distinction. I will argue that there are no reasons in favour of—and 
in fact some reasons against—this way of understanding superficiality. I will 
then present an alternative way of understanding superficiality. According to 
this account, if a property is superficial with respect to a certain source of 
information, its nature must be accessible—at least under certain 
conditions—through the relevant source of information. This way of 
understanding superficiality doesn’t entail the failure of the seem/is 
distinction. Thus, IND doesn’t logically follow from the superficiality of 
phenomenal characters. In fact, it is possible for a superficial property to 
appear to be different than it is if there are interfering conditions that 
prevent the relevant source of information from functioning correctly.  
However, the superficiality of phenomenal characters poses a serious 
challenge for the relationalist. If the nature of phenomenal characters must 
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be accessible through the relevant source of information (in this case 
introspection), the relationalist needs to explain how she can maintain that a 
perception and an indiscriminable hallucination have different phenomenal 
characters without being committed to denying that phenomenal characters 
are superficial. This leads us to the problem that the remainder of this thesis 
will be devoted to answering. In this chapter I will examine in detail the 
nature of this challenge and what motivates it.  
 
3.1 The Purported Infallibility of Introspection 
We can relate to Hinton’s bemusement at the widespread acceptance 
of IND: there is no general requirement to explain indiscriminability in 
terms of the sameness of certain properties. As we have seen, one might be 
unable to distinguish cotton muslin from dupioni silk, but this doesn’t mean 
that the two types of fabric have relevant properties in common. For a 
colour-blind person, two apples might be indiscriminable with respect to 
their colour. This doesn’t mean that the two apples have the same colour.  
However, there is widespread conviction that there is a significant 
difference between two introspectively indiscriminable experiences and two 
perceptually indiscriminable apples. Two apples are indiscriminable for a 
subject with respect to their colour because they seem to be of the same 
colour to the subject. Precisely because indiscriminability is epistemic, the 
reason for the indiscriminability is explained in terms of facts that have to 
do with the subject: to the subject they look the same. There is a compelling 
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intuition that, when it comes to explaining the fact that two experiences 
seem the same with respect to their phenomenal character, explaining the 
indiscriminability in terms of what’s going on with the subject only serves 
to support the claim that they have phenomenal characters, for the notion of 
phenomenal character is meant to capture how experiences strike us 
introspectively. In turns this suggests that indistiguishability should be in 
terms of sameness of phenomenal character. Deutsch somehow voices this 
widely accepted, but often implicit, assumption:  
What it is like to perceptually experience something that is 
perceptually indistinguishable from something else is just what 
it is like to perceptually experience that something else. Our 
notion of phenomenal character seems essentially tied to our 
notions of appearing the same as, or being perceptually 
indistinguishable from. Things that are perceptually 
indistinguishable cannot give rise to phenomenally different 
perceptual experiencesthis ought to strike one as a conceptual 
truth. (Deutsch 2005: 9)26  
In this passage Deutsch doesn’t actually claim that indistinguishable 
experiences ought to be explained in terms of experiences with the same 
                                                 
26In the literature the terms ‘indistinguishable’ and ‘indiscriminable’ are used 
interchangeably, and so will I. For consistency I will use ‘indiscriminable’ and 
indiscriminability’, unless when reporting the position of someone who uses the 
terms ‘indistinguishable’ and ‘indistinguishability’.  
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phenomenal character, but he clearly assumes this. His claim is that the 
experience of indistinguishable objects should be explained in terms of 
experiences with the same phenomenal character. Thus, Deutsch seems to 
skip the second step (probably because it seems to him so obvious and 
indubitable) in the reasoning mentioned above: (1) the perceptual 
indiscriminability of two objects should be explained in terms of the 
indiscriminability of their experience; (2) the indiscriminability of two 
experiences should be explained in terms of the identity of their phenomenal 
characters.  
Beyond begging the question against any externalist account of 
phenomenal character, Deutsch’s claim doesn’t take into account the trivial 
fact that indistinguishable objects are seen from different angles, giving rise 
to experiences that are very much distinguishable with respect to how they 
strike one subjectively. But it is fair to assume that Deutsch is just being 
elliptical and has in mind experiences of indistinguishable objects seen in 
sufficiently similar conditions. What is relevant here is the claim that it 
‘ought to strike us as a conceptual truth’ that when two things are 
perceptually indistinguishable to one, the experiences of the two things have 
the same phenomenal character.  
It remains unclear, however, why we should take this to be a necessary 
truth. Deutsch appeals to the idea that ‘our notion of phenomenal character 
seems essentially tied to our notions of appearing the same as, or being 
perceptually indistinguishable’, which is true: these are clearly related 
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notions. But Deutsch doesn’t specify the nature of this tie and yet assumes it 
amounts to identity. The task we face as philosophers of perception is 
precisely to understand how these notions all relate to each other. 
Underwriting Deutsch’s—and many others’—assumption is clearly a cluster 
of intuitions about the nature of phenomenal character, its relation to 
introspection, and to perception. It is unclear what exactly these intuitions 
amount to. We need to unpack them and see whether any of them should be 
accepted and can support IND.  
A relationalist can say that the experiences of two objects (seen from 
the same point of view and under relevantly similar conditions) are 
phenomenally the same, because the notion of phenomenal character 
captures how the experience strikes one. But this doesn’t entail that any two 
indistinguishable experiences should have the same phenomenal character. 
We have seen that perceptual indiscriminability doesn’t entail sameness of 
properties in the objects perceived because one can explain the fact that two 
objects with different qualities are not discriminated in terms of something 
going wrong with the perceptual discriminatory capacities. One could say 
the same for introspective indiscriminability: two experiences seem the 
same with respect to their phenomenal character because something goes 
wrong with the introspective capacities of the subject. That is, unless one is 
committed to infallibilism about introspection.  
Could a commitment to the infallibility of introspection be what 
underwrites IND? This is unlikely. Infallibilism about (certain) introspective 
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judgments may have been popular in the past,27 but nowadays it is out of 
favour and the recent literature on introspection abounds with counter-
examples to infallibility. It is quite common, for instance, to realise that an 
episode of our childhood that we think we are recollecting is in fact an act 
of imagination, as our parents have told us that this event never actually 
occurred. Very often our own emotions, motivations, and intentions are not 
transparent to us. For instance, we take ourselves to be angry with someone, 
when in fact we feel guilty and frustrated with ourselves, and so on. 
Counter-examples to the infallibility thesis also include introspective 
judgments about one’s own experience. Empirical evidence suggests that 
when a perceptual input is presented to us for a very short duration of time, 
mistakes are inevitable (see Churchland 1984 for a discussion of these 
data).28 Schwitzgebel notices that even outside of experimental settings, in 
very ordinary experiences when we have all the time we want to reflect on 
our experience, introspective judgments are not immune to error and 
uncertainty either:  
Consider not your visual experience when you are looking 
directly at a canonical color but rather your visual experience, in 
                                                 
27
 The origin of the infallibility thesis is sometimes attributed to Descartes (1637; 
1641). However, he explicitly commits to indubitability, while the attribution of 
the infallibility thesis is debatedalthough some textual evidence, especially in the 
Second meditation, may support his subscription to an infallibility thesis (see 
Schwitzgebel 2010). The infallibility thesis is also attributed to Locke (1690) and 
Hume (1748) and, more recently, has been defended by Ayer (1963) and the early 
Shoemaker (1963). 
28
 See Bayne and Spener (2010), Shoemaker (1996), Rosenthal (2005) for other 
counterexamples to the infallibility of introspection. 
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an ordinary scene, of the region ten degrees or thirty degrees 
away from the center point. How clear is that region? How 
finely delineated is your experience of the shape and color of 
things that you are not looking directly at? People give very 
different answers to this question—some say they experience 
distinct shape and color only in a very narrow, rapidly moving 
foveal area, about one to two degrees of arc (about the size of 
your thumbnail held at arm’s length); others claim to experience 
shape and color with high precision in thirty or fifty or one-
hundred degrees of visual arc; still others find shape imprecise 
outside a narrow central area, but find color quite distinct even 
twenty or thirty degrees out. And furthermore, people’s opinions 
about this are not stable over time. In the course of a 
conversation, they will shift from thinking one thing to thinking 
another. (Schwitzgebel 2012b: 32)  
As Schwizgebel notices, there is a great deal of disagreement about, 
for instance, how we experience objects in the peripheral areas of our visual 
fields, and about the boundaries of the visual field—where they are located, 
whether we can see them or whether we rather experience within boundaries 
without really experiencing them. Schwizgebel’s explicit target here is 
indubitability, but since infallibility is stronger than indubitability, we don’t 
seem to be infallible about those aspects of our phenomenal character if we 
hesitate and further revise our judgment on how experience strikes us.  
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However, one might be tempted to argue that, although these 
examples show that introspective judgments can be wrong, these errors are 
due to misclassification or a lack of the appropriate concepts. Alternatively, 
it might be that one doesn’t pay enough attention to how experience strikes 
one, but if one paid enough attention, one would be in a position to 
formulate correct judgments. Thus, there is a pre-judgmental sense in which 
introspection gives us infallible access to the phenomenal character of our 
experience. It is not clear that we can really interpret the scenarios described 
by Schwitzgebel as cases where, if only one could find the right concept, or 
tried a bit harder to focus on her experience, one would be able to formulate 
true judgments. Moreover, to defend this view one would have to explain 
how a capacity may be pre-judgmental yet infallible. But what is more 
important here is to understand what one needs to commit to in order to 
claim that there is some form of non-judgmental introspection that is 
infallible.  
In a recent paper, Giustina and Kriegel (forthcoming) defend precisely 
this view. They claim that there are two forms of introspection, in the same 
way that, according to Dretske, there are two forms of seeing: ‘epistemic 
seeing’ and ‘non-epistemic seeing’ or ‘simple seeing’ (Dretske 1969; 1981; 
1995). Epistemic seeing involves facts, takes the logical form ‘S sees that 
p’, and requires one to possess and employ the relevant concepts and 
cognitive capacity. Non-epistemic seeing involves objects and is pre-
judgmental. Giustina and Kriegel suggest that, along the lines of this 
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distinction regarding perception, we should postulate two forms of 
introspection: fact-introspection and thing-introspection.29 The latter ‘does 
not involve classifying or characterizing one’s conscious experience. It is a 
more direct awareness of the experience itself, in its pure phenomenal 
appearance so to speak’ (Giustina and Kriegel forthcoming). Others share 
the idea that we have some ‘immediate’ pre-judgmental access to the 
phenomenal character of our experience on which introspective judgments 
rely. Gertler, for instance, claims that ‘my judgment registering the relevant 
aspect of how things epistemically seem to me (this phenomenal property is 
instantiated) is directly tied to the phenomenal reality that is its truthmaker’ 
(Gertler 2012: 111; italics in original).  
 Giustina and Kriegel maintain that thing-introspection is infallible, 
but this is not due to any special cognitive achievement. It is de jure 
infallible: infallible in virtue of the fact that the domain of phenomena it 
concerns ‘have no independent existence’ and are ‘facts fixed by how they 
are represented by the relevant representation’ (Giustina and Kriegel 
forthcoming). In order to defend this limited version of infallibilism, one 
needs to commit to controversial claims regarding the nature of phenomenal 
character and its relation to introspection, starting with the idea that there is 
indeed a pre-judgmental form of introspection. This requires an account of 
introspection that not everybody would be willing to accept, plausibly either 
                                                 
29
 They note that the term ‘thing’ in ‘thing-introspection’ is not meant to restrict 
the ontological category that one can introspect.  
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a quasi-perceptual model of introspection or a model where one is 
introspectively aware of the phenomenal character of one’s experience just 
in virtue of having the experience (see the first chapter for a brief discussion 
of these views). 30  By contrast, the notion of judgmental introspection 
doesn’t require one to commit to any particular view of introspection. In this 
sense, introspection is whatever cognitive faculties, processes, and states 
give rise to introspective judgments, i.e. judgments that the subject 
formulates, from a special first-person perspective, on her own mental 
occurrences.31 These faculties, processes, and states might not be exclusive 
to introspection; they might also be deployed in other cognitive tasks (see 
Schwitzgebel 2011, 2012; and Butler 2013 for examples of this pluralist 
view of introspection).  
What is important to notice here is that even if we accept that there is 
a pre-judgmental form of introspection and that it is infallible, IND doesn’t 
need to be true. Discriminating is a cognitive act: it is a mental activity 
                                                 
30
 Both Kriegel (2009: Chapter 4) and Gertler (2012) defend versions of the latter.  
31
 Accepting that there is a special way of accessing one’s own mental 
occurrences—a way that is not available to third parties and that is in some sense 
privileged with respect to the latter—doesn’t require one to commit to the idea that 
a special mechanism or process is involved in introspection. Even a pluralist who 
maintains that introspection deploys a plurality of faculties, states, and processes 
that are also employed when performing other cognitive tasks, including knowing 
other people’s minds, can maintain that we still have special access to our own 
mental occurrences. This could be due to the a greater availability of evidence or to 
the way these multiple faculties, processes, and states can be combined when one 
introspects, rather than when one performs other tasks concerning the external 
word and other minds. Some theories of introspection explicitly commit to a parity 
between the first- and the third-person perspective on one’s mind (see, for instance, 
Bem 1967 and Gopnik 1993), thereby denying that there is an introspective (and 
somehow privileged) and a non-introspective way of accessing one’s own mind. 
However, apart from the parity theories, which are very contentious, it seems that 
all agree that introspection preserves some degree of privilege. 
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involving cognitive capacities. Thus indiscriminability is the impossibility 
of performing such a cognitive act. One might not be in a position to 
discriminate the distinct phenomenal character of two experiences because 
of failures in one’s judgmental capacities, even if one is pre-judgmentally 
aware of the phenomenal character for what it really is. We need to look 
elsewhere to motivate IND. 
 
3.2 Superficial Properties  
Giustina and Kriegel’s restricted infallibility thesis relies more on an 
assumption about the relation between phenomenal characters and 
introspection than on a commitment to some special cognitive achievements 
that are possible through introspection. It is not clear what sort of special 
relation they think this could be. However, it is certainly part of the notion 
of phenomenal characters that there is a special relation with introspection. 
As we have seen in earlier chapters, the very notion of introspection is 
introduced to capture that aspect of experience that is accessible through 
introspection. But this doesn’t yet say what kind of relation ties phenomenal 
characters and introspection together. Understanding the nature of this 
relation might help us make progress with deciding whether there is a valid 
motivation for IND.   
One intuitive way of cashing out this special relation is to say that 
phenomenal characters are superficial with respect to introspection. 
Superficial properties differ from what we might call ‘deep’ entities in the 
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following respect. Deep entities like the ordinary objects we find around us 
have a multitude of properties, accessible through a multitude of sources of 
information.
32
 A lemon has gustatory properties, shape, surface texture, 
colour, a biochemical composition, and so on. Some of these properties are 
accessible through taste, some by touch, by vision, or by sophisticated 
experimental enquiry. They have, so to speak, multiple dimensions and not 
all of these dimensions are accessible through the same source of 
information.  
Some entities are not like this. Phenomenal characters seem to have 
only one dimension. It seems that all there is to a phenomenal character is 
what can be introspected of it. Phenomenal characters seem superficial with 
respect to introspection. Observational properties, or at least some of them, 
seem superficial: a smell can only be known through olfaction; a colour can 
only be seen. 33  Both phenomenal characters and these observational 
properties are superficial in the sense of being tied in some special way to a 
                                                 
32
 It is an open question that I will not address in this thesis whether the mark of 
deep entities is merely multiple sets of properties accessible through one source of 
information, rather than that they have multiple properties where some of them are 
other than the basic perceptual ones, like chemical structure—which are in some 
sense more fundamental. Choosing between the two options depends on one’s 
ontological commitment regarding the existence of essential or fundamental 
properties. I am inclined to believe that we can draw a working distinction between 
deep and superficial properties just in terms of the number of sources of 
information through which their properties are accessed. This has some 
implications for what entities count as superficial. In particular, this entails that if 
observational properties such as shape and size are to count as superficial, the 
relevant superficial property is not the shape and size that one can both see and 
touch. Instead we would count as independent superficial observational properties 
the visible shape and size and the touchable shape and size.  
33
 Whether other properties that might be considered observational, such as shape 
and size, are superficial is more controversial (see also previous footnote). Thus I 
will only focus on observational properties such as colour, smell, and taste here.  
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specific source of information: introspection in one case and perception in 
the other. Given this initial understanding of superficiality, it is possible that, 
besides observational properties and phenomenal characters (which are 
superficial with respect to introspection), there might be other superficial 
properties with respect to other sources of information, and that these share 
interesting properties with observational properties and phenomenal 
characters.  
There has been little discussion of the nature and features of 
superficial properties. The discussion about superficiality mainly takes the 
form of wondering whether this or that property is superficial, or whether 
superficiality is a coherent notion at all, but surprisingly little can be found 
in the way of defining what superficiality is. Deciding whether this or that 
property is superficial is generally made on the basis of a quite widespread, 
although little argued for, conception of what superficiality amounts to. 
Williamson voices this widespread way of understanding superficiality as 
follows:  
 Things of most kinds have depth; they can be indiscriminable 
without being identical. It is nevertheless tempting to believe 
that things of some kinds are purely superficial; for them, 
indiscriminability and identity would coincide. (Williamson 
1990: 48) 
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Clearly, this understanding of superficiality would make IND true by 
definition, unless one denies that phenomenal characters are superficial.  
Williamson here reports, without subscribing to, a widespread and 
tempting form of reasoning: if deep entities can be indiscriminable without 
being identical, superficial properties are properties for which 
indiscriminability and identity coincide. They are properties for which there 
is no seem/is distinction. The idea here is that what accounts for the failure 
of the inference from indiscriminability to identity in the case of things with 
depth is that they have multiple properties accessible through multiple 
sources of information. So one might be unable to distinguish through 
perception a lemon from a lemon-shaped soap, because the lemon and the 
lemon-shaped soap share certain properties—those that are accessible 
though perception. However, they have many other properties that 
differentiate them, but that are not accessible to the subject (in given 
circumstances). Superficial properties do not have depth; they are available 
entirely though one source of information, having only one dimension. If 
this is the case, the explanation for the failure of the inference from 
indiscriminability to identity that we just gave for deep entities fails. It 
cannot be the case that one fails to discriminate between two properties 
because one has partial access to them. If there is access to the superficial 
entity at all, it must be through the elective source of information, and this 
gives complete access to the entity. Or so the argument goes.  
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However, this understanding of superficiality is deeply unsatisfactory. 
First of all, it seems to rely on a fallacious argument:  
1. Deep entities can be indiscriminable without being identical; 
2. No superficial property is deep; 
3. Therefore, no superficial property can be indiscriminable without 
being identical. 
But this argument is invalid because the major premise is distributed 
in the conclusion, but not in the minor premise. Moreover, when it comes to 
superficial properties, although one of the explanations for the failure of the 
inference from indiscriminability to identity normally available for deep 
entities is not available (one cannot appeal to the multiple properties of an 
object that are not accessible though the currently exploited source of 
information), another explanation—which we have already considered, 
when discussing Hinton in the previous chapter—is. Two objects might be 
indiscriminable with respect to their superficial properties because they just 
seem to have the same properties, due to inattention, an unfavourable point 
of view, impairments of the subject’s cognitive or perceptual capacities, and 
so on. I mentioned earlier the case of two apples that are indiscriminable to 
a colour-blind person, although one is green and the other is red. But colour 
is precisely one of those properties that we are inclined to think of as 
superficial. So it doesn’t seem true that superficial properties are properties 
for which indiscriminability entails identity. 
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Finally, if it were true that phenomenal characters are superficial and 
that for superficial properties indiscriminability entails identity, this would 
entail the infallibility of introspection—and not just in its restricted sense, as 
involving pre-judgmental introspection, because, as we have seen, 
introspective discrimination seems to entail cognitive capacities. But we 
have already seen that there are many reasons to resist the infallibility claim. 
Thus, if one needs to commit to this view of superficiality in order to justify 
IND, the proponent of IND is in a very unstable position. For the 
relationalist can easily dismiss the assumptions on which it relies.  
 
3.3 Observational Properties  
Although understanding the notion of superficiality as entailing an 
inference from indiscriminability to identity for superficial properties is 
problematic, the initial intuition that certain properties are superficial 
remains. Thus, there might be an alternative way of understanding the 
notion of superficiality that proponents of IND might use to support their 
view and show that the relationalist commitment to disjunctivism is 
untenable. I do not aim to provide a full account of superficiality here. I will 
merely identify some criteria that allow us to draw an interesting distinction 
between deep and superficial properties. Then I will consider whether these 
criteria impose constraints on what can be said about superficial 
propertiesconstraints that the proponent of IND could use against 
relationalism.  
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In order to find such criteria, I will primarily turn to those 
observational properties that seem superficial, and in particular to colour, 
rather than phenomenal characters. This is because, as saw in the first 
chapter, it is difficult to spell out what phenomenal character is without 
committing to some controversial and philosophically loaded claims. 
Modelling an account of superficiality on phenomenal character runs the 
risk of incorporating independent and controversial assumptions about 
phenomenal characters into the notion of superficiality. The nature and 
metaphysics of colours is very controversial too, but at least it seems 
possible to agree on what we are talking about, that is, on the phenomenon 
we are trying to describe, without making metaphysical assumptions.  
Not everybody would agree that colours are superficial: that they are 
tied to vision in an interesting way, which tells them apart from other things 
that can be perceived. Reductive physicalists about colours, for instance, 
would argue that colours have depth, since their nature is defined by 
properties that are hidden to perception, such as their spectral reflectance 
profile. For our present purposes, I don’t need to delve into the dispute over 
the metaphysics of colour or any other observational properties. What I 
propose here is a conditional claim: if colours are superficial, there are 
certain constraints that are imposed on how we should conceive them. These 
constraints can then be extended to all superficial properties, and once we 
have these constraints and criteria for superficiality in place we can apply 
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them to phenomenal characters too—whose superficiality is far less 
controversial.  
Moreover, when people deny that colours or other properties are 
superficial and claim that they have no less depth than objects like lemons 
and pieces of soap this is partly motivated by the difficulty of giving a 
coherent account of superficiality. Previous attempts to identify a criterion 
that distinguishes observational properties from other properties failed. 
Many of these accounts talk of being superficial with respect to perception, 
in the yet indeterminate sense of having a special tie to perception that I 
have introduced here. However, they fail to frame the nature of this tie in a 
satisfactory and informative way. Take for instance this proposal from 
Langsam:  
Properties are observational in so far as they are presented or 
represented in perceptual experience. Properties are represented 
in experience by means of appearances; thus we can say that 
observational properties are those properties that objects can 
appear to have when we perceive them. (Langsam 2000: 69) 
This definition is far too inclusive and fails to single out observational 
properties from any other entity that can be seen. The realm of properties 
that objects can appear to have when we perceive them is far broader than 
the class of properties we want to call observational (typically, as we saw, 
colour, shape, sound, smell, taste…). Being a lemon is a property that a 
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lemon can appear to have when we look at it. Emotions and physical states 
can be presented in experience too: it is by looking at someone’s face and 
how it appears that we can tell that she is irate, sad, or out of breath.  
It may be tempting to mark the difference between the property of 
being a lemon and being yellow by noting a difference in the way that their 
respective concepts are acquired. In order to possess the observational 
concept of yellow, it may seem, I need to have seen something yellow. Not 
so for an x-ray tube: many bits of knowledge may go into one’s concept of 
an x-ray tube, but having seen one doesn’t seem a necessary requirement for 
knowing what they are. As a matter of fact, I take myself to possess a 
(rudimentary) working concept of ‘x-ray tube’, although I have never seen 
one. It is enough for me to know what it is used for and how it works, and 
maybe to have heard descriptions of what it looks like. This means that 
perceptual acquaintance with a superficial observational property is 
necessary for the possession of its respective concept, while it is not for the 
possession of concepts of deep entities.  
Despite its initial appeal, even this proposal is inadequate. In fact, the 
requirement of a perceptual encounter with the property in order to possess 
the respective concept is neither necessary nor sufficient for something to be 
a superficial observational property. This condition discriminates between 
recognitional and non-recognitional concepts, but we can have recognitional 
and non-recognitional concepts of both superficial observational properties 
and deep entities. For instance, one can have a recognitional concept of a 
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lemon, which requires a perceptual sensitivity to what lemons look like, and 
have a non-recognitional concept of colour. Therefore, the requirement of 
perceptual encounter over the possession of a concept only marks a 
distinction between the types of concept one may have and cannot be 
extended to the type of property that the concept is a concept of. 
 One might challenge the suggestion that one can have a non-
recognitional concept of colour: after all, how can one really possess a 
concept of red if one hasn’t seen red before? One may use the term ‘red’, 
but unless one has seen red, the use of the term doesn’t signify that one 
knows what red, the superficial, visible property is. So the concept one 
possesses must grasp something else: not the superficial property of being 
red, but rather the reflectance property of materials, or the wavelength range 
corresponding to red. Thus, one might insist, we can indeed learn something 
about properties themselves by looking at the kind of concepts we employ 
to refer to them. One could then derive the following definition of 
superficial observational properties: they are properties for which one can 
only have a recognitional concept.  
However, a famous thought experiment may help us appreciate that 
one can have a non-recognitional concept of colours. Jackson describes a 
woman, Mary, who was born and raised in a black and white room, and 
trained there—always through black and white media—to be a colour 
scientist. Mary doesn’t leave the colourless room until she has learned all 
the physical facts about colours and colour perception. Only then does she 
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leave the room and see red for the first time. We can suppose that, even 
before seeing red, Mary had a superficial observational concept of red, 
although not a recognitional one. Mary might, for instance, have been able 
to entertain thoughts such as ‘The visible red light has a wavelength of 
about 650 nm’. Or, upon reading black and white versions of Goethe’s 
Farbenlehre and Kandinsky’s Du Spirituel dans l’Art, she might be in a 
position to claim that orange is more similar to red than it is to blue. When 
she utters these sentences, she is not (only) referring to physical properties. 
She is referring, it seems, to the observational property of red, the ‘visible 
red’.34 Thus one can have a concept of an observational property without 
having had the relevant perceptual contact with such a property. Ordinary 
examples may illustrate this point too: blind people have concepts of 
colours: they know that lemons are yellow and tomatoes are red. The 
difference between Mary’s situation before and after leaving the room 
concerns her ability to use recognitional concepts for the observational 
property redness, not her ability to think about redness. 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Of course, a reductive physicalist would reject the suggestion that colours are 
superficial. However, as mentioned earlier, my aim here is not to defend a specific 
view of colour metaphysics, or a view where colours are superficial properties. As 
mentioned, my aim is to explore whether a satisfactory and coherent notion of 
superficiality is availablethat is, whether one who wants to claim that colours are 
superficial can explain their superficiality coherently. For our current purposes, 
then, I do not need to worry about disagreement regarding the observationality of 
colour, as long as the view is coherent. Whether this is the case is exactly what I 
assess here. 
Chapter 3: How to Be Superficial 
 
 
110 
 
3.4 The Superficiality Constraint  
I propose that we look instead at the difference between superficial 
observational properties and non-superficial entities in epistemic terms: 
there are different patterns of epistemic possibilities for claims concerning 
observational properties compared to claims about non-observational 
properties. This epistemic approach draws from Peacocke’s (1983: 87–106, 
see also Peacocke 1986; 1992) discussion of observational concepts, 
although I shall not embrace all aspects of Peacocke’s account. Peacocke 
suggests that observational concepts have a pattern of epistemic possibilities 
that is different from that of non-observational concepts, such as concepts of 
natural kinds, in the following respect: ‘It is epistemologically possible that 
something which is tomato-like is not a tomato.’ (Peacocke 1983: 94). Here 
Peacocke is interested in drawing a distinction between concepts such the 
concept of a natural kind ‘tomato’, which possesses an experiential 
component (tomato-like) that could be shared with something that is not a 
tomato, and observational concepts such as ‘square’, for which:  
[t]here is nothing which is both the experiential component of 
the visual concept of being square and which could also be 
enjoyed by someone who does not possess all the concepts and 
the theories possessed by someone who has the concept of being 
square. (Peacocke 1983: 93) 
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 For our present purposes, we can use this distinction to look at the 
conditions under which one might fail to distinguish between two things, for 
deep and superficial properties respectively, and what would allow one to 
distinguish them. For deep entities, as we have seen, it is possible to fail to 
discriminate two objects because we are accessing them through a certain 
source of information and the properties available thorough that source of 
information are identical. For example, a lemon and a lemon-shaped soap 
might be indiscriminable with respect to their visible properties. The failure 
to discriminate here is due to the fact that the piece of soap shares certain 
properties with the lemon. It might be the case that, even if one looked very 
carefully at the lemon-shaped soap and the lemon, one would keep failing to 
discriminate between the two, because the visible properties of each are 
exactly the same. However, it would be enough to explore the piece of soap 
through other sources of information to find further properties of the object 
that are not shared with lemon. Trying to eat it would unpleasantly reveal 
that it possesses a taste that lemons do not possess; trying to wash it under 
running water would reveal a capacity to dissolve and produce bubbles that 
lemons lack; and so on.  
When it comes to superficial observational properties, this scenario is 
not possible: it is not possible to explain the failure to discriminate two 
distinct properties in terms of the properties being the same with respect to 
what is accessible through a certain source of information, but are different 
through another source of information. They don’t seem to be accessible 
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through other sources of information other than the designated sense-
modality. However, we have already seen that it is possible to fail to 
discriminate between observational properties. If I look at two vases in the 
dark, they might be indiscriminable with respect to their colour. What I 
ought to do in order to put myself in a position to distinguish between the 
two colours is not to look for further aspects of colours that are not 
accessible to perception. I wouldn’t find any: all I would find, if colours are 
superficial as they seem, would be properties of the object that are related in 
some way to the superficial property of being coloured—such as a 
spectral reflectance profile—but I wouldn’t find what colour the vases are. I 
might be able to infer that the colour of one vase is blue by learning about 
the reflectance properties of its surface, because I know how colours along 
the visible spectrum correlate with certain spectral reflectance profiles. But 
if I have never seen blue before, knowing that the vase has some reflectance 
properties won’t be of any use in discovering the colour of the vase. There 
is, however, a very simple and efficient way to find out what colours the 
vases are—one that only involves perception. I just have to take the vases 
into the daylight, or turn the light on and look at them in better conditions. 
For observational properties, then, what motivates the failure of 
discrimination is the presence of some conditions that interfere with one’s 
perceptual discriminatory capacities. These interfering conditions might be 
of different sorts: they might have to do with the context in which the 
perception occurs (the distance, the lighting conditions, and so on), with the 
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perceptual system (the subject might have a sight deficit, or some 
neurological condition), or one might not be attentive enough to pick up a 
difference with respect to observational properties that would otherwise be 
noticeable.35   
We can derive the following constraints about what can account for 
the failure to discriminate superficial properties:  
The inability to distinguish among what are in fact different 
superficial properties must be due to the occurrence of 
interfering conditions that prevent the source of information 
with respect to which the properties are superficial to detect the 
difference.  
                                                 
35
 The sorites puzzle has been often used to argue against the existence of a 
coherent notion of superficiality (see for instance Goodman 1951; Travis 1985 and 
Dummett 1975). It might be thought that it presents a counterexample to the 
present proposal too. Ex hypothesis, sorites cases are cases where everything seems 
perfectly in order with the perceiver’s perceptual system and the viewing 
conditions. Take the classical example of a series of patches of colours gradually 
changing in hue, where patch a is indiscriminable from b, b is indiscriminable from 
c, but a is distinguishable from c. All the successive patches are seen in a neutral, 
unchanging light, the subject is attentive and nothing is wrong with her sight. Yet 
she fails to see a difference between the colour of the first and the second patch, the 
second and the third one, the third and the fourth one, and so on. Although no 
interfering condition can be invoked here to explain the indistiguishability of non-
identical superficial properties, what it takes to realise that the patches are different 
doesn’t go beyond the ken of vision. We can tell that patch a is not identical with 
patch b, despite their perceptual indiscriminability, because we see an overall 
progression in hue across all the patches. This requires one to use some reasoning, 
but the reasoning is not the source of information: it only helps one to exploit at 
best the information provided by perception. Also, it might be possible to see 
immediately that any two adjacent patches are distinct by contrasting them with 
other background colours, which—thanks to the colour-contrast effect—might 
make the difference more salient.  
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This excludes that one could account for the failure to discriminate 
between superficial properties in terms of the presence of certain 
distinguishing features that are not accessible through the elective source of 
information with respect to which the entity is superficial. The converse of 
this gives us a constraint about what may constitute the real nature of a 
superficial property:  
What determines the nature of a superficial property must be 
accessible through the relevant source of information. 
If we apply these constraints to phenomenal characters, the following 
constraint applies to any account of phenomenal character that seeks to 
preserve the intuition that phenomenal characters are superficial:  
What determines the nature of a phenomenal character of an 
experience should be accessible through introspection.  
I shall call this the ‘superficiality constraint’. Notice that saying that 
what determines the nature of a phenomenal character should be accessible 
through introspection doesn’t mean that it needs to be accessible through 
introspection at any time. In the same way as one can fail to appreciate the 
real colour of something because of interfering conditions, one might fail to 
appreciate the phenomenal character of an experience because of interfering 
conditions—lack of the appropriate concepts, simple failure to focus 
attentively enough on one’s experience, a cognitive impairment that 
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interferes with one’s introspective capacities, and so on. Moreover, it 
doesn’t mean that what determines the nature of phenomenal character is 
only accessible through introspection: the superficiality constraint is not 
necessarily incompatible with claiming that one can know about the 
phenomenal character of one’s own experience or of others’ through non-
introspective means—for instance by testimony.  
 
3.5 Impersonal Indiscriminability 
Can this constraint support IND? Well, it depends how one interprets 
‘indiscriminable’. As Williamson points out, indiscriminability is a relative 
notion: relative to a context, a subject, and the source of knowledge 
concerned. When we say that a is indiscriminable from b, this is always for 
a subject at a certain time. While introducing Williamson’s notion of 
indiscriminability, Fish makes the following observation:  
The subject relativity is there to account for the fact that you 
may be able to distinguish between two things where I cannot—
perhaps because you have sharper eyesight than I do. The 
temporal relativity is there to account for the possibility that I 
may be unable to distinguish between two things at one time, yet 
be able to distinguish between them at a different time. For 
example, if I am looking at two people at a distance or in half-
light, I may well be unable to make a discrimination. According 
to this definition, those individuals are therefore 
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indistinguishable (for me, at that time). But bring them closer to 
me, or turn up the lights, and I may then be able to tell one from 
the other. So at this later time when the conditions under which I 
am attempting the discrimination have improved, the individuals 
are now distinguishable (again, for me, at that time). (Fish 2008: 
146) 
 Fish notices that a and b can be indistinguishable for one and the 
same person at one time and distinguishable at another time, depending on 
contingent conditions of observation. Fish mentions distance and lighting, 
but we can include other factors, including subjective ones, such as 
variability of one’s eyesight (due, for instance, to surgery, corrective lenses, 
or decline in sight due to illness), variations in level of attention, etc. If we 
understand indiscriminability in these relative terms, a modal claim about 
the indiscriminability of two things turns out to be true every time one fails 
to discriminate them: they are indiscriminable for that subject, in those 
conditions, at that time, etc. This is manifest in the current debate on the 
argument from hallucination, where, in order to support the claim that 
hallucinations are indiscriminable from perception it is often thought to be 
sufficient to show one case in which one fails to discriminate it from 
genuine perception.36 If we take indiscriminability claims to be made true 
                                                 
36
 One of many examples is this quote from Fish, where he notices that  
‘the evidence for [the claim that hallucinations can be indistinguishable 
from perception] lies in the annals of literature, psychopathology, and in 
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by any instance of failure to discriminate, we have already seen that the 
relationalalist has many reasons to reject IND: accepting the claim would be 
to accept that one can never fail to discriminate two distinct phenomenal 
characters.  
 However, we use indiscriminability claims in all sorts of ways: 
depending on the context, different factors to which the indiscriminability 
can be relative to will or will not be taken into account. Sometimes, if we 
are wondering whether something is indiscriminable to someone, we are not 
interested in knowing whether it is indiscriminable for her on this particular 
occasion, but rather whether she is unable to discriminate them in a set of 
conditions. We can thus make those conditions relative to which two things 
are discriminable for one more or less wide. For instance, we can wonder 
whether the sounds made by two birds are indiscriminable to a subject when 
they are heard for a long enough period of time, and the source of the 
sounds are close enough to the person. Even understood in these terms, it is 
still possible to admit that two indiscriminable sounds are nonetheless 
distinct, because interfering conditions intervene. It is possible that the 
auditory acuity of the subject is liable to declining with tiredness and the 
sounds are heard when the subject is tired, or that they are systematically 
inattentive to birds’ sounds, that they have a hearing impairment, or that, 
                                                                                                                            
some cases even personal experience. There we find numerous cases in 
which subjects have sincerely taken themselves to be having an 
experience just like that of seeing something (we will focus only on the 
visual case) in situations where the thing apparently encountered was not 
there to be seen’ (Fish 2008: 144). 
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from the position the subject listens to, there are always other noises that 
partly cover the birds’ sounds and make them indiscriminable.  
Also, notice that even if the subject is completely unable to 
distinguish between two properties at any time and in any conditions, 
claiming that the two observational properties are nonetheless different 
doesn’t entail a violation of the superficiality condition. For my colour-blind 
friend, my scarf and my skirt are indiscriminable with respect to their 
colour; they are indiscriminable for him in any conditions, even the most 
favourable ones. The same goes for someone who doesn’t have access to the 
relevant source of information at all, such as a blind person. What makes the 
property nonetheless superficial is that, although the blind person personally 
has no means to perceptually distinguish two objects with respect to their 
colour, what he needs to do in order to know that they are distinct is to ask 
other subjects with normal sight. The blind person will have to defer to 
people who can see in order to distinguish the respective colours of the 
objects, but deferring to other seers still makes the nature of the properties 
accessible to perception, although not the perception of the person in 
question. The fact that someone, under some circumstances, could 
distinguish between the two colours is enough for them to be different, 
event if they are indiscriminable for the subject in question.  
This means that one doesn’t have to deny that phenomenal characters 
are superficial if she claims that two experiences have different phenomenal 
characters, although they are indiscriminable to the subject who has the 
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experience: it might be that the subject has some impairment that prevents 
her from noticing a difference in phenomenal characters. But as long as the 
difference in phenomenal character is one that could be discovered through 
introspection, the superficiality condition is not violated. All that is required 
by the superficiality condition here is that if there is a difference, it must fall 
under the scope of introspection. This suggests that the proponent of IND 
can hope to justify the acceptance of IND only if she conceives of the notion 
of indiscriminability in an impersonal sense.  
 We use indiscriminability in this sense in ordinary language. We 
might, for instance, say that two shades of blue are discriminable under 
these lighting conditions at this time, even though a given subject fails to 
discriminate them. If I need to patch my dress and I walk into a shop asking 
for a piece of fabric of a colour that is indiscriminable from that of my dress 
and I am given a piece of fabric that only the clerk fails to discriminate 
(because, say, she is colour-blind) or which is indiscriminable for me only in 
the lighting conditions of the shop, which turn out to be very poor, I won’t 
take my request to be satisfied. I will think that the colour of the patch is not 
indiscriminable from that of my dress in the relevant sense, despite the fact 
that at a certain time and place I fail to discriminate them, or that a given 
subject is constitutively unable to discriminate them.  
Martin (2004) uses a similar case to introduce an impersonal notion of 
indiscriminability: often we want to use ‘indiscriminable’ in a way that is 
not relative to the inability to discriminate of a particular subject. We instead 
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want a notion of indiscriminability such that two things can be claimed to be 
indiscriminable only if nobody can distinguish between them. This ‘nobody’ 
needs qualification, though. As said, indiscriminability is relative to the 
source of information used, and it is likely that in this case we are interested 
in (standard and non-augmented) human sight (as we are interested in the 
sensitivity to colours of the potential members of the extended social 
community of those who can express judgments about the quality of my 
dress). So even if it turned out that Martians or other non-human animals 
with a different sensitivity to light wavelengths than us—or even humans 
with exceptional sensitivity to certain wavelengths generally unseen by 
standard human sight, such as tetrachromats—turn out to be able to tell the 
colour of the patch from the colour of my dress, or if there were a special 
device capable of extending the range of wavelengths to which we are 
sensitive, we would still consider the patch and the dress indiscriminable by 
human sight with respect to their colour.  
The proponent of IND can argue that (at least some) hallucinations are 
indiscriminable through introspection from perception in an impersonal 
sense. For brevity I will from now on call these kinds of hallucinations 
‘IIIH’: Hallucinations that are Impersonally Indiscriminable through 
Introspection. In these hallucinations, it is not the case that there is some 
interference or disabling condition that prevents one from discriminating a 
difference that would be otherwise accessible through introspection. If this 
is the case, it is difficult for the relationalist to claim that the IIIH has a 
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different phenomenal character than perception without violating the 
intuition that phenomenal characters are superficial. It seems that the 
impersonal notion of indiscriminability rules out the possibility of 
explaining the introspective indiscriminability of a hallucination from a 
perception without assuming that the hallucination has a real nature that is 
inaccessible through introspection—which would amount to violating the 
superficiality constraint.  
But as we have already seen, it is not clear that one can deny the 
superficiality of phenomenal characters without departing from what the 
notion of introspection is designed to capture in the first place: how the 
experience introspectively strikes the subject of the experience. Thus, unless 
the relationalist explains why it is possible for the phenomenal character of 
an IIIH to be different from that of a genuine perception without committing 
to the idea of phenomenal characters, one should accept IND.  
Reflecting on the nature of superficial properties thus poses a serious 
challenge for the relationalist. This challenge seems difficult to avoid, 
because it doesn’t rely on any controversial claim. It doesn’t rely on the idea 
that introspection is infallible, nor on any controversial assumption about 
superficial properties being such that for them indiscriminability entails 
identity. All it relies on is what seems a very minimal requirement imposed 
on the notion of superficiality, a requirement whose denial would make it 
difficult to preserve any intuitive distinction between superficial and non-
superficial properties. This requirement holds that it is not possible for a 
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superficial property to have its nature determined by something that is 
inaccessible through introspection. But the relationalist is committed to 
claiming that hallucination does not have the same phenomenal character as 
perception. In the case of an IIIH, there is no way to distinguish 
hallucination from perception through introspection, and it is not possible to 
attribute the subject’s inability to discriminate to interfering conditions. It 
thus seems that the relationalist is committed to claiming that what makes 
the phenomenal character of hallucination different from the phenomenal 
character of the genuine perception from which it is indistinguishable 
depends on some aspects of it that are inaccessible through introspection—
an obvious candidate for this difference would be facts that have to do with 
the world around one: the fact that the relevant object is not present and 
doesn’t determine the phenomenal character of the experience. 
One fails to understand what is really at stake in the disagreement 
between relationalists—with their commitment to disjunctivism—and their 
opponents unless one focuses on the intuition that phenomenal characters 
are superficial. Often opponents lament that disjunctivism is committed to 
‘absurdities’, although it is not always clear what this absurdity is supposed 
to amount to. Knight, for instance, claims that the ‘disjunctivist strategy 
requires that we adopt an extreme form of skepticism with respect to our 
knowledge of our mental states’ (Knight 2013: 3). Knight seems to suggest 
that disjunctivism is unacceptable because it requires the assumption that we 
can be introspectively wrong about our mental states in a very radical way. 
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However, it is not clear why admitting that introspection can go radically 
wrong is unacceptable, unless we subscribe to some form of infallibilism. 
But most opponents of disjunctivism would not be outraged by the 
admission that introspection can go radically wrong with respect to all sorts 
of self-attributions of mental states. So why is maintaining that the 
phenomenal character of hallucination is not what it seems considered so 
absurd? 
The discussion of this chapter explains why. Disjunctivism seems 
unacceptable because it seems committed to violating the superficiality of 
phenomenal characters, the intuition that whatever determines the nature of 
a phenomenal character must be accessible through introspection. We 
should understand Knight’s accusation of a too extreme scepticism in this 
sense: disjunctivism requires one to claim that what is, by definition, 
necessarily accessible through introspection (i.e. the phenomenal character 
of an experience) is in fact not accessible through introspection. This 
explains why what Knight calls an extreme form of scepticism is considered 
absurd—while all kinds of extreme sceptical claims have been made in the 
history of philosophy without generally being deemed absurd, only 
undesirable. What’s really at stake here is not the disjunctivist commitment 
to scepticism about introspection, but it’s violation of the superficiality 
constraint. 
Martin (2006) also presents opponents of disjunctivism as committed 
to a too immodest view of introspection. In this way he frames the 
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disagreement between proponents and opponents of disjunctivism in terms 
of a disagreement about the powers of introspection. Although, locally, this 
might be what motivates some opponents of disjunctivism, this cannot be 
where the fundamental source of disagreement really lies, as I have argued 
in this chapter. What fundamentally motivates the rejection of disjuncitivism 
is the intuition that phenomenal characters are superficial and disjunctivists 
cannot account for the phenomenal character of hallucination without 
violating this intuition.  
Disjunctivists are either seen as committing to a blatantly incoherent 
viewthey claim that phenomenal characters are superficial, yet they give 
an account of the phenomenal character of hallucination that is incompatible 
with their superficialityor they surreptitiously change the rules of the 
game and the meanings of the terms used in the debate. The relationalist 
strategy might seem somewhat similar. First the relationalist claims that the 
phenomenal character of genuine perception is constituted by the mind-
independent objects we seem to perceive. She motivates this claim by 
appealing to introspection. She thus seems to comply with the intuition that 
phenomenal characters are superficial. Then the opponent points out that in 
hallucination, where there is no suitable object that can constitute the 
phenomenal character of hallucination, experience also strikes one 
introspectively exactly in the same way: mind-independent objects seem to 
be presented. To this the relationalist replies that the phenomenal character 
of perception is not what it seems to be through introspection. The opponent 
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retorts that maybe the relationalist doesn’t appreciate the full extent of the 
consequence of her claim. Since ex hypothesis, hallucinations are 
impersonally indiscriminable from phenomenal characters, she commits 
herself not only to the claim that the phenomenal character of hallucination 
seems introspectively different to what it actually is (which could be 
acceptable), but also to the claim that the phenomenal character of 
hallucination really is inaccessible through introspection, which violates the 
intuition that phenomenal characters are superficial. At this point the 
relationalist might reply that, if she is committed to denying the 
superficiality of phenomenal character, tant pis for the superficiality. What 
she means by ‘phenomenal character’ is the property of relating the subject 
to certain objects in the environment and their features. If this violates the 
superficiality, well… phenomenal characters are not superficial after all. If 
the relationalist adopts this strategy, she can be rightly accused of trading 
with the terms of art used in the debate. Everybody assumes that it is part of 
the notion of phenomenal characters that they are superficial, because this 
follows from the idea that phenomenal characters just capture what it is like 
to have that experience. The relationalist may well stipulate that the 
phenomenal character doesn’t need to be superficial. But then it seems they 
are talking about something else, which leaves it open what do they have to 
say about the phenomenal character (understood as superficial) of 
perception and hallucination, respectively.  
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The tenability of relationalism depends on whether relationalists find a 
way to account for the difference in phenomenal character between an IIIH 
and perception that doesn’t violate the superficiality constraint. However, it 
is not obvious how this can be done. In order to make this difficulty more 
explicit, we can formulate these worries in the form of an independent 
argument against relationalism. I will call this argument ‘argument from 
superficiality’:  
1. Some hallucinations are IIIH; 
2. An IIIH is phenomenally conscious; 
3. (from 2) IIIHs have a phenomenal character; 
4. Phenomenal characters are superficial. 
5. If phenomenal characters are superficial, the phenomenal character 
of an experience is accessible (at least in principle) through 
introspection (superficiality constraint); 
6. Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of an IIIH is 
different from the phenomenal character of a perception; 
7. (from 6) For the relationalist, the phenomenal character of an IIIH 
is different from how it introspectively seems: its real nature is 
hidden to introspection; 
8.  (from 2, 5 and 7) Relationalism is committed to the claim that the 
phenomenal character of IIIH is not superficial;  
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9. (from 4 and 8) Relationalism is untenable because it denies the 
superficiality of phenomenal characters.37 
What strategy could the relationalist adopt to resist this argument? We 
have already seen that trying to resist (4) and reject the idea that 
phenomenal characters are superficial is not a viable option. A relationalist 
could adopt different strategies to counter this argument. She could try to 
deny the first premise. If she shows that there is no IIIH, all cases of 
indiscriminable hallucinations could be explained in terms of interfering 
conditions preventing one from introspectively discriminating differences 
that are indeed accessible through introspection, although not on that 
particular occasion. I will explore this strategy in the next chapter.  
However, in Chapter 5 I will show that, although there is indeed no 
empirical evidence that any IIIH exist, the relationalist is not in a position to 
deny the metaphysical possibility of IIIHs. Another option is to deny the 
third premise: that hallucinations have any phenomenal character. This 
strategy is actually adopted by some disjunctivists, in particular Fish (2008; 
2009), but is sometimes also erroneously attributed to Martin (see for 
instance Knight 2013). In Chapter 6 I will show why this strategy is 
unsatisfactory. Ultimately, in Chapter 6, I will argue that the strategy that the 
                                                 
37
 Soteriou (2013: 198–206) presents a similar challenge for the relationalist. 
However, the challenge for Soteriou doesn’t arise from the assumption that 
phenomenal characters are superficial or from a consideration of the conditions 
imposed on superficiality. For Soteriou the problem arises from what we can take 
to be the ground for claims about phenomenal characters (see also Soteriou 2005: 
183).  
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relationalist should pursue to block this argument is to deny premise (7), 
showing that it doesn’t follow from (6).  
 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I explored what the proponent of the argument from 
hallucination needs to commit to in order to support IND. I considered two 
assumptions from which, if accepted, IND would logically follow. These 
assumptions are a commitment to the infallibility of introspection, on one 
hand, and to the idea that phenomenal characters cannot seem different than 
they are. I argued that both these assumptions are ill motivated and can be 
resisted by relationalists. However, although the assumption that there is no 
seem/is distinction for phenomenal characters should be rejected, we can see 
it as a (unsatisfactory) way of cashing out a valid intuition: phenomenal 
characters are superficial, in the sense that their nature seems entirely 
determined by what is accessible through introspection. This assumption 
seems to be a constitutive aspect of the notion of phenomenal character, 
which is introduced precisely to single out those aspects of experience that 
are accessible to the subject who undergoes the experience through 
introspection.  
 I have argued that, without making further controversial assumptions 
(such as the claim that introspective judgments can never be false, or that 
nothing can interfere with the way a phenomenal character introspectively 
appears to one), the superficiality of phenomenal character provides the 
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proponent of IND with a solid argument in its favour. The superficiality of 
phenomenal characters imposes that, if there is a difference between the 
phenomenal character of perception and hallucinations that are impersonally 
introspectively indiscriminable from perception (IIIH), it must be in 
principle detectable through introspection. But it is part and parcel of the 
notion of impersonal indiscriminability through introspection that no 
difference can be detected through introspection. So the relationalist seems 
committed to denying that the phenomenal character of an IIIH is 
superficial: she seems committed to saying that an IIIH has a phenomenal 
character that is not accessible through introspection. What we access 
through introspection is only the phenomenal character that the IIIH seems 
to have. But real phenomenal character, whatever this amounts to, is hidden 
to introspection—which seems absurd.  
The most controversial assumption that this argument makes, it seems, 
is that there are indeed IIIHs. The existence of IIIHs cannot simply be 
motivated by the platitude that we often fail to tell that a hallucinatory 
experience is not a genuine perception: as we have seen, a simple failure to 
discriminate two things doesn’t entail that the two things are impersonally 
indiscriminable. So we need further evidence for the claim that there are 
IIIHs. In the next chapter I will explore whether there is any such evidence.  
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In the previous chapter I argued that what underwrites the acceptance 
of IND is the idea that phenomenal character are superficial and that, in case 
of hallucinations that are impersonally indiscriminable from perception 
(IIIHs), there is no way for the relationalist to claim that the phenomenal 
character of that experience is different from that of perception without 
committing to the idea that what determines the reality of the phenomenal 
character of the hallucination is inaccessible through introspectionwhich 
would amount to denying the superficiality of phenomenal characters.  
This argument against relationalism, however, works only if it is 
possible to show that there are indeed IIIHs. In all other cases of 
hallucinations, it is open to the relationalist to explain the difference in 
phenomenal character between hallucination and perception by claiming 
that interfering conditions prevent one from noticing the differences in 
phenomenal characters that would in principle be accessible through 
introspection.  
In this chapter, I will explore whether there are indeed any IIIHs. If it 
turns out that there aren’t any, the argument from hallucination and the 
related argument from superficiality are unsound, as one of their premises is 
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false. I will examine both theoretical considerations—in order to understand 
what it takes for a hallucination to count as an IIIH—and empirical 
considerations, to establish whether any of the hallucinations reported in the 
literature meet these conditions. I will conclude that it is not possible to find 
empirical support for the claim that IIIHs actually exist.  
 
4.1 Instinguishable from What? 
If my analysis of the current debate on disjunctivism and the argument 
from hallucination is correct, both parties tend to overlook the fact that IND 
holds only if indiscriminability is understood in an impersonal way, and the 
failure to notice this results in little attention being paid to what we mean 
when we accept that hallucinations are indiscriminable from perceptionas 
well as what follows from this.  
As a result, people accept as obvious premise (2) in the argument from 
hallucination (that some hallucinations are indiscriminable from perception) 
without discussing in what sense they are or can be indiscriminable. 
However, premise (2) is obvious only in the weak sense that sometimes 
people who hallucinate think that they are perceiving. But if we understand 
(2) in this sense, the argument is a non-sequitur. The proponent of the 
argument from hallucination, therefore, has to show that the following 
revised version of premise (2) is true:  
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(2*): Some hallucinations are impersonally indiscriminable 
through introspection from genuine perception (i.e. some 
hallucinations are IIIH).  
Since proponents of the argument from hallucination have so far failed 
to realise that it is vital for the success of the argument that hallucinations be 
impersonally indiscriminable from genuine perception, there is currently no 
discussion of whether (2*), rather than merely (2) (which does not specify 
in which sense the notion of indiscriminability is used), obtains.   
Establishing whether (2*) is true is far from easy. It is not even clear 
how we should approach this issue, what we need to look for, or what sort 
of phenomena might confirm the claim that hallucination is impersonally 
indiscriminable through introspection from perception. A preliminary 
question we need to answer to work towards an answer is the following. 
What is the logical structure of the relation of indiscriminability that is 
predicated in this claim?  
The go-to reference for discussion of the structure of 
indiscriminability is Williamson. He claims that:  
a is indiscriminable from b for a subject at a time if and only if 
at that time the subject is not able to discriminate between a and 
b, that is, if and only if, at that time the subject is not able to 
activate (acquire or employ) the relevant kind of knowledge that 
a and b are distinct. (Williamson 1990: 8) 
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Williamson stresses that this is not a definition, in the sense that it 
doesn’t provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the correct use of the 
ordinary English word ‘indiscriminable’; it merely allows us to identify 
paradigmatic cases of indiscriminable entities (which might be objects, 
events, or properties). Around these paradigmatic cases, there might be less 
clear cases for which we might wonder whether it is appropriate to use the 
notion of ‘indiscriminability’. The paradigmatic case that Williamson has in 
mind here are cases in which indiscriminability takes the form of a one-to-
one relation between particulars. Williamson notices that, in this 
paradigmatic form, the relation of indiscriminability has the following 
properties:  
(1) Reflexivity. Since a cannot be distinct from itself, and since knowledge is 
factive, it is impossible to activate the knowledge that a is distinct from 
itself, a is necessarily indiscriminable from itself.  
(2) Symmetry. If one is unable to activate the knowledge that a is distinct 
from b, one is also unable to activate knowledge that b is distinct from a.  
(3) Non-transitivity. It is a well documented phenomenon that there is what 
is called a phenomenal sorites: there can be a series of items s1 ... sn, 
presenting a smooth, continuous, transition with respect to some 
perceptual property (colour, shape, pitch, taste...) such that s1 is 
indiscriminable with respect to some perceptual dimension from s2, s2 is 
indiscriminable from s3, but s1 is distinguishable from s3. 
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However, as Williamson himself remarks, the relation of 
indiscriminability can take a different form and relate more than two terms 
and terms that are not particulars. The question we need to ask is what form 
the relation of indistinguishabilty predicated in (2*) takes. The superficial 
structure of the sentence suggests that this is a one-to-one relation between a 
hallucination and a perception. But what are the hallucination and the 
perception in question? What the hallucination is supposed to be is fairly 
clear: it is whatever hallucination one is undergoing. But what is the 
perception?  
It cannot be a genuine perception that one is having, as one does not 
perceive and hallucinate the same thing at the same time. Maybe cases of 
polyopia38 could be interpreted as cases where one can directly compare a 
genuine perception and a hallucination, but subjects undergoing polyopia 
systematically describe the copies of the object that they experience as 
different in shape, size, and definition from the original object (Jones, 
Waggoner, and Hoyt 1999). That is to say, in such cases the hallucinated 
copy is indeed distinguishable from the real object (and if it is 
indiscriminable, it is not impersonally indiscriminable).  
It is not even the case that, when we talk about hallucinations that are 
impersonally indiscriminable through introspection, we are comparing a 
current hallucination with a veridical perception from the past. Although 
                                                 
38
 Polyopia is the phenomenon of seeing two or more images (up to hundreds) 
arranged in ordered rows, columns, or diagonals after fixation on a stimulus. It may 
occur both in monocular and binocular vision.  
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there might be cases of hallucination where one hallucinates scenes from the 
past, these cannot be cases of impersonal indiscriminability, since it is not 
possible to exclude that the inability to discriminate is attributable to 
memory failure rather than introspective failure (see Farkas 2006: 211–213). 
Dorsch claims that we should understand the relation predicated in 
(2*) as a one-to-many relation (the label is mine), in the sense that it claims 
that the hallucination is indistinguishahable from each of the members of 
the class of perception. He notices that we use indiscriminability in this 
sense in many ordinary situations, in sentences like: ‘I cannot tell from his 
looks whether he belongs to that community’ (Dorsch 2013: 183). In both 
cases, indiscriminability turns out to be a relation between more than two 
entities. And in the latter case, it stops being symmetrical in any meaningful 
sense. For it is not necessary that any member of the comparison group is 
itself indiscriminable from anything other than the entity originally 
compared with the group. In particular, the members of the group need not 
be indiscriminable from each other (see Dorsch 2013: 184). 
Dorsch is certainly right to point out that when we talk about 
indiscriminability of hallucination we mean something along the lines of not 
being able to tell that the hallucination does not belong to the class of 
perceptions. However, the way Dorsch spells it out in terms of the 
hallucination’s not being distinguishable from any of the perceptions in the 
class of perceptions (a one-to-many relation) doesn’t seem to me like the 
most helpful way to spell this out. The problem with this proposal is that it 
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is not clear what the class of relevant perceptions is supposed to be. Does it 
contain perceptions the subject has had in the past, or any perception that 
human beings have ever had? Or does it contain possible perceptions? I do 
not see any reason for restricting this class, or any way of deciding non-
arbitrarily how to restrict it, so I suppose the class should include all 
possible perceptions. This would mean that the relation is to be understood 
in counterfactual terms: if one were to compare one’s actual hallucination 
with any possible perception, one would not be able to distinguish it through 
introspection from any genuine perception. But this is clearly false. A 
hallucination of a hammer is indeed distinguishable from a perception of a 
squirrel or a chair. One might try to solve the problem by circumscribing the 
class of perceptions from which hallucination is indiscriminable to the class 
of perceptions of a certain kind of objects F—a hallucination of a hammer 
may be indiscriminable from a perception of a hammer. But perceptions of 
hammers can differ greatly from each other phenomenologically and so it 
cannot be the case that the hallucination in question is indiscriminable from 
each one of them. One could then propose that when we say the 
hallucination of an F is indiscriminable from perceptions of an F, ‘an F’ 
stands for a more detailed specification than something like ‘a hammer’: the 
distance and perspective from which it is seen, the colour, the shape, the 
background, and all other relevant details should be specified. However, 
even if one adds many specifications to the description of the F, several 
perceptions with different phenomenology can fit the same description: they 
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may have slightly different shades of the same colours or be more or less 
illuminated.  
It seems that the only way to narrow down the members of the class of 
perceptions of an F to only those from which the given hallucination is 
impersonally indiscriminable would be to take only the perceptions whose 
phenomenology matches the hallucination. This would amount to assuming 
that we should understand the relation of impersonal introspective 
indiscriminability between hallucination and perception in terms of 
sameness of phenomenal character.39 But we should avoid a characterization 
that entails IND. 
I think a better way of understanding the relation of impersonal 
indiscriminability is to say that the hallucination is indiscriminable from any 
perception with respect to the property of belonging to the class of 
perceptions. This doesn’t present the problem of having to narrow down the 
relevant class of perceptions and better captures what we have in mind when 
we say that one is unable to tell that a hallucination is indiscriminable from 
perception. As Martin notices, saying that a hallucination of a picket fence is 
introspectively indiscriminable from perception means that the hallucination 
                                                 
39
 This view is largely assumed by opponents of disjunctivism, but it is rarely 
defended. See Farkas (2006) for a defence of the idea that the only way to make 
sense of indiscriminability is in terms of sameness of phenomenal character. The 
discussion in this chapter can be seen as an indirect refutation of her argument. For 
one thing, I argue that there is indeed an alternative way to understand the relation 
of indiscriminability holding between perception and hallucination. Moreover, 
Farkas fails to take into account various aspects of the relation of indiscriminability 
that my discussion highlights, such as its being a relation holding between an 
individual and a class.  
Chapter 4: Hallucinating, for Real 
 
 
138 
 
‘is such that it is not possible to know through reflection that it is not one of 
the veridical perceptions of a white picket fence’ (Martin 2006: 364).  
To say that a hallucination is impersonally indiscriminable from 
perception is to say that one is unable to tell from introspection that the 
hallucination does not belong to the class of perceptions. Understood in this 
sense, the relation of indiscriminability is not a one-to-many relation, as the 
hallucination doesn’t need to be indiscriminable from any individual 
perception. It only seems to belong to the same class as they do. The 
relation is rather a relation between the occurring hallucination and the class 
of (all) perceptions: the relation is one of not being able to tell that the 
former doesn’t belong to the latter. The claim that a hallucination is 
indiscriminable from perception, when properly understood, amounts to the 
inability to correctly categorize the experience as a hallucination rather than 
as a perception. There does not need to be any specific perception from 
which the hallucination is indiscriminable in order for it to be considered a 
member of the class of perceptions. This makes the relation asymmetric: the 
hallucination is indiscriminable from perception in the sense that one cannot 
tell that one’s experience doesn’t belong to the class of perception, but there 
isn’t any sense in which the class of perception is indiscriminable from the 
hallucination.  
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4.2 Hallucination: A Fuzzy Notion  
The proposed reading of indiscriminability is close to certain 
characterizations of hallucination to be found in clinical and experimental 
psychology, where the notion of indiscriminability is entirely absent, but 
instead hallucinations are mainly classified on the basis of the degree of 
success or failure in reality testing and presence or lack of an insight into the 
unreal nature of the hallucination. 
Looking at attempts made by psychologists to define hallucination is 
instructive for philosophers, who tend to underestimate the variety of 
hallucinations, treating them as a monolithic mental kind identified with a 
simple definition. Aleman and Larøi (2008: 16) indicate the following as the 
most accurate definition of hallucination, although they acknowledge that 
this definition also has its limits and that it might not be possible to reach an 
exhaustive definition:  
A sensory experience which occurs in the absence of 
corresponding external stimulation of the relevant sensory 
organ, has a sufficient sense of reality to resemble a veridical 
perception, over which the subject does not feel s/he has direct 
and voluntary control, and which occurs in the awake state. 
(David 2004: 108) 
This definition only captures paradigmatic examples of hallucination, 
leaving out certain phenomena that are considered hallucinations both in 
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ordinary language and for diagnostic purposes, and including phenomena 
that are not hallucinations. Among the weaknesses of this definition are the 
following: 
1. The clause ‘in absence of corresponding external stimulation’ is 
supposed to distinguish hallucination from illusion. However, many 
cases of hallucination are triggered by an external stimulus. For 
instance, someone distraught might hear a menacing voice in the 
blowing of the wind. Depending how we understand the 
‘corresponding external stimulation’, these phenomena will count as 
illusion or hallucination: illusion if we take them to be misperception 
of the external stimulus, or hallucination if we consider that the 
external stimulus doesn’t correspond to the experience (because too 
different from what is presented). Similarly, cases of polyopia might 
equally well be considered as either hallucinations or illusions, 
depending on whether one considers that a real object triggers the 
pattern of multiple copies (illusion), or that there are multiple visible 
objects, while there is only one real object (which makes the various 
‘copies’ of the object hallucinatory) (see ffytche 2013: 59).  
2.  The reference to sufficient resemblance to perception is meant to 
distinguish hallucination from imagination.40 However, it is not clear 
                                                 
40
 The definition refers to resemblance with respect to the sense of reality. 
However, the notion of a ‘sense of reality’ is as ubiquitous as elusive, so much so 
that philosophers (Austin 1962: 59) and psychiatrists (Sarbin 1967) alike have at 
times recommended abandoning it. Even Jaspers (1912), who first stresses the 
importance of the sense of reality of some hallucinations for diagnostic purposes, 
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that hallucinations always bear a stronger resemblance to perception 
than imagery does. A well-known fact among psychologists since the 
pioneering work of Francis Galston in the nineteenth century is that 
different subjects present a striking variety in their respective ability to 
visualize (Thomas 2009). Some, whom Phillips (2014) calls ‘super-
imagers’, report to be able to easily imagine scenes with the apparent 
richness and vividness of normal vision. 
3. The aspect of voluntary control is meant to add a further distinction 
from imagination, but here too we find that not all hallucinations are 
completely beyond voluntary control. On the contrary, teaching 
patients—especially with schizophrenia—how to control their 
hallucinations is a coping strategy widely adopted by practitioners 
(see for instance Jimenez et al. 1996; Badcock and Hugdahl 2014). On 
the other hand, patients with anxiety disorders, depression, eating 
                                                                                                                            
laments the lack of clear criteria for the notion. However, Aggernaes (1972: 222–
227) systematised the various criteria proposed in the literature in the following 
criteria: (1) sensation (‘if it seems to the subject that the experience is due one’s 
sensory organs, and not merely imagined or thought’: (2) behavioural relevance 
(‘the patient or subject experiences this something as being of relevance for his 
emotions and/or needs, and/or actions, in the actual or in some potential situation’ 
223); (3) publicness: (‘if the experiencer is aware […] that anybody else possessing 
normal sensory faculties would be able to perceive this something with his senses 
if he were within reach of it’); (4) objectivity questioned (‘if the experiencer feels 
that under favourable circumstances, he would be able to experience the same 
something with another modality of sensation than the one giving the quality of 
sensation’): (5) existence (‘if the experiencer is aware […] that he feels certain that 
this something also exists when nobody experiences it at all’); (6) involuntarity (‘if 
the experiencer feels that it is impossible or extremely difficult for him to alter or 
dismiss the experience simply by wishing it to be altered or dismissed’); (7) 
independence of a quite unusual mental state in oneself (‘if the experiencer is 
aware […] that this experience is not simply the result of his being in a quite 
unusual state […such as] psychosis, ‘bad nerves’, very intense emotional state, and 
drug-withdrawal state’).  
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disorders, and psychosis frequently report the intrusion of extremely 
vivid, detailed, and uncontrollable visual imagery (see Tudor et al. 
2013).  
4. The condition of wakefulness is meant to exclude dreams from the 
definition. However, episodes like hypnagogic and hypnopompic 
hallucinations—which occur respectively at sleep onset and at 
awakening—could be considered either hallucinations or dreams.  
The unclear boundaries between hallucinations and many other mental 
occurrences suggest that at least some hallucinations could be not sensory 
experience, but rather instances of other types of mental occurrences that 
one mistakenly takes for sensory experiences. One of the most credited 
theories of verbal hallucination in schizophrenia, for instance, explains 
hallucination in terms of misattribution of inner speech to an external 
agency (see for instance Allen, Aleman, and Mcguire 2007; Moseley, 
Fernyhough, and Ellison 2013). In all these cases, the indiscriminability 
from perception simply amounts to a meta-cognitive error: the subject self-
ascribes a kind of mental state, while in fact she has another kind of mental 
state. None of these cases count as impersonally indiscriminable cases that 
can support IND.  
This doesn’t exclude, of course, that some hallucinations are 
genuinely experiential. We need now to consider whether, among these, 
there are some that are introspectively indiscriminable from perception.  
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4.3 What Counts as Impersonally Indiscriminable from 
Perception 
All sorts of different phenomena go under the name of ‘hallucination’; 
from very simple phosphenes and tinnitus to the complex multi-modal 
scenes experienced by some psychotic patients, hallucinations vary greatly 
in their aetiology, phenomenology, and population affected. When 
researching for IIIHs among these multiform phenomena, we can proceed 
by exclusion.  
A first notable fact is that not all hallucinations are confused with 
perception by the subject who undergoes them.41 Many subjects preserve the 
insight that what they are experiencing is not real.42 We thus need to focus 
                                                 
41
 One might contend that failure to discriminate tout court doesn’t exclude that 
the hallucination in question is introspectively indiscriminable from perception. As 
far as we know, one might preserve insight into the unreal nature of their 
experience in virtue of extra-introspective clues, rather than on the basis of 
introspection. One might for instance reason that the content of one’s hallucination 
is very odd and incoherent with one’s previous experiences and conclude that one 
must be hallucinating, although, solely on the basis of introspection, one wouldn’t 
be able to do so. Or one might be told that one is hallucinating. However, since we 
are not interested here in deciding whether this or that hallucination count as 
introspectively indiscriminable, but only with whether there is any hallucination 
that is impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from perception, and since 
there are many cases of hallucination in which the subject believes she is 
perceiving, we had better focus on the latter, rather than looking at those 
hallucinations in which one preserves some insight into the hallucinatory nature of 
one’s experience, and examine whether the ability to discriminate is due to 
introspective or extra-introspective clues. 
42
 At the onset of the systematic scientific study of hallucination in the 19th 
century some thinkers tried to systematise the notion of hallucination and restrict it 
to those experiences where the subject lacks insight into the hallucinatory nature of 
her experience, calling experiences where one lacks such an insight 
‘pseudohallucinations’. However, since its introduction, the meaning of the notion 
has always oscillated between two uses: that of a hallucination with insight and that 
of vivid imagery (See Berrios 1996: 49–59 for an overview of the history of the 
notion). The notion of pseudohallucination is still occasionally used in the clinical 
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on hallucinations in which the subject doesn’t preserve insight into their 
unreal nature. What would it take for a hallucination to count as 
impersonally indiscriminable through introspection from perception? As per 
the notion of impersonal indiscriminability defined in the previous chapter, 
it must be the case that the difference between the hallucination and 
perception, if any, is such that it doesn’t fall under the scope of 
introspection.  
Many cases of hallucinations fail to meet this condition. It seems that, 
if only the subject were more attentive, for instance, she could discriminate 
her current hallucination from cases of perception. For instance, all the cases 
of polyopia, palinopsia—including afterimages 43 —, phosphenes, and 
hallucinations in migraine aura 44 —although they might occasionally be 
taken by the experiencer to be cases of genuine perception—present 
introspectible features that are not to be found in genuine perception: many 
                                                                                                                            
practice with both meanings. However, the current consensus among 
neuroscientists and clinicians is that the notion of pseudohallucination ‘is of little 
theoretical and clinical importance’ (Aleman and Larøi 2008: 22), ‘gives rise to 
much confusion, and is weak because it is defined negatively’ (Berrios and Dening 
1996), and has ‘low construct validity and [is] accordingly clinically ambiguous’ 
(Van der Zwaard and Polak 2001). Thus, nowadays most clinicians and 
psychologists apply the term ‘hallucination’ irrespective of whether the object 
experienced is located externally or is taken to be real.  
43
 Palinopsia is the persistence or recurrence of visual images after the stimulus 
has been removed. It is a non-specific term that describes multiple types of visual 
symptoms, including afterimages, light striking, and visual trailing, and is linked to 
a variety of aetiology.  
44
 An aura is a perceptual disturbance that often precedes the onset of the 
migraine or seizure (although sometimes the aura is not followed by a manifest 
seizure or migraine). Perceptual disturbances include the occurrence of non-
complex hallucinations in different modality, such as a strange smell, a flash of 
light or visual patterns, the feel of a pressure, and noises. It also includes deformed 
experience, such as visual alteration in the contours of objects or a change in the 
experience of environmental light.  
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hallucinations differ significantly from perception with respect to vividness, 
sense of reality, complexity, etc. The objects presented in these 
hallucinations do not appear to be material objects and do not seem to 
occupy the space in the same way as material objects do; they sometimes 
superpose them without occluding them entirely, they do not exhibit size, 
colour, and other forms of perceptual constancy and, in the case of 
phosphenes, afterimages and some hallucinations in migraine aura, they 
remain visible even when one closes one’s eyes.45 A subject who fails to 
realize that she is hallucinating would have been able to do so if she had 
paid attention and reflected more on her experience, for example like 
someone who fails to distinguish a mending done poorly but would have 
noticed it if she had looked more carefully.  
Many cases of more complex hallucinations have a dream-like 
character or an otherwise fuzzy, confused, incoherent, indeterminate 
character. Epileptic patients, for instance, often describe the hallucinatory 
experiences that precede a seizure as dream-like or memory-like, and these 
episodes are called a ‘dreamy state’ by some clinicians (Vignal et al. 2007). 
Hallucinations induced by LSD and other psychotropic drugs, but also in 
some psychotic states, are described as more vivid and bright than any 
genuine perception ever experienced (see Huxley 1954; Sacks 2012: 90–
121; Duppen 2015).  
                                                 
45
 See Phillips (2013) for a discussion of afterimages and how the relationalist can 
accommodate them; see Sacks (1985; 2012: 122–132) and Schott (2007) for a 
description of migraine aura; see Gersztenkorn and Lee (2015) for a literature 
review on palinopsia. 
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How about hallucinations that don’t display these phenomenal 
differences and seem to have all the traits that we generally find in 
perceptionexperiences where the object presented seem constant, 
persistent, perceived as existing in the external environment, that present the 
same vividness and coherence as genuine perceptions? It is not clear that the 
presence of all these conditions in a hallucination indicate that it is an IIIH.  
The problem is that it is not clear what would count as evidence for 
this claim. In order to prove that certain hallucinations are impersonally 
indiscriminable from perception, we have to show that, in such cases, there 
isn’t anything that interferes with the subject’s capacity to tell that she is not 
in fact perceiving. Many hallucinations are vivid, described by the subject 
as entirely similar to perception, and believed to be genuine perception, but 
there is no way to verify that nothing is going wrong with some cognitive 
faculty of the subject or with some other condition that, if absent, would 
enable the subject to distinguish her experience from perception. 
On the contrary, there is extensive evidence that some cognitive 
impairment or some state of distress can influence the subject’s insight on 
the hallucinatory nature of her experience. The incidence of hallucinations 
where the subject lacks insight into the unreal nature of her experience is 
much higher in the clinical population with psychiatric or neurological 
disorders such as schizophrenia, Alzheimer’s syndrome, or peduncular 
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hallucinosis,46  or in altered states due to psychoactive drugs, where the 
hallucination is associated with cognitive and behavioural abnormalities, 
and emotional distress—which are likely to impair one’s ability to tell a 
hallucination apart from normal perception. On the contrary, in 
hallucinations in non-psychiatric populations such as patients with sensory 
deficits, e.g. Charles Bonnet syndrome (Eperjesi and Akbarali 2004),47 in 
the large majority of cases the patient is fully aware of the hallucinatory 
nature of her experience.  
This suggests, albeit in a non-conclusive way, that cognitive 
impairments may, unbeknownst to the subject, interfere with her ability to 
discriminate her hallucination from perception.  
Even in cases where the non-psychiatric patient takes herself to be 
perceiving, we are not in a position to know whether some factor interferes 
with her capacity to judge about her current state and whether, were this 
                                                 
46
 Peduncular hallucinosis is a rare neurological disorder that causes vivid and 
very realistic visual hallucinations that typically occur in dark environments and 
last for several minutes. The hallucinations often involve people and environments 
that are familiar to the affected individuals, and patients can rarely distinguish 
between the hallucinations and reality. Peduncular hallucinosis occur in patients 
with serious lesions in the frontal cortex and are often associated with dementia, 
Alzheimer’s syndrome, and delirium tremens (see Benke 2006).  
47
 Charles Bonner syndrome is a common condition among people who have lost 
their sight entirely or to a great extent and consists in the occurrence of visual 
hallucination (very rarely accompanied by sound) of simple repeated patterns or 
complex hallucinations, often with repeated figures (animals, people, faces—often 
deformed—landscapes, buildings) scrolling across one’s visual field repeatedly. 
The hallucinations are typically well-defined, organized, and clear, and the patient 
has little or no control over them. They are usually pleasant or emotionally neutral, 
but may sometimes cause distress if the figures appearing are frightening, such as 
scary animals or deformed figures. It is believed that they are due to spontaneous 
activity in the visual cortex that hasn’t yet accommodated to the lack of stimuli 
(See Manon et al. 2003 for an overview).  
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factor to be removed, she would still not be able to tell her hallucination 
apart from perception. Take a case of hallucination in a patient with Charles 
Bonnet syndrome, where the subject thinks she is genuinely perceiving. It 
could be the case that she fails to recognize herself as hallucinating because 
she is, for instance, surprised or scared by her experience and isn’t paying 
sufficient attention to its character. There is no way to exclude any such 
interfering condition.  
 While there is sufficient empirical evidence to claim that in many 
cases an interference disrupts the subject’s ability to discriminate her 
hallucination from perception, no clear evidence currently seems to be 
available for the existence of cases where no such interference is at play. 
Hence, so far, premise (2*) is not empirically supported. Since premise (2*) 
is meant to be an empirical claim, it cannot be accepted unless further 
empirical studies show that in certain cases of hallucination we can rule out 
the intervention of an interference of some sort as the cause of the subject’s 
inability to tell her experience apart from genuine perceptions. 
 The only way in which we can introduce the case for the possibility 
of hallucinations that are impersonally indiscriminable from perception is 
via a stipulation: one should simply assume that some hallucinations are 
impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from perception. In the next 
chapter I will consider whether good reasons exist for making such an 
assumption. In the remainder of this chapter I will consider how these 
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considerations bear on the way we should think of the challenge that 
hallucinations pose to relationalists.  
  
4.4 The Problem of Hallucination is Not a Phenomenological 
Problem 
Whether or not this stipulation is acceptable and well-grounded, the 
present chapter has shown that the opponent of relationalism should be 
doing much more work in order to make the argument from hallucination go 
through. The spreading step requires IND and IND has some plausibility 
only if we employ the notion of impersonal indiscriminability. Therefore, 
the argument must also show that some IIIHs exist. In this chapter, I have 
shown that there is no conclusive empirical evidence to support that claim. 
This needs to be introduced through stipulation and the validity of the 
stipulation must be motivated on theoretical grounds.  
This confirms what I argued in Chapter 2. The argument from 
hallucination arises from a conflict between the way perception strikes us, 
on one hand, and a reasoning that emerges when we start to think 
problematically and philosophically about experiences, which allegedly 
compels us to give the same account to both perception and hallucination, 
on the other. As Valberg puts it, this is ‘problematic reasoning’, not a 
phenomenological datum (as transparency and the apparent relationality of 
experience are). As we will see in the next chapter, it is because of certain 
things we know about experiences, such as what brings them about and the 
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sufficient conditions for their occurrence, that we suppose that a certain type 
of hallucination (IIIH) is possible. And only the possibility of IIIHs sets the 
spreading step in motion.  
Not all proponents of the argument from hallucination, however, are 
as clear as Valberg about the theoretical nature of the problem. There is 
widespread temptation to think of the problem posed by hallucination as a 
phenomenological one. Some philosophers explicitly present the argument 
from hallucination as a phenomenological problem for relationalists. 
Crane, for instance, claims that ‘[t]his problem is a phenomenological 
problem, in the broad sense of having to do with how things appear to us’ 
(Crane 2005b: 242: see also Crane 2005a). The problem, according to 
Crane, arises from the incompatibility of four assumptions that are equally 
phenomenological, in the sense that they are motivated by how experience 
strikes us. These assumptions are the mind-independence of the object of 
perception, what he calls the ‘openness of perception’—‘when a subject has 
a perceptual experience of an object, the nature of the experience is partly 
determined by the nature of the actual object currently being perceived’ 
(Crane 2005b: 231)—, the possibility of hallucination, and IND, which he 
calls the ‘identity of subjective indistinguishables’.  
As we have seen, IND is certainly not grounded in how experience 
strikes us, and is far from obvious. Interestingly, when it comes to 
explaining and motivating the assumptions composing the antinomy, Crane 
indicates two possible motivations. One is what he calls a Cartesian view of 
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the mental—recently defended by Farkas (2003). This view commits to 
some version of the infallibility of introspection, which I rejected in Chapter 
3. The second motivation he considers is local supervenience, which I will 
consider and reject in the next chapter. Irrespective of whether they are valid 
motivations or not, none of these is a phenomenological motivation, so it is 
puzzling and misleading that Crane calls the problem ‘phenomenological’. 
This feeds the confusion regarding the structure and the motivations 
underlying the argument from hallucination and makes it look easier than it 
is to mount a seriously threatening argument against relationalism.  
Millar (2014) states even more clearly that the problem hallucinations 
pose for relationalism is phenomenological. He argues:  
I suffer a hallucination, some object seems to be immediately 
present to me even though there is no such object—but 
perceptual acquaintance can’t explain the phenomenological 
directness of such an experience since one can only be 
perceptually acquainted with objects that exist. Thus, naïve 
realism would seem to have difficulty handling what we might 
call the phenomenological problem of perception (‘the 
phenomenological problem’ for short): how to develop a theory 
of perception that explains the phenomenological directness of 
perceptual experience given that illusory and hallucinatory 
experiences possesses this phenomenological feature, and 
assuming that such a theory should provide a unified 
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explanation of why veridical, illusory and hallucinatory 
experiences possess this phenomenological feature. (Millar 
2014: 626, my italics) 
Millar embeds among the allegedly obvious assumptions about how 
experience strikes us the assumption that a unified explanation should be 
provided for the phenomenal character of perceptions, illusions, and 
hallucinations. But there is no phenomenological datum that supports this 
assumption. If anything, in this chapter, we have seen that there are reasons 
to suppose that it is not even possible to achieve a unified account of 
hallucinations, let alone of perceptions, illusions, and hallucinations. There 
is no clear phenomenological characteristic that all hallucinations share and 
that they also share unequivocally with perceptions.  
Moreover, even if we grant that at least some hallucinations have 
certain phenomenological features in common with perception, this is no 
reason to suppose that they are the same kind of mental occurrence whose 
phenomenal character is to be accounted for in the same way. The fact that 
such similarities exist is not something that the relationalist overlooks, as we 
saw in Chapter 2. However, relationalists reject the spreading step and the 
idea that we should account for them in the same way. Invoking the 
similarities between perception and hallucination is not enough to compel 
one to accept the spreading step, just as invoking the similarity between a 
lemon and a lemon-shaped soap in not enough to prove that they are the 
same kind of thing. What is needed to secure the spreading step is IND. But, 
Chapter 4: Hallucinating, for Real 
 
 
153 
 
as we have seen, IND has some plausibility only if introspective 
indiscriminability is impersonal, and thus the spreading step can obtain only 
if one can show that hallucinations are indistiguishable in this sense. As we 
have seen in this chapter, no phenomenological evidence is available to 
support this claim. Therefore, there is no valid phenomenological argument 
from hallucination against relationalism.  
There is a tendency to evaluate relationalism on the basis of its ability 
to provide a valid and credible account of hallucination, and a presumption 
that it can’t. However, relationalists can say whatever they want about the 
phenomenal character of hallucination, as long as they don’t thereby 
establish that the spreading step is successful. They can say that the 
phenomenal character of hallucination is constituted by sense-data, qualia, 
intentional properties, relations to spatial locations, relations to universals, 
or anything else. It is also possible that different hallucinations deserve 
different accounts.  
If the spreading step fails, no constraint is imposed on the relationalist 
as to what account can be given for hallucination—apart from the constraint 
that it cannot be a relationalist account. Of course, for any account of 
hallucination the relationalist proposes, it remains to be seen whether is it 
satisfactory, but this should be decided on its own merits and terms, not with 
respect to the consequences this could have for the relationalist account of 
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genuine perceptions.48 One may lament that relationalists so far haven’t said 
enough about how we should account for hallucinations. But this would 
simply amount to expressing distaste for one’s chosen research topic: 
complaining that the relationalist is interested in accounting for the 
phenomenal character of genuine perception, rather than that of 
hallucination.  
Moreover, the discussion in this chapter shows that, even if it turns out 
that we have to stipulate the possibility of impersonally indiscriminable 
hallucinations, for those cases of hallucination that are not impersonally 
indiscriminable—as far as we can tell, all documented hallucinations—can 
still be accounted for in terms of whatever one deems fit. The success of the 
spreading step would impose constraints only on the account to be given of 
impersonally indiscriminable hallucinations. The failure to realise this is 
largely due to the lack, in the current debate, of serious discussion on the 
notion of indiscriminability and of what is required for IND to be plausible, 
among both proponents and opponents of relationalism. Failing to 
appreciate the distinctions between different notions of indiscriminability 
and that impersonal indiscriminability through introspection is required to 
(tentatively) motivate IND leads many to think that the simple failure to tell 
that one is not genuinely perceiving imposes constraints for the relationalist 
                                                 
48
 In Chapter 6 we will see that constraints are indeed imposed on the account that 
relationalists should give of hallucinations. But these constraints do not arise from 
the acceptance of IND, but from a problem identified by Martin (2004; 2006), 
which he calls the screening-off problem.  
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with respect to what she can plausibly say about the phenomenal character 
of hallucinations.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter I explored whether there is any evidence to conclude 
that at least some hallucinations are impersonally indiscriminable through 
introspection from perceptions. I argued that the structure of the relation of 
indiscriminability with which we are concerned holds between an occurring 
hallucination and the whole class of perceptions: it amounts to saying that it 
is impossible to tell through introspection that one’s current experience is 
not a member of the class of perceptions.  
I then argued that, in virtue of the superficiality constraint that 
emerged from the discussion in the previous chapter, in order for a 
hallucination to be an IIIH, it must be the case that what distinguishes the 
hallucination from perceptions is not accessible through introspection. In 
order to show that this is the case, one should prove that there is no 
condition (altered state of mind, or cognitive deficits) that may impair one’s 
introspective capacities and prevent one from noticing through introspection 
certain phenomenological differences that would be otherwise detectable. I 
argued that, when considering hallucinations, it is not possible to exclude 
the occurrence of any of these interfering conditions. Indeed, it is not clear 
what kind of empirical evidence could prove the absence of such conditions.  
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The proponent of the argument from hallucination can still maintain 
that it is possible to have hallucinations that are indiscriminable from 
perception in the impersonal sense, even though we do not have conclusive 
empirical evidence for their actual existence. She would have to resort to 
introducing via stipulation the possibility of certain hallucinations that meet 
this criterion. In the next chapter I will explore whether this stipulation is 
legitimate, how it should be thought of, and, if we accept it, what follows 
from this. 
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We have seen that there is a sense in which premise (2) in the traditional 
argument from hallucination is obviously true: some hallucinations are such 
that one may fail to tell that they are not a case of genuine perception. 
However, if we understand premise (2) in this way, even if we accepted 
IND, the argument from hallucination would be a non-sequitur. For IND 
requires impersonal indiscriminability through introspection, while the 
sense in which (2) is trivially true only delivers mere failure to discriminate 
on a given occasion, or if it involves a modal notion of indiscriminability at 
all, it is one that is relative to the subject and her current situation, not the 
impersonal notion of indiscriminability required. 
In order for the argument to succeed, thus, one needs to show that a 
modified version of premise (2) is true. This modified version reads as 
follows: 
(2*) Some hallucinations are impersonally 
indiscriminable through introspection from genuine 
perception (IIIHs).  
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But in the previous chapter we saw that there is no empirical evidence 
available to support this claim. What the proponent of the argument can do, 
then, is to show that IIIHs are metaphysically possible, although there is no 
evidence that any actual hallucination meets the requirements for being an 
IIIH. In other words, (2) should be further replaced with the following 
modal claim:  
(2#) IIIHs are metaphysically possible. 
 In this chapter, I shall consider whether we have any grounds for 
making such a modal claim. I will consider three principles that might be 
seen as viable candidates for supporting (2#): experiential naturalism, local 
supervenience, and the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’ 
principle. I will argue that the first is insufficient to demonstrate the 
possibility of IIIHs; while the other two principles are problematic and beg 
the question against relationalism. In the process, I will also argue that two 
alternative versions of the argument from hallucination based on the latter 
two principles, which aim to reject relationalism without assuming IND, 
fail. I will also introduce and dismiss a further argument against 
relationalism, aiming to show that, if we consider—as we should—the 
object of perception as causally related to the perception, it cannot also play 
a constitutive role in determining the nature of perception, since cause and 
effect are metaphysically independent.  
However, at the end of the chapter I will present a non-conclusive 
reason for accepting that IIIHs are possible, based on (1) the metaphysical 
possibility of stimulating the brain in such a way that the subject is in the 
same neural state as in a genuine perception and (2) the fact that, in such a 
case, we lack reasons for assuming that any condition might interfere with 
one’s capacities to introspect.  
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5.1 A Metaphysical Possibility  
An obvious reaction to the failure to find empirical evidence for the actual 
existence of IIIHs is to say that there is no need to establish that any actual 
hallucination is an IIIH. It is enough to establish that IIIHs are 
metaphysically possible. This metaphysical possibility, it is widely believed, 
is as telling of the nature of experience as the actual existence of IIIHs.  
Hence, one might argue, we can replace the existential claim in (2*), 
saying that that there are hallucinations that are impersonally 
indiscriminable through introspection from veridical perception, with a 
modal claim:  
(2#) IIIHs are metaphysically possible.  
Many recent versions of the argument, indeed, feature such a modal 
claim, although as we saw in the previous chapter, it is often suggested that 
the argument can run on the simple assumption that actual hallucinations are 
indiscriminable (in a subjective, not impersonal, way) from perception. 
Robinson (2013), for instance, claims that philosophers are generally not (or 
should not be) interested in hallucinations as they actually occur, but in 
metaphysically possible IIIHs, that he calls ‘philosophers’ hallucinations’.49 
The revised argument from hallucination, with the modified second 
premise, runs as follows:  
                                                 
49
 Like most philosophers, Robinson doesn’t make the distinction between 
different notions of indistinguishablility, so he only says that philosopher’s 
hallucinations are subjectively indiscriminable from perception, not that they are 
impersonally indiscriminable.  
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1. Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of conscious 
perceptual experiences is to be accounted for in terms of the 
obtaining of a psychological relation with the mind-independent 
objects with which one is perceptually presented;  
2#. In some cases of hallucination, one has an experience which is 
introspectively indiscriminable from an experience one may have 
in a genuine perception;  
3. In the hallucinatory case, the object one seems to perceive doesn’t 
exist; 
4. (from 3) In the hallucinatory case, the phenomenal character of 
one’s experience is not accounted for in terms of the obtaining of a 
psychological relation with the mind-independent objects with 
which one is perceptually presented; 
5. If two conscious experiences are introspectively indiscriminable, 
they have the same phenomenal character (IND); 
6. (from 1, 4, 5) Relationalism cannot be true even in the genuine 
perceptual case. 
We need to assess whether there is any reason to accept (2#).  
The first thing to notice is that in the previous chapter I argued that 
when we assess whether an actual hallucination is indiscriminable from 
perception, we are assessing whether the hallucination in question can be (or 
could be, were the conditions more favourable) said through introspection 
not to be part of the class of perceptions. (2#) claims that a certain type of 
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hallucination is possible. Since it states the possibility of a scenario, we 
don’t have an actual hallucination to be compared with the class of 
perceptions. But we have a counterfactual scenario and instructions to 
imagine such a scenario. The instructions go roughly like this: take 
whatever perception you are having now and suppose that the object seen is 
removed while you keep having an experience introspectively 
indiscriminable from the perception of the object.  
In the previous chapter, we argued that, when it comes to ordinary 
hallucinations—however we understand the relation of indiscriminability—
the relation holds between an occurring hallucination and a class of 
perceptions. Since the relation holds between an individual and a class, it is 
not symmetrical. The relation of indiscriminability holds between a 
hallucination and a class in the sense that it is not possible for the person to 
tell that her hallucinatory experience is not a member of the class of genuine 
perceptions. This relation is asymmetrical because the reverse cannot be 
true: it doesn’t make sense for a class to be indiscriminable from an 
individual.  
On the contrary, in the case of philosopher’s hallucinations, the 
relation of indiscriminability holds between a genuine perception chosen at 
will and a hypothetical hallucination. This is a one-to-one relation involving 
particulars, and we saw in the previous chapter that this kind of relation is, 
in its typical form, symmetrical. What might prevent the relation from being 
symmetrical in any meaningful sense, however, is the fact that the 
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hallucination is a hypothetical construct and the perception provides the 
model for imagining such a hallucination. 
While it makes sense to claim that a counterfactual hallucinatory 
situation is indiscriminable from a genuine perception, it is not so clear what 
it would mean for an actual situation to be said to be indiscriminable from a 
counterfactual one, all the more so if the counterfactual situation is designed 
to be indiscriminable from the target perception. If it makes sense at all to 
say that the perception is indiscriminable from the hallucination, it can only 
be in a trivial, non informative way: the perception is trivially 
indiscriminable from the counterfactual hallucination, since it was part of 
the instructions to imagine the latter such that is indiscriminable from the 
perception. If there isn’t a structural asymmetry, there is at least an 
important asymmetry in the order of explanation of the direction of the 
relation of indiscriminability. Being indiscriminable from a definite 
perception was part of the instructions given for constructing the 
counterfactual hallucination. It is an open question whether or not these 
instructions can be followed. Whether or not they can successfully be 
followed—i.e. whether or not it is possible to have a hallucination that is 
indiscriminable from the target perception—will tell us something about the 
hallucination, but it is unclear whether it will tell us anything about the 
perception. Even if we can grammatically say that the perception is 
indiscriminable from the hypothetical hallucination (which has been 
designed to be indiscriminable from the perception), this doesn’t say 
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anything informative about the perception itself, if not that it can be used as 
a model for conjuring up a counterfactual situation.  
The asymmetry of this relation will become relevant in the following 
chapter, in which I will defend a negative view of hallucination as the only 
way to respond to the superficiality constraint and to other challenges 
arising for relationalist accounts, where this negative account of 
hallucination would be threatened if the relation of indiscriminability were 
symmetrical. But it is also relevant for the purposes of the current chapter, 
i.e. for deciding whether we should accept (2#). For it is important to 
understand the nature of the relation between a hallucination and the 
perception from which it is meant to be impersonally indiscriminable. 
Many philosophers hold (2#) with extreme confidence. Most often, 
the possibility of IIIHs, often called ‘perfect hallucinations’ or 
‘corresponding hallucinations’ is simply stated, as a fact that doesn’t require 
further questioning. Farkas notices that many ‘introductions to the problem 
of perceptual knowledge, or epistemology, or scepticism, or the nature of 
perception’ contain something like the following paragraph:  
Suppose I now see a teacup in front of me. Wouldn’t it be 
possible that everything seems the same, and yet the teacup I 
take myself to be perceiving is not there? Wouldn’t it be 
possible to have a hallucination which is subjectively 
indistinguishable from my present experience? (Farkas 2006: 
207)  
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It is clear that these are rhetorical questions, as becomes manifest in 
Farkas’ next sentence, where she abandons the questioning and switches to 
talking about ‘the fact that hallucinations are possible’. 50  It should be 
noticed that in this passage, as in those I will quote later and in most 
discussions on the argument from hallucination, there is no mention of the 
hallucination being impersonally indistinguishable from perception, because 
of a lack of awareness of the relevance to the debate of different notions of 
indiscriminability. However, the scenario that Farkas and others introduce 
as possible here is compatible with the conditions imposed by the 
impersonal notion of indiscriminability that I discussed in Chapter 3.  
Similarly, in their introduction to their edited volume on 
disjunctivism, Byrne and Logue start by proposing the following thought 
experiment:  
Imagine that you are looking at an ordinary lemon in good light. 
Your vision is good: you see the lemon, and it looks yellow and 
ovoid. Now suppose that, unbeknownst to you, some minor 
deity removes the lemon, while preserving its proximate neural 
effects. Your brain is in the same local physical states as it was 
                                                 
50
 By ‘hallucinations’ she does not mean any kind of hallucination, but 
‘subjectively indiscriminable hallucinations’, as she says in the preceding passage. 
However, this is an indication of the widespread tendency that I signalled earlier 
among proponents of the argument from hallucination to switch from presenting 
the argument as relying simply on the trivial fact that we have hallucinations to the 
possibility of a certain kind of hallucinations that is supposed to pose special 
problems to relationalists. This adds to the confusion due to the lack of discussion 
of different notions of indiscriminability.  
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in when the lemon was there: the neurons in your visual cortex, 
for instance, are firing in the same pattern. After the removal, 
you do not see the lemon, because the lemon is not around to be 
seen. Yet—we can all grant—you notice nothing amiss. 
Questioned after the removal, you claim that you have been 
looking at a lemon for the last few minutes. (Byrne and Logue 
2008b: vii) 
For Smith (2002) there is indeed no room for doubt on this matter:  
It is surely not open to serious question that […] if the activity 
of your optic nerve when you are genuinely perceiving 
something green is precisely replicated artificially, you will, 
other things about you being normal, seem to see something 
green in a genuinely sensory manner. (Smith 2002: 203) 
Byrne and Logue, as well as Smith, mention the conditions in which 
we have reason to believe that an IIIH could be produced: i.e. upon 
activation of the subject’s neurons in a way that matches the neural state she 
is in when having a genuine perception. I will call this situation a ‘neurally 
matching situation’. Thus, we can say that (2#) relies on the following 
assumption: 
(a) It is possible to have a neurally matching situation: i.e. it is 
possible to reproduce the neural state one is in when perceiving, in 
the absence of the object of perception. 
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 Robinson (1994), however, notices that this assumption alone is not 
sufficient to motivate (2#). A further assumption is needed. In his words, 
this is the idea that:  
(b) ‘our mental life is strongly tied to what happens in the brain’ 
(Robinson 1994: 152).  
The thought is that, in virtue of the relation between psychological 
occurrence and neural state stated in (b), if it is possible to stimulate the 
brain as stated in (a), the result of (a) would be an IIIH. For Robinson, both 
these claims are uncontroversial, as is their ability to grant (2#). But we 
should pause and ask whether or not this is true. 
One could object that (a) is far from obvious. Our knowledge of the 
minute functioning of the brain is as yet far too unsophisticated to allow us 
to freeze the brain in a state specific to a given time. As far as we know, 
there might be insurmountable limitations making it impossible to ever do 
so, no matter how far the evolution of neuroscience and technology goes.  
However, Robinson points out that (a) should be understood as a 
claim about what is compatible with known natural laws. It doesn’t matter 
whether freezing the relevant brain state is or will ever be practicable. What 
matters is the fact that such a neurally matching situation is physically 
possible; that is to say possible without breaching the causal laws:
51
  
                                                 
51
 By noting that this scenario is physically possible, I do not commit to the claim, 
weaker than metaphysical possibility, that the scenario is possible only within the 
current physical laws, but that it is possible without breaching physical laws, which 
is compatible with it being possible in a world governed by different physical laws. 
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Such a fixing of brain state is conceivable, not only in the sense 
that it is logically possible; it is empirically possible, in the 
sense that we may conceive of ways of doing it which involved 
no breach of natural law. This is compatible with its not being 
practicable and even with our having reasons for thinking that it 
might never be practical. It might even happen by a remarkably 
improbable coincidence (given quantum theory) or there might 
be a drug which held constant the relevant areas of the brain. 
(Robinson 1994: 152) 
Thus understood, there doesn’t seem to be any reason to reject (a): the 
possibility of neural replication, although potentially impracticable, doesn’t 
seem to breach natural laws.  
 
5.2 Experiential Naturalism 
Whether the possibility of a neurally matching situation entails the 
possibility of IIIHs as stated in (2#) depends on how we understand the 
nature of the ‘strong tie’ stated in (b). Robinson talks vaguely about a 
‘strong tie’ between mental life and the brain. What is this tie supposed to 
be? Is it causation? Is it mere correlation? If there is a causal law, what sort 
of causal law links them? Talk of a strong connection, as noticed by 
Bergson, is as obvious as uninformative:  
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That there is a close connection between a state of 
consciousness and the brain we do not dispute. But there is also 
a close connection between a coat and the nail on which it 
hangs, for, if the nail is pulled out, the coat falls to the ground. 
(Bergson 1988: 12) 
We cannot hope in this context to define the exact nature of the 
relation between mental occurrence and neural states. Doing so would 
require taking a stance in the debate over the controversial mind–body 
problem, which is far too deep and broad to be satisfactorily tackled here. 
However, the acceptance of (2#) should not require committing to any 
controversial claim. Robinson must conceive the acceptance of (b) as being 
independent from commitments on the mind–body problem, since there is 
notoriously very little agreement on the latter, while Robinson presents (b) 
as widely agreed upon.  
One uncontroversial idea that might motivate (b) is what Martin 
(2006) calls ‘experiential naturalism’. This is the idea that ‘our sense 
experiences are themselves part of the natural causal order, subject to 
broadly physical and psychological causes’(Martin 2006: 357). Martin 
explains what he takes to be involved in being part of the natural causal 
order by underlying what it would take to reject experiential naturalism:  
Where there is a genuine causation, then there is a pattern of 
causes and effects that has an implicit generality. If a given 
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causal condition has produced a certain kind of effect in one 
context [and another kind of effect in another], then there will be 
some general condition which differs between the two. It seems 
that to deny this would be either to claim that in the case of 
psycho-physical causation there need be no such determinacy of 
cause to effect, or to embrace in general a radical singularism 
about causation according to which the fact that particular 
causes were related to the effects that they had implied nothing 
at all about the general patterns of causation. (Martin 2004: 288) 
Experiential naturalism affirms that the generality and regularity of 
causal processes applies to experiential phenomena. As Martin notices, this 
is a ‘regulative assumption of both empirical work on sense experience and 
philosophical discussion of it’ (Martin 2006: 360). This principle is general 
enough to be accepted by proponents of all sorts of metaphysical views and 
empirical hypotheses about the relation between mental occurrences and 
brain states.  
But is this reading of (b) enough to support (2#)? Valberg seems to 
think so. Valberg doesn’t talk of ‘experiential naturalism’, but rather of what 
he calls a ‘causal picture of experience’, which consists in the idea 
expressed by ‘experiential naturalism’ complemented with some more or 
less rudimental notion of the specific causal laws concerning ‘the basic facts 
about the transmission and reflection of light, the nature of the eye, and the 
process in the nervous system and brain which results or culminates in 
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visual experience’ (Valberg 1992b: 24). Valberg claims that the idea that the 
same brain activity could continue to occur even in the absence of the 
external stimulus is ‘implicit in our everyday knowledge about the causal 
dependence of experience on objects and processes in the world (implicit, 
i.e., in the causal picture of experience)’ (Valberg 1992b: 25). We have 
already granted that we can suppose that it is possible to maintain a brain 
state unvaried in the absence of the object experienced. But Valberg says 
something more than that: he claims that ‘if the activity in my brain were to 
continue on as it is, my experience would also continue on as it is’ (Valberg 
1992b: 25) and ‘it would be in some sense be true that how things are in my 
experience would remain the same’ (Valberg 1992b: 28). This further step is 
more problematic. It is far from obvious that this would suffice to maintain 
an experience that is indiscriminable from the original perceptual 
experience—let alone the far stronger claim that it would be the very same 
experience. So we need to consider more carefully what ‘experiential 
naturalism’ entails. Here Valberg seems to conflate the claim that a given 
neural state is a necessary condition for a certain mental occurrence with the 
claim that the brain state is sufficient for the mental occurrence.52  
                                                 
52
 By committing to this sufficiency claim, as a matter of fact, then, Valberg 
commits to something along the lines of the ‘same proximate cause, same 
immediate effect’ principle that I will discuss later in this chapter. However, I have 
opted to discuss his proposal separately, as relying on a more general commitment 
to the simple idea that there is some causal link between neural state and conscious 
experience, because he seems to believe that the possibility of IIIHs derives solely 
from the general and pre-theoretical idea that there is some sort of psycho-physical 
causal law, without the need to commit to any particular view about causality. 
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The principle of ‘experiential naturalism’ states that if we have two 
situations in which the same cause produces a certain kind of effect in one 
situation and another kind of effect in the other situation, this must be due to 
some difference in the background conditions or antecedents of the causes 
in the two situations. For instance, the striking of a match generally 
generates fire; but this effect doesn’t occur if the match is struck in an 
atmosphere that doesn’t contain oxygen, or if the match is immediately 
immersed in water after the striking. In the case of our neurally matching 
situation, the principle predicts that the effect of the brain activity in the 
hallucinatory case can differ from the effect of the brain activation in the 
perceptual case only if different contextual conditions are in place. But it is 
no mystery that there are indeed different conditions in the perceptual and 
hallucinatory case: the presence or absence of the external object. Since the 
brain states in perception and in the neurally matching situation are 
identical, it is possible that the resulting effects will differ in all sorts of 
ways. As far as what experiential naturalism dictates, it is possible that the 
absence of the object would act like the absence of oxygen in the match 
scenario: in its absence there might not be an experience with a phenomenal 
character, let alone one indiscriminable from that of a genuine perception.  
This is not to deny the intuition that neural replication would result in 
an IIIH. For all we know so far, it might or might not be true, but certainly it 
doesn’t follow from experiential naturalism alone. Sure, it would be 
disconcerting and disappointing to be forced to reject the powerful intuition 
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that neural replication, if possible, would give rise to IIIHs. But precisely 
because this intuition is so forceful and widespread, it is important to 
understand what exactly underwrites it. Unfortunately, assumptions about 
the link between mind and brain underwriting (2#) are rarely discussed and 
often conflated with one another.  
In what follows, I will identify two assumptions that are often more or 
less explicitly offered to motivate (2#) and are often used interchangeably, 
although they have different implications and demand different 
commitments. These are the principle of local supervenience and the ‘same 
proximate cause, same immediate effect’ principle. Both principles are often 
used to mount independent arguments against relationalismarguments 
that are allegedly more compelling than the traditional one (including in the 
revised form we are considering here), since they do not require the 
acceptance of IND, which (as we have seen) is the most speculative and 
controversial premise in the argument. I will argue that neither local 
supervenience nor the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’ 
principle are well motivated. Therefore, they cannot be used to motivate 
(2#) in the revised argument from hallucination, nor they can feature in 
independent arguments against relationalism.  
 
5.3 Local Supervenience 
One tempting way to think of the ‘strong tie’ between conscious experience 
and brain state is in terms of supervenience. It is often claimed that the 
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mental supervenes on the brain, in the sense that no two mental occurrences 
can differ qualitatively without there being an underlying difference in the 
properties of the brain state. Typically, supervenience claims are used in 
philosophy of mind as part of attempts to define the commitments of 
physicalism and, although different supervenience claims might entail 
stronger or weaker versions of physicalism, even the weakest version of the 
supervenience thesis entails a commitment to at least a very minimal 
physicalism. Thus, supervenience, at least in some version, can be accepted 
by any philosopher with physicalist inclinations, as it remains neutral on all 
sorts of questions about the nature of mental phenomena. Supervenience 
states a connection of sufficiency between brain and phenomenal character, 
but it doesn’t specify the nature of such a relation, or what explains it, and is 
therefore compatible with multiple ways of construing the relation between 
the mind and the brain, including ways that allow other factors to influence 
the relation of dependency between the brain state and the phenomenal 
character of the experience.  
Despite the pervasive success of physicalism among current 
philosophers, there are still some who resist itfor instance Robinson, who 
is committed to a version of substance dualism.
53
 Therefore, for Robinson it 
cannot be a supervenience claim that underwrites (2#). However, this seems 
                                                 
53
 Some maintain that some versions of property dualism are compatible with 
physicalism. For instance, primitivist emergentists claim that the mind supervenes 
on the body insofar as the latter is a precondition for emergence. Whether these are 
coherent views and whether they really fulfil the brief of both physicalism and 
dualism is a question I shall not address in this thesis.  
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to be exactly what many other philosophers who equally take (2#) to be 
undeniable have in mind and is thus worth exploring.   
Although supervenience is generally taken to be the minimal 
commitment of physicalism, the literature is replete with ‘an unlovely 
proliferation’—as Lewis puts it (Lewis 1986: 14)—of brands of 
supervenience claims: general and local, weak and strong supervenience 
claims being the most popular versions. These are not equally minimal and 
non-committal and it is a matter of debate which brand of supervenience 
one should accept. Also, supervenience claims often leave unqualified what 
properties of mental occurrences supervene on the brain state, probably 
under the assumption that all properties of a mental occurrence do so.  
But it is important to make distinctions. For instance, an externalist 
about mental content might maintain that the mental content of an 
experience doesn’t supervene on the subject’s brain state, yet its 
phenomenal character does (Burge (1979; 2003) is a prominent advocate of 
this view). Most representationalists indeed see the relation between content 
and phenomenal character as a one-direction relation: the phenomenal 
character supervenes on the content, but not vice versa. Since externalism 
about content is widely accepted, while externalism about phenomenal 
character is not and strikes many philosophers as implausible,
54
 here I will 
                                                 
54
 This is due to the understanding of phenomenal characters that many of these 
representationalists have in terms of intrinsic properties, or qualia, an 
understanding of phenomenal character that the relationalist and any other 
externalist about phenomenal character is committed to reject. Whether such an 
understanding of phenomenal character is indeed compatible with externalism 
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consider supervenience about phenomenal character alone. This is also 
because we are interested in supervenience as a motivation for (2#), which 
is a claim about introspectively indiscriminable experiences, i.e. about 
experiences that are indiscriminable with respect to their phenomenal 
character.  
In addition, in order to be relevant to (2#), the supervenience claim 
needs to be local. Global supervenience claims that the total state of any 
possible world could not have been any different mentally without differing 
physically. But the situations in perception and hallucination differ 
physically from one another in that in one case, but not in the other, there is 
an object. As far as we know, the presence of the object could be a 
necessary condition for the occurrence of an experience with a certain 
phenomenal character. Global supervenience would allow for the neurally 
matching situation to produce a hallucination with a phenomenal character 
introspectively different from that of perception, or even for the neurally 
matching situation not to produce any conscious experience at all, or to 
produce an experience with no phenomenal character at all, due to the 
context dependence of mental occurrences allowed by global supervenience. 
Thus, the supervenience thesis needed for the argument from hallucination 
is a claim of local supervenience about phenomenal character. According to 
                                                                                                                            
about content is another issue, which goes beyond the scope of this thesis. See 
Hellie (2010) for compelling arguments to the effect that externalism about content 
is incompatible with internalism about phenomenal character.  
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local supervenience, the obtaining of the brain state is sufficient for the 
occurrence of an experience with a specific phenomenal character.  
Local supervenience, together with (a), clearly entails (2#). If it is 
possible to reproduce the brain state of a genuine perception in the absence 
of the object perceived, then, in virtue of local supervenience, the brain 
activation will be sufficient to produce an experience with the same 
phenomenal character as the genuine perception. The two experiences 
would then of course be indiscriminable.  
However, this form of local supervenience is at least controversial and 
many have pointed to numerous potential counterexamples: neural 
replication alone would be enough for sameness of phenomenal characters 
even in all sorts of cases where we might find it problematic.
55
 Local 
supervenience would entail that a disembodied brain in a vat whose neurons 
are stimulated appropriately would have a hallucination indiscriminable 
from the target perception. But proponents of embodied cognition would 
reject this. They maintain that the beyond-the-brain body plays a significant 
causal role in many features of cognition (see Noë and Thompson 2004; 
Noë and Thompson 2004; O’Regan and Noë 2001; Varela, Thompson, and 
Rosch 1991; Hurley 1998). Similarly, neural replication in a subject 
deprived of the cognitive capacities allowing them to recognize objects 
would be enough for the subject to have a hallucination indiscriminable 
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 The Twin Earth thought experiments proposed by Burge (1979) and Putnam 
(1975) are cases of neurophysiologically indiscernible people whose thoughts have 
different contents.  
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from the target perception. This would be rejected by those who maintain 
that perceptual capacities require the deployment of conceptual capacities or 
other cognitive capacities that must be already in place (see for instance 
McDowell 1994 and Brewer 1999). In order not to beg the question against 
these theoretical options, whose acceptance goes beyond the acceptance of 
relationalism and can be held by representationalists too, one needs to 
qualify local supervenience with two clauses:  
(LS): Neural replication is sufficient for production of 
experience with phenomenal character in brains of subjects who 
(1) are in a functioning body, (2) are capable of the relevant 
cognitive capacities required for experiencing.  
Finally, as Fish notices, empirical data, although not conclusive, speak 
against the possibility of inducing hallucinations in a person who was born 
blind. Although he couldn’t find any study of direct electrical stimulation of 
the brain in blind subjects, he found studies that used transcranial magnetic 
stimulation (TMS) (Gothe et al. 2002). The study resulted in a marked 
difference between blind and non-blind patients in the ability of TMS to 
produce simple visual phosphenes. It must be premised that even the 
systematic production of phosphenes in blind people would not prove that 
supervenience should be accepted (as phosphenes are not the kind of 
experience that is IIIH). However, the study showed that the ability to 
produce phosphenes decreased as the severity of the blindness and the 
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length of time of being blind increased, and TMS could not induce any 
phosphenes in the congenitally blind. Despite not being conclusive evidence 
against local supervenience, this suggests that previous ability to perceive 
might also be required in order for one to hallucinate, making neural 
activation not sufficient.  
Notice that, even with these qualifications, local supervenience, if 
true, would be enough for securing (2#). In the thought experiment, in fact, 
there is no assumption about the subject’s being blind, or being a 
disembodied brain, or being deprived of the relevant cognitive capacities. 
The thought experiment asks us to imagine that the very same person, that 
is, a person with a functioning body and normal cognitive capacities, who 
genuinely saw an apple a moment before, can be induced through brain 
replication to have an indiscriminable experience of the apple when the 
apple is removed from the environment. 
Most importantly, local supervenience provides much more than is 
needed to secure (2#) in the traditional argument from hallucination. 
Accepting local supervenience, even thus qualified, provides one with a 
direct argument against relationalism. If local supervience is true, 
relationalism has to be false: relationalism claims that the phenomenal 
character of perception is partly determined by the objects and events 
perceived, but local supervenience claims that the phenomenal character 
supervenes on the brain state, so the presence or absence of the objects of 
perception cannot make any difference in the phenomenal character of one’s 
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experience. Therefore, if local supervenience is true, there will be no need to 
accept IND for relationalism to be in trouble.  
According to Broad, local supervenience would provide a ‘knock-
down argument’ against relationalism:  
Suppose it could be shown that the occurrence of a certain 
disturbance in a certain part of a person's brain at a certain time 
is the immediate sufficient condition of his then having an 
experience which he would naturally describe as seeing or 
hearing or feeling a foreign object of a certain kind in a certain 
place.56 Then it would follow at once that the actual presence of 
such an object in that place at that time cannot be a necessary 
condition of the occurrence of the experience. From this it 
would follow at once that the experience cannot be, as it appears 
to be to the person who has it, a prehension of the object in 
question. In that case the utmost that could be alleged is that the 
presence of such an object in the place in question at a 
somewhat earlier date is an indispensable causal ancestor of that 
                                                 
56
 ‘Immediate sufficient condition’ here suggests that Broad might have in mind 
the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’ principle, rather than the local 
supervenience principle. However, it is difficult to decide which principle exactly 
he is suggesting (Fish 2009, for instance, assumes that Broad is talking about 
supervenience). This is indicative of a widespread tendency in this field to 
overlook the difference between the two principles. This is not surprising, as the 
two principles have the same result with respect to the argument from hallucination 
(see Section 5.5 for further discussion).   
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disturbance in the brain which is the immediate sufficient 
condition of the occurrence of the experience. (Broad 1952: 10) 
We might not be willing to concede to Broad that the above would 
be a knock-down argument. Hinton would resist it, claiming that it is 
possible to disjunctively characterize the event supervening on the brain 
state. Discussing a related argument that will occupy us in the next section, 
the argument from the ‘same cause, same effect principle’, he claims: 
The impulse reaches certain specified structure, and then—
what? My continuation was,—‘and then, one perceives a flash 
of light or has the illusion of doing so, as the case may be, 
according to the nature of the initial stimulus. (Hinton 1973: 75) 
We will see in the next chapter how the relationalist could provide a 
disjunctive account of the event supervening on the mental state. For our 
current purposes, it is worth noticing that even Broad acknowledges that it 
would be precipitate to accept ‘the sweeping assertion that the occurrence of 
a certain kind of disturbance in a certain part of a person's brain is the 
immediate sufficient condition, as distinct from an immediate necessary 
condition, of his having an experience’ (Broad 1952: 10). Although 
tempting, local supervenience is far from granted. Indeed, as Fish points 
out, ‘many of the reasons given for thinking that local supervenience is true 
are not as compelling as they are often assumed to be’ (Fish 2009: 42).  
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Fish thinks that many accept local supervenience as an inference to 
the best explanation for the fact that ‘hallucinating subjects take themselves 
to be having veridical perceptual experiences, and this needs explaining’ 
(Fish 2009: 118). The reasoning would go as follows: 
The fact that hallucinating subjects take themselves to be having 
perceptual experiences suggests that hallucinations are mental 
events that have a phenomenal character that is the same as, or 
at least similar to, the phenomenal character of veridical 
perception. Yet given what we know about the etiology of 
hallucinations, the only thing that seems to be necessary for a 
hallucination to occur is brain activity of the right kind. A 
plausible inference to the best explanation would conclude that 
this neural activity suffices for the existence of the hallucination, 
together with the phenomenal character. If so, then the 
hallucinatory phenomenal character is a property whose 
instantiation is assured by the neural activity alone. […] If 
neural activity alone suffices for a hallucination, to instantiate a 
phenomenal character of a certain kind, then if that neural 
activity also occurred in a case of veridical perception, it would 
likewise suffice for the instantiation of a phenomenal character 
of the same kind. (Fish 2009: 118) 
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The main problem with this line of reasoning is that there is no 
evidence that hallucination involves exactly the same brain activity as 
genuine perceptions. On the contrary, the etiology of hallucination varies a 
lot across types of hallucinations and pathologies or conditions in which 
they occur and often involves the activation of brain regions that are not 
activated during genuine perception.
57
 Also, as we have extensively seen in 
the previous chapter, there is a crucial difference between IIIHs and 
hallucinations that one simply happens to be unable to tell apart from 
perception. So this argument trades on mischaracterizing what happens 
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 In schizophrenic patients, there is evidence that a too high level of dopamine in 
the limbic system (amygdala, hippocampus, ventral striatium, cingulate) plays an 
important role in the occurrence of hallucinations and other psychotic symptoms 
(Laruelle, Kegeles, and Abi-Dargham 2003). The effect of dopaminomimetic 
agents on the limbic system also seem to be responsible for hallucinogenic 
episodes in patients with Parkinson’s disease (Wolters and Berendse 2001), 
especially when administered L-dopa, which has a strong dopaminergic effect 
(Onofrj et al. 2006). LSD and other psychoactive drugs boost serotonin 
transmission and induce an increased excitability of the visual cortex, which might 
lead to hallucinations (Oliveri and Calvo 2003). Hallucinations involved in 
epileptic seizures are connected with stimulation of the amygdala or hippocampus 
(W. Penfield 1955)(Penfield 1955; Vignal et al. 2007). Studies have found that 
genetic factors are connected with an enhanced sensitivity of neurotransmitters to 
dopamine (Malhotra et al. 1998). Moreover, studies have highlighted abnormalities 
in the volume of brain structures of schizophrenic patients, including a reduction in 
volume of the superior temporal gyrus and increased volume of ventricles (Weiss 
and Heckers 1999). Studies using magnetic resonance on schizophrenic patients 
suggest that, during inner speech, the alterations of white matter fibre tracts 
responsible for the connectivity between frontal and parietotemporal speech-related 
areas lead to abnormal coactivation in regions related to the acoustic processing of 
external stimuli. This abnormal activation may account for the patients' inability to 
distinguish self-generated thoughts from external stimulation (Hubl et al. 2004). In 
a study involving Charles Bonnet patients, ffytche et al. (1998) found brain 
activation of content-specific areas of the visual cortex (in particular in the ventral 
occipital lobe) and noticed that the content of the hallucination reflected the 
functional specialization of the specific region activated. These few examples 
indicate the variety and complexity of factors (bio-chemical, genetic, of brain 
structure, and of brain areas activated) involved in the aetiology of different types 
of hallucinations occurring in different conditions.  
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when one hallucinates, both on the neuronal and the phenomenological 
level. As it stands, the fact that some people hallucinate can at best prove 
that the phenomenal character of hallucination supervenes on the activation 
of some brain states. It doesn’t show that the very same phenomenal 
character that one could have when genuinely perceiving can occur also in 
hallucination, where it seems that brain activity is sufficient for the 
occurrence of an experience with phenomenal character.  
But even if it were the case that some hallucinations were 
introspectively indiscriminable from perception in an impersonal way, the 
argument would be begging the question against relationalism. Even if the 
phenomenal character of hallucination supervened on brain activity, it 
would still be possible for the relationalist to deny that the same is true for 
the phenomenal character of perception. Nothing about the etiology of 
hallucination can show that, in the case of perception, the existence of the 
object experienced is not necessary for the occurrence of the phenomenal 
character. This is precisely the debate at hand here: the relationalist 
contends that, even when impersonally indiscriminable through 
introspection, a perception and a hallucination will have different 
phenomenal character, because the phenomenal character of a genuine 
perception is partly constituted by the presence of the object. The proponent 
of local supervenience cannot justify supervenience on the basis of a 
principled rejection of this possibility.  
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Since real hallucinations cannot support local supervenience, 
proponents often turn to imaginary cases of hallucination, where one is in 
exactly the same brain state as when one has a genuine perception and has 
an experience that is indiscriminable from perception (or which has the 
same phenomenal character as perception, proponents of local 
supervenience would say). But as will be clear from the discussion so far, 
we are considering local supervenience as a ground for the possibility of 
(2#), which in the thought experiment allows for the move from neurally 
matching situations to IIIHs. Trying to justify local supervenience with such 
a thought experiment involving neural replication and IIIHs would thus 
amount to committing to blatantly circular reasoning, as Fish points out:  
To get from neural replication to sameness of experience [in the 
thought experiment] […] local supervenience is just assumed. 
So, as it stands, such a thought experiment does not underwrite 
local supervenience, but rather takes it for granted. (121) 
The fact that many philosophers take the thought experiment to 
involve cases in which, as Fish puts it, we ‘get from neural replication to 
sameness of experience’, is indeed an indicator of the fact that local 
supervenience underwrites this kind of counterfactual reasoning. Local 
supervenience delivers more than would be needed in order to secure (2#). 
Conversely, if the mere possibility of IIIHs brought about by neural 
replication involved in the thought experiment was motivated by reasons 
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independent of local supervenience (we will consider another candidate for 
grounding this possibility further below), it would still not be possible to 
ground the acceptance of local supervenience in such a possibility. For local 
supervenience would predict that that neural replication would produce 
matching neural state has the very same phenomenal character as the 
corresponding genuine perception: one would simply have that they are 
indiscriminable.  
 
5.4 Is there Empirical Support for Local Supervenience? 
Given that neither reflection on ordinary hallucinations reported in the 
psychopathological literature nor thought experiments can be used to 
establish local supervenience (even in its qualified version), lest we beg the 
question against relationalism and incur a charge of circularity, one might 
try to turn to empirical data that allegedly provide evidence for the claim 
that hallucinations that causally match an experience are also impersonally 
indiscriminable from it. Fish notices that there is widespread conviction that 
local supervenience is an empirical hypothesis supported by data about 
brain stimulation experiments (see Fish 2009: 123). Although this strategy 
often remains implicit, Lowe (1992: 80), for instance, explicitly mentions 
Penfield’s studies on direct brain stimulation to support the supervenience 
claim. Similarly, Robinson mentions Penfield’s studies as classical 
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‘empirical evidence’ ‘for the sufficiency of brain stimulation for experience’ 
(Robinson 1994: 152 and footnote).
58
 
Although dated, Penfield’s work remains to date the most extensive 
corpus of data on brain stimulation generating hallucinatory experiences. 
This might be due to the fact that direct brain stimulation is practiced for 
therapeutic purposes, and not in the context of theoretical research about the 
nature of experience or to assess hypotheses about the nature of the relation 
between neural states and psychological event.
59
 Recent research on the 
effects of direct brain stimulation are part of an emerging experimental 
treatment of neuropsychiatric conditions such as depression, anxiety, 
Parkinson’s disease, and chronic pain. There are so few studies monitoring 
whether direct brain stimulation induces experiences and a small fraction of 
these give enough details about the phenomenology of the experiences 
induced to support any speculation whatsoever about the correlation 
between mental occurrences and the brain. More recent studies are 
Diederich, Alesch, and Goetz (2000), which reports the occurrence of a 
hallucination in one patient with Parkinson's disease upon deep stimulation 
of the subtalamic nucleus, and Halgren (1982), which reports ‘vivid formed 
dream- or memory-like hallucinations, or intense feelings of familiarity 
                                                 
58
 As noted earlier, Robinson wouldn’t be happy to accept supervenience, since 
he rejects physicalism. However, he believes that brain stimulation suffices for 
experience in virtue of the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’ 
principle.  
59
 As noted by Penfield in a discussion with Libet during a study week whose 
contributions are collected in Eccles (1966) ‘experiment is never a primary purpose 
[of stimulation of the human brain]: the primary purpose is therapeutic (Eccles, ed. 
1966:176). 
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induced by direct electrical stimulation of the limbic system’. Both studies 
tested only one subject and the first-person descriptions of the reported 
effects of stimulation are meagre.
60
  
Compared to these sparse results, Penfield’s final summary of his 
research on epileptic seizures spanning from the late 1930s to the 1960s 
(Wilder Penfield and Perot 1963) is impressive. It collects the data of 520 
epileptic patients whose cortex of the temporal lobe was electrically 
stimulated and contains detailed first-person descriptions of the experience 
undergone. These data were collected while conducting surgeries to remove 
specific parts of the temporal lobe areas considered responsible for epilepsy. 
During the operation, Penfield discovered that patients under local 
anaesthesia could respond to his questions even during surgery.
61
 Among 
520 patients, 40 patients (7.7%) reported complex auditory or visual, or 
even multimodal (auditory and visual) experiences.  
None of the experiences described by the patients can possibly count 
as an IIIH. The direct brain stimulation induced an epileptic seizure and in 
some cases the seizure was accompanied by hallucinatory episodes. 
Hallucinations in both spontaneous and induced epileptic seizures have 
phenomenal traits very different from genuine perception and could in 
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 Taylor, Walsh, and Eimer (2010) also induced phosphenes by applying 
transcranial magnetic stimulation, but we have seen in the previous chapter that 
phosphenes are not indiscriminable from genuine perceptions.  
61
 The fact that studies of this extent haven’t been reproduced can be explained by 
progress in surgical treatment, which has become less invasive and tentative, and 
pharmacological treatment, which has replaced surgery for many patients (see 
Shorvon, Perucca, and Engel Jr 2009).   
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principle be easily distinguished from them, as did the experiences reported 
by Penfield’s patients. Although some patients described their 
hallucinations as a ‘true experience’ (Penfield and Perot 1963: 643), most of 
them described them as being ‘like a dream’ (Penfield and Perot: 680), or 
like a ‘memory’. The experiences described in Penfied’s study indeed had 
traits typical of hallucinations in epileptic seizures, such as a sense of déjà 
vécu and complex visual hallucination accompanied by a feeling of 
‘strangeness’ (Aleman and Larøi 2008). Penfield describes these 
experiences as ‘recall of past experiences’ due to the ‘activa[tion] of a 
neuronal record’.  
 Although Penfield sometimes seems to stress the genuine experiential 
nature of the episodes undergone by his patients,
62
 he never conceives of 
these experiences as akin to genuine perception. On the contrary he calls 
them ‘a new order’ of phenomena (Penfield and Paine 1955, reported by 
Aleman and Laroi 2008). (Jackson 1931) calls these states ‘dreamy states’. 
                                                 
62
 As noted by Hinton (1973), the ordinary notion of ‘experience’ is very general: 
‘a transparent, colourless, or empty verb, akin to “undergo” or “do”’ (Hinton 1973: 
13). It can be found in locutions such as ‘the experience of swimming the 
Bosphorus’ (6), where there isn’t any specific reference to conscious sensory 
experience. But even if we understand ‘experience’ in a narrower way, 
encompassing ‘states of consciousness’ (Hinton 1973: 22), ‘experience’ doesn’t 
only apply to perceptual experience, but to all sorts of conscious mental 
occurrences such as pain and bodily experience, but also imagining and 
visualizing, dreaming, recollecting, and so forth. So we shouldn’t read too much 
into Penfiend’s and his patients’ use of the expression ‘experience’. Fish, it seems 
to me, does read too much into it when he sees Penfield as committed to the claim 
that these experiences are genuine veridical and auditory experiences in the sense 
that they ‘have perceptual-like phenomenal character’ (Fish 2009: 130).  
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This ‘dreamy nature’ of the experiences is confirmed by (Vignal et al. 
2007), who revisited Penfield’s studies.  
Other phenomenal traits distinguish Penfield’s patients’ experiences 
from genuine experience. For instance, one patient explains that ‘[he] see[s] 
the people in this world and the people in that world too at the same time’ 
(Penfiel 1955: 679). This kind of superposition of the hallucinatory scene 
over the perceived one, accompanied by an awareness of their distinctive 
nature, is precisely one of the phenomenological traits that allows one to tell 
through introspection that one is hallucinating rather than genuinely 
perceiving. Moreover, Penfield notes that, no matter how vivid and rich the 
experience was, none of the patients took their experience for a genuine 
perception, even for a few seconds. Clearly, thus, Penfield’s direct brain 
stimulation cannot be interpreted as inducing IIIHs.  
Penfield’s studies show that neural activation of some sort (we have 
no evidence that the neurons activated in Penfield’s studies are exactly the 
same as those activated in normal perception, and there is some evidence to 
the contrary) is enough to produce an experience with a phenomenal 
character of some sort (there is evidence that the experiences produced by 
Penfield’s direct brain stimulation are phenomenologically very different 
from occurrences of genuine perception).
63
 But obviously this falls short of 
                                                 
63
 My diagnosis of how we should interpret the results of Penfield’s study differ 
from that offered by Fish. I maintain that Penfield’s studies only show that direct 
brain activation is sufficient to produce an experience with a phenomenal 
character, although it is not clear that either the same brain area involved in 
perception are activated in Penfield’s studies, or that the phenomenal character 
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showing that conscious hallucinations brought about by the very same brain 
state as a perception is possible, and even less that this experience will be 
impersonally indiscriminable from the corresponding perception.  
Given that considerations on hallucinations—either naturally 
occurring, induced by brain stimulation, or introduced as counterfactual 
hypotheses in thought experiments—cannot support local supervenience, 
one might turn to other empirical data that do not involve hallucinations. 
One type of evidence that Fish considers (and dismisses) is a number of 
clinical studies of perceptual impairment undergone by patients with lesions 
on certain areas of the brain. Fish for instance mentions Zeki's (1990, 1991) 
review articles of studies showing that patients with damage to the ventral 
surface of the occipital and temporal lobes lose the ability to perceive in 
colour, while preserving otherwise normal vision. These kinds of data show, 
                                                                                                                            
produced upon such activation is indiscriminable from that of genuine perception. 
Fish, instead, claims:  
‘These results show that, in these subjects, brain activity alone is 
sufficient for the occurrence of a visual experience. But this is not to 
accept (yet) that the brain stimulations results support the claim that brain 
activity is sufficient for experiences with phenomenal character’ (Fish 
2009: 124).  
With reservations, Fish maintains that it might be granted that Penfield’s studies 
show that the hallucinations induced by direct brain stimulation can be 
indistinguishable from a perception, but not that they have a phenomenal character. 
Fish’s divergent interpretation has two explanations. On the one hand, he fails to 
distinguish between different notions of indiscriminability, and therefore is prone 
to take experiences that one merely fails to distinguish from perception as 
indistinguishable in the relevant sense. On the other hand, Fish’s claim that the 
hallucinations resulting from brain stimulation lack a phenomenal character is 
motivated by his independent commitments about the nature of phenomenal 
character and the particular version of disjunctivism he proposes, whereby 
hallucinations lack any phenomenal character whatsoever and only seem to have 
one in virtue of their cognitive effect and functional role. I will discuss Fish’s view 
on this point and argue for my disagreement in the next chapter.   
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unsurprisingly, that neural activity in fairly well-defined areas of the brain is 
necessary for the occurrence of experience with certain kinds of 
phenomenal character. But clearly this correlation is not enough to support 
local supervenience, which is a claim about sufficiency. One might still try 
to run an argument for local supervenience as an inference to the best 
explanation, claiming that a certain brain activity is necessary for the 
occurrence of a certain phenomenal character because it is the product (in 
the sense that it is directly caused or supervenes on) of activity in a specific 
area of the brain. But as Fish points out, there is no reason to prefer this 
explanation to others. An alternative explanation—Fish proposes—would 
be to consider the brain activity of a certain kind as an enabling condition of 
the awareness of, say, red, rather than as the sufficient cause for my 
awareness of red (see Fish 2009: 137).  
In conclusion, contrary to what is often maintained—although rarely 
explicated or argued for—neuroscience doesn’t support local supervenience. 
The truth is that we know very little about the connection between brain 
states and phenomenal experience to either confirm or disconfirm local 
supervenience. Rather than being supported by empirical evidence, local 
supervenience is a powerful assumption that informs scientific thinking and 
practice.  
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5.5 The Causal Argument from Hallucination 
An alternative explanation of the link between the mind and the brain 
assumed in (b) such that it can support (2#) claims that there is a casual link 
between the two. Accepting the existence of a causal link between the mind 
and the brain is less demanding than accepting local supervenience and is 
compatible with non-physicalist views, such as Robison’s.  
The purported uncontroversial claim we are looking for to characterise 
the link between neural activity and conscious experience Robinson 
gestures to in (b) could then be some causal link. We have already seen, 
however, that accepting that there is a suitably general causal law whereby 
psychological occurrences depend on brain states is not enough to grant that 
an experience and a hallucination brought about by the same brain state are 
IIIHs. However, one might think that there is a further principle that applies 
to causal laws and makes (2#) true.  
Many are convinced that such a principle is what is often known as 
the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’ principle (‘SC/SE’ for 
short). The idea is that the same kind of proximate cause necessarily entails 
the same kind of effect. Notice that this is significantly stronger than 
‘experiential naturalism’. The latter claims that if in two situations the 
effects of an identical cause differ, then some other conditions are in place. 
This is because we take causes to have generality, so two causes cannot 
result in different effects unless other conditions that differ are in place. 
SC/SE can be seen as hinging on the principle of Newtonian mechanics that 
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there is no ‘spooky action at distance’ and on what Hume calls the ‘locality 
requirement’the requirement that causes be spatially and temporally 
contiguous with their effects. However, SC/SE is committed to more than 
the refusal of spooky action at a distance. Rejecting the possibility of so-
called ‘spooky action at distance’ predicts that if a distal event has to count 
as causing an effect, this must be through a chain of causes that are spatially 
and temporally close to it. This means that, once the distal cause has 
produced an intermediate cause in the causal line or process, it becomes 
redundant: the efficacy of the event further up in the chain is pre-empted by 
the efficacy of the proximate cause, so that if the distal cause were removed, 
but the proximate cause remained in place, the same effect would be 
preserved. SC/SE adds something more:  
(SC/SE) In the causal chain, the occurrence of the same type of 
most proximate cause is sufficient for the obtaining of the same 
type of effect.  
This adds the idea that the proximate cause is sufficient for the 
occurrence of the immediate effect and requires the further assumption 
(which is not contained in the idea of rejecting ‘spooky action at a distance’) 
that nothing but the proximate cause may contribute to the effect, and that 
nothing may interfere with the proximate cause and prevent it from 
producing the effect it generally produces.  
If we apply this principle to the experiential case, SC/SE would 
predict that the reproduction of a certain pattern of neural activation will 
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necessarily give rise to the very same experience irrespective of whatever 
distal cause precedes the neural state and irrespective of whatever further 
condition applies to the situation. Although accepting SC/SE is less 
demanding than local supervenience, since it doesn’t impose that a certain 
brain activity be sufficient for a given mental occurrence in all possible 
worlds, it delivers, for our present purposes, the same result as accepting 
local supervenience: it establishes that brain activity is sufficient for a 
mental occurrence, given the laws of nature. Therefore, if we accept the 
principle, we will be able to prove more than is required to establish (2#): it 
can directly motivate the acceptance of the claim that the resulting 
hallucination has the same phenomenal character as perception.
64
  
The principle is often used to mount an independent argument against 
relationalism that it doesn’t rely on IND. Indeed, claims (a) and (b) in 
support of (2#) in the traditional argument from hallucination that I 
borrowed from Robinson were used by him as the premises of such an 
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 For instance, Foster claims:  
Given their exact similarity to what occurred earlier, it seems reasonable 
to assume that the artificially induced neural signals and the brain 
responses they elicit will produce a visual experience which subjectively 
matches the earlier perception, so that it will be with Henry, subjectively, 
exactly as if he sees a qualitatively identical salmon making a 
qualitatively identical leap. But, crucially, it also seems reasonable to 
suppose that, in addition to subjectively matching (to being 
introspectively indistinguishable), the two resulting mental episodes will 
be, at the fundamental level of description, of exactly the same 
psychological type—instances of exactly the same psychological state. 
(Foster 2000: 24. Italics in original) 
Here Foster makes explicit that the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate 
effect’ principle entails not only that the experience resulting from neural 
replication and the target perception introspectively match, but also that they are 
‘exactly the same psychological type—instances of exactly the same psychological 
state’.  
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argument, which he calls the ‘revised causal argument’. In the literature the 
argument is more often dubbed the ‘causal argument from hallucination’ 
and I will adopt this terminology. It goes as follows:  
1. It is theoretically possible by activating some brain process 
which is involved in a particular type of perception to cause an 
hallucination which exactly resembles that perception in its 
subjective character. 
2. It is necessary to give the same account of both hallucinating 
and perceptual experience when they have the same neural 
cause. Thus, it is not, for example, plausible to say that the 
hallucinatory experience involves a mental image or sense 
datum, but that the perception does not, if the two have the same 
proximate—that is, neural—cause.  
These two propositions together entail that perceptual processes 
in the brain produce some object of awareness which cannot be 
identified with any feature of the external world. (Robinson 
1994: 152) 
Robinson presents the claim that experiences caused by the same 
neural activity are subjectively indiscriminable—what I earlier labelled (2#) 
in the context of the traditional argument—as independent from the claim 
that experiences caused by the same neural activity have the same 
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phenomenal character
65
 and as not requiring the assumption of the ‘same 
proximate cause, same immediate effect’ principle. As I explained earlier, 
the motivations Robinson explicitly provides for the claim that ‘it is 
theoretically possible by activating some brain process which is involved in 
a particular type of perception to cause a hallucination which exactly 
resembles that perception in its subjective character’ (premise (1) in 
Robinson’s causal argument and premise (2#) in the traditional argument 
from hallucination) are:  
(a) It is possible to ‘freeze’ a neural state by artificially preserving 
activated all the neurons that were activated when having a 
perception.  
(a) There is a ‘fairly general agreement that our mental life is strongly 
tied to what happens in the brain’ (Robinson 1994: 152).  
Robinson thus seems to believe that the link between mind and brain 
is a minimal requirement, independent of SC/SE, and that premise (1) of the 
causal argument (or 2# in the traditional argument) relies on such a link 
alone. However, as noted before, simply invoking a strong tie between the 
mind and the brain is too vague, and under a natural understanding of such a 
                                                 
65
 Robinson here talks about the causally matching experience deserving the same 
account as the target perception, not about the sameness of their phenomenal 
characters. However, I substitute ‘same account’ with ‘same phenomenal 
character’ in reconstructing Robinson’s view, because the latter is more specific 
and less prone to ambiguity, and because the target of the current discussion is 
relationalism, which is a claim about phenomenal characters. I believe this 
substitution is harmless, because Robinson is committed to the claim that two 
experiences with the same account have the same phenomenal character and vice 
versa.  
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link (what Martin calls ‘experiential naturalism’) insufficient to secure (1). 
Robinson doesn’t provide any further specification of this link. Therefore, it 
seems to me that Robinson already has SC/SE in mind and that it is this 
principle that motivates (1) as well as (2). Presenting premises (1) and (2) in 
his argument as two successive steps is at best a rhetorical strategy, reliant 
on the fact that (1) seems intuitively less contentious than (2).  
The following reconstruction of the argument thus better reflects 
Robinson’s reasoning:  
1. When one perceives an object O, the presence of O is a distal cause, 
while the firing of certain neurons is the proximate cause of the 
effect, E, namely the occurrence of a conscious experience as of O;  
2. It is possible to directly stimulate the brain in such a way as to 
exactly reproduce the neural state one is in when perceiving O, in the 
absence of O; 
3. In causal chain, the occurrence of the same type of most 
proximate cause is sufficient for the obtaining of the same type 
of effect (SC/SE); 
4. (From 1 and 3): the firing of certain neurons is sufficient for the 
occurrence of the effect E in the case of genuinely perceiving an O;  
5. (From 2 and 4): in the case where one directly stimulates the brain, 
and there is no external object O, the firing of certain neurons is 
sufficient for the occurrence of the effect E, the occurrence of a 
conscious experience as of O; 
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6. (From 4 and 5): the same effect E occurs irrespectively of the 
presence or absence of the distal object O; 
7. If the same effect E occurs in both the situation when one perceives 
O and when one has a hallucination of O induced by direct 
stimulation, perception and hallucination deserve the same account.  
Should SC/SE be accepted? One could object that Newtonian 
mechanics and its commitment to the locality requirement embedded in the 
principle is surpassed and proven wrong by more recent quantum 
mechanics. However, it doesn’t seem implausible to insist that, even if 
quantum entanglement proves to violate this principle, this doesn’t mean 
that the principle doesn’t apply for macro-physical phenomena that can be 
explained with classical mechanics. Moreover, relationalists would be in a 
weak position if their rejection of the causal argument from hallucination 
was entirely dependent on resolutions about the compatibility of different 
paradigms in theoretical physics.  
But once one has made the suggestion that different theoretical 
principles might be relevant to different domains of reality, it is legitimate 
to wonder whether it makes sense to extend the principles of Newtonian 
mechanics that we adopt to explain the macro-physical world to 
psychological phenomena. Even if we accept some form of physicalism, 
applying the idea of spatial and temporal contiguity to the causal link 
between neural and mental events may indeed be tricky. First, it is not clear 
where, if at all, perceptual experiences are spatially located, so it becomes 
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unclear what it means for a cause to be spatially adjacent to the effect. 
Moreover, even temporally, it is not entirely straightforward to identify the 
most proximate cause. However, granting these difficulties, it seems 
intuitive to claim that the firing of neurons happens fractions of second after 
the causal impact made by the object through light rays on the subject’s 
retina. Similarly, someone who is not bothered by the claim that mental 
occurrences have a location might maintain that, although it is not clear 
where an experience is located, wherever it is, it must be closer to whatever 
happens in the brain of the perceiver than it is to what happens in the 
environment outside him.  
There is a further problem with locality: its intuitive strength relies on 
the modern atomistic idea that space is made up of discreet positions that 
can be occupied by objects, so that for any location, there is a next location, 
such that if two objects are in contiguous locations, they touch each other. 
However, more recent theories claim that space is not divided into particles; 
it is rather measured in rational or real numbers, such that for any two 
locations it is always possible to find intermediate locations.
66
 So it makes 
no sense to talk of objects touching and being in contiguous locations: at 
best, we can talk about arbitrarily small distances between two locations. 
In conclusion, there are several difficulties with SC/SE. However, the 
bullets that the proponent of the causal argument from hallucination needs 
to bite in order to preserve the application of SC/SE to experiences will not 
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 See LePoidevin (2002) for a discussion of this point.  
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do too much damage to her dentistry. The most serious problem with SC/SE 
doesn’t lie in commitments to do with the metaphysics of causation and 
other claims in the philosophy of science. The problem is rather that SC/SE 
meets all the objections previously addressed to local supervenience: we 
should allow that factors such as background enabling conditions, the 
embodiment of the experience, the requirement of conceptual capacities etc. 
play some role additional to the proximate cause in the resulting effect.  
In his formulation of the causal argument, Foster allows for such 
conditions:  
granted that the relevant neural factors are qualitatively the same 
on the two occasions, and assuming that we hold constant all the 
other relevant factors pertaining to the subject's current bodily 
and psychological condition, there seems to be nothing in the 
causal influences at work which might lead to a difference in 
psychological outcome. (Foster 2000: 24; my italics) 
Foster acknowledges that a series of background conditions and 
factors might alter the capacity of the proximate cause to produce the 
relevant effect: the subject must be in the relevant mental states and must 
have the relevant cognitive capacities; and other physical conditions 
regarding the subject might be needed too (for instance, the brain in 
question must be part of a functioning body). Strictly speaking, then, for 
Foster the appropriate brain activity is not sufficient for the occurrence of an 
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experience of a certain kind. However, since he thinks that a hallucination 
brought about by neural replication would be ‘exactly the same 
psychological kind’ as the target perception, he clearly doesn’t consider the 
presence or absence of the distal object as one of the ‘relevant factors […] 
which might lead to a difference in psychological outcome’.  
What is the rationale for thinking that the embodiment of a brain is a 
relevant factor, while the presence of the mind-independent object is not? 
Foster doesn’t explain this and it might be thought that this is arbitrary. 
Martin suggests that excluding the presence of the object from the relevant 
factors consists precisely in having already made assumptions about the 
nature of experience and its phenomenal character and thus begging the 
question against relationalism,  
for the principle so conceived rules out the possibility that 
relational states of affairs or events can form part of a causal 
nexus where relational states of affairs may differ purely in their 
distal elements. (Martin 2006: 368) 
 Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of perception is a 
relational property whose relatum is the object and therefore constitutively 
depends on the object one perceives. Relationalists don’t need to accept that 
some spooky action at a distance is possible: they agree that the causal role 
that the object plays in determining the experience is mediated by a chain of 
events, including brain activity of a certain type. However, the distal object 
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also has a constitutive role in determining the phenomenal character of 
perception. The mere presence of the object cannot, alone, produce the 
perception: a causal link between such an object and the psychological 
occurrence must be in place, and this will certainly include brain activity of 
a certain type. But, although not sufficient for the occurrence of the 
perceptual experience, for the relationalist the presence of the object is a 
necessary condition for its occurrence. Thus, the absence of the distal object 
is sufficient for the failure of the relational occurrence that is perception to 
obtain. 
The fact that the same proximate cause involved in perception can 
produce an experience indiscriminable from a genuine perception in the 
absence of the distal object is compatible with perception being different 
from the hallucination caused by neural replication, in virtue of its 
constitutive relation with the distal object.
67
 Therefore, the presence of the 
object should be included among the conditions taming SC/SE. But if we do 
include this condition, it doesn’t follow that the hallucination brought about 
by the same neural state necessarily has the same phenomenal character. 
Thus, the causal argument from hallucination fails. This also means that 
SC/SE doesn’t support (2#), because, as far as we know, the presence of the 
object could make an introspectibly noticeable difference in the phenomenal 
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 A similar remark is made by Langsam when he claims that ‘only intrinsic 
changes that result from the operation of identical causes must be the same’ 
(Langsam 1997: 190), where ‘intrinsic changes’ exclude changes in relations 
obtaining between the object and the subject of experience.  
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character of perception with respect to that of a hallucination resulting from 
an identical neural state.  
 
5.6 Causation and Constitution 
The relationalist’s response to the causal argument lies in the 
suggestion that we may well reject the possibility of ‘spooky action at 
distance’ and agree that the distal object plays a causal role in producing the 
experience only through the mediation of causes further down in the causal 
chain. However, the distal object can still make a non-causal contribution to 
the phenomenal character in virtue of being it’s constituent. An opponent 
might challenge this response by arguing that a cause cannot be a 
component of its effect: if we accept that something plays a causal role in 
bringing about an effect, we cannot also say that it is a metaphysical 
condition on the existence of that effect, such that its absence is sufficient 
for the effect’s failure to obtain. The relationalist, then, one might be 
tempted to say, cannot claim that the object is the distal cause of the 
perceptual experience and also a necessary constituent of it.  
Hinton considers this objection in the following passage:  
There is the feeling that […] every effect […] must be what you 
might call ‘narrowly identifiable’; meaning that one can state 
the what-it-is of it, to a degree of exactitude which satisfies 
normal human interest in the matter, without having to know 
what its proximate, let alone remote, cause is. […] The feeling 
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[…] is based only on the tautologous fact that an effect is always 
narrowly identifiable. […] An objector may […] wish to assert 
that an effect can always be described, and is always described, 
in terms that do not logically entail the previous or simultaneous 
occurrence of any cause, proximate or non-proximate. (Hinton 
1973: 80–81; italics in original)  
The objector to which Hinton refers argues that, once we start 
thinking about experience as the outcome of a causal process, we realise that 
any view committed to the claim that the event brought about by a causal 
process logically entails the existence of any of the causes involved in the 
causal process is untenable. This is because it seems to violate the widely 
accepted idea, which goes back to Hume, that ‘only logically distinct 
existences can be causally related’ (Strawson 1979: 132).  
Hinton characteristically doesn’t say who these opponents are or 
where concerns about the implications of this Humean Principle for the 
account of perception can be found in the literature. However, we know that 
such concerns were at the forefront of the debate on the casual theory of 
perception, which dominated the debate on perception for more than a 
decade, starting with the publication of Grice’s ‘The Causal Theory of 
Perception’ in 1961.  
Proponents of the causal theory, championed by Grice (1961, 1988), 
Pears (1976), and Strawson (1974, 1979), maintain that, as Strawson puts it:  
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The idea of the presence of the thing as accounting for, or being 
responsible for, our perceptual awareness of it is implicit in the 
pre-theoretical scheme [of commonsense realism] from the very 
start. (Strawson 1979: 133) 
Causal theorists claim that the ordinary notion of perception is a 
causal concept. They are interested in the analysis of the concept of 
perception and claim that the idea of a causal link with the object plays a 
fundamental role. As Snowdon notices, it is not entirely clear what 
philosophers mean by ‘causal concept’, and he identifies at least two 
different ways of understanding it: 
causal concept1: ‘C counts as a causal concept just in case it is 
an a priori truth that a (positive) judgement containing the 
notion C necessarily requires for its truth, that is to say entails, 
that a (certain sort of ) causal condition obtains’ (P. Snowdon 
2011: 125). 
 causal concept2: ‘a concept such that it is a necessary condition 
for a subject to count as having that concept that she or he holds 
that the concept applies only if a causal link of some kind 
obtains’ (Snowdon 2011: 125).68 
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 Snowdon also identifies a weaker and more vague notion, causal concept3—
’the idea that by and large any relatively mature person with the concept takes it 
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 Whether Strawson (1979) has in mind causal concept1 or causal 
concept2 is not particularly relevant here. I will suppose he accepts causal 
concept2, only because it is less committal than the former. What is 
interesting for our purposes here is that he sees the Humean Principle as 
possibly posing a challenge for the causal theory: 
The correctness of the description of a perceptual experience as 
the perception of a certain physical thing logically requires the 
existence of that thing; and the logical is thought to exclude the 
causal connection, since only logically distinct existences can 
be causally related. (Strawson 1979: 136–137. Italic in the 
original) 
Strawson is worried by a problem that is the converse to that 
highlighted by Hinton’s fictional opponent. But we will see that the strategy 
he proposes for tackling the challenge that the Humean Principle poses to 
the causal theory also neutralises the challenge for Hinton and the 
relationalist, at least as long as the Humean Principle is formulated in terms 
of logical entailment, as is the case in both Hinton and Strawson’s 
formulations.  
                                                                                                                            
that it applies only if a (sort of) causal link obtains’ (Snowdon 2011: 125)—but he 
thinks it is mainly used by developmental psychologists rather than philosophers, 
and certainly not by those interested in the project of conceptual analysis, such as 
causal theorists.  
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Strawson might be seen as presenting what looks like an inconsistent 
triad:  
1. Humean Principle: cause and effect involved in a causal relation 
are logically distinct existences, so it cannot be the case that the 
effect logically requires the existence of the cause to obtain; 
2. Causal Theory: it is a necessary condition for the concept of 
perception to apply that the perception is caused by the object 
perceived.  
3. Relationalist intuition: ‘The correctness of the description of a 
perceptual experience as the perception of a certain physical 
thing logically requires the existence of that thing.’  
Strawson argues that the conjunction of (2) and (3) does not violate 
the Humean Principle. Things and events can be described in many different 
ways, and perception can correctly be described in such a way that it both 
logically requires the existence of the thing perceived and requires that the 
very same thing is causally related to it. This situation has many parallels:  
Gibbons would not be the historian of the decline and fall of the 
Roman Empire unless there had occurred some actual sequence 
of events more or less corresponding to his narrative. But it is 
not enough, for him to merit that description, that such a 
sequence of events should have occurred and he should have 
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written the sentences he did write. For him to qualify as the 
historian of these events, there must be a causal chain 
connecting them with the writing of the sentences. […] The 
recently much canvassed ‘causal theory of reference’ merely calls 
attention to another instance of the causal link which obtains 
between thought and independently (and anteriorly) existing thing 
when the former is rightly said to have the latter as its object. 
(Strawson 1979: 139) 
As Steward puts it in her discussion of Strawson’s treatment of the 
Humean Principle: 
It may often be logically required, in order that something 
(Gibbon’s writing of certain sentences […]) qualifies for a 
description of a certain sort, that the thing in question be 
causally related in a certain way to something else (a series of 
historical events […]). But of course, Gibbon’s writing of his 
sentences is a distinct event from those he is writing about. 
(Steward 2011: 140–141) 
In order for Gibbon to qualify as a historian of Roman Empire, the 
Roman Empire must have existed, and there must have been a causal chain 
between the events occurring during the Roman Empire and Gibbon’s 
writing about them. Similarly, it is certainly required, for something to 
count as a perception of an object, both that the object is present and that the 
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perception is caused by the object, but this doesn’t mean that the perception 
and the presence of the object are not distinct occurrences, in the same way 
as Gibbon’s writing and the events described in his writing are distinct 
events.  
The fact that it is possible to describe a visual perception in such a 
way that the truth of ‘S sees P’ entails the truth of ‘There is P (in front of S)’ 
doesn’t make it less true that the occurrence of the perceptual experience 
and the object perceived are two distinct entities. This allows Strawson to 
claim that perception is a causal notion, a claim that would be in tension 
with the idea that perception entails the presence of the object if this meant 
that perception and the object are not distinct existents. But his response can 
be used to defend relationalism as well. If correctly understood, the Humean 
Principle is not in contradiction with the correctness of the description of 
perception as entailing the presence of the object. Believing otherwise 
would be a category mistake: 
Only distinct natural items (‘distinct existences’) can be causally 
connected; only things capable of truth or falsity (propositions 
or propositional contents, the contents of assertions, hypotheses, 
descriptions, etc.) can be logically connected. The fact that the 
truth of a description of one item logically requires the truth of 
the existence of another has no force at all to show that the item 
in question are not distinct natural existences, capable of being 
causally linked. The idea that these natural items themselves 
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could be logically linked is nonsense, a category howler. 
(Strawson 1998: 314; italics in original) 
A fundamental component of Strawson’s response to the challenge is 
the distinction between what can be logically connected (or not) and what 
can be metaphysically connected (or not). It wouldn’t make sense to 
understand the Humean Principle as claiming that the effect cannot logically 
require the existence of the cause. Indeed, it is possible to describe all sorts 
of things in such a way that the truth of that description entails the truth of 
the description of their cause. If the Humean Principle is to have any force, 
it must be understood in a metaphysical way, as stating that the existence of 
the effect is metaphysically independent of the existence of its cause. If we 
come back to the triad, then, Strawson invites us to revise the way the 
Humean Principle is formulated: it shouldn’t read as a claim about logical 
inferences—‘the cause and effect involved in a causal relation are logically 
distinct existences’—, but rather as a metaphysical claim—‘the cause and 
effect involved in a causal relation are metaphysically distinct existences’.  
However, if we understand the Humean principle as a metaphysical 
principle, the response that Strawson envisages may work as a defence of 
the causal theory of perception, but it doesn’t work as well as a defence of 
relationalism. For Strawson, what needs to be accommodated with the 
Humean Principle is the intuition that there is a (natural) way of describing 
perception such that the truth of this description entails the existence of the 
object. This description, he says, remains silent with respect to the 
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metaphysics of perception and what is required for one to perceive. But it is 
precisely its silence with respect to the metaphysics that makes this response 
unsuitable for the relationalist. Saying that the event brought about by the 
causal chain can be described in relational terms, such that the truth of the 
description logically entails the presence of the object, leaves it open that 
other descriptions capture the event and that the correctness of some of 
these might not logically require the existence of the thing.
69
 Indeed, the 
relational description is compatible with the Humean Principle because it 
doesn’t reflect any metaphysical dependency between the perception and its 
object.
70
  
If this is all the relationalists have to offer, one might wonder what 
they mean when they claim that perception is constituted by the object in 
front of one. With their talk of constitution, relationalists might be seen to 
be trading between the platitude that the truth of ‘S sees O’ requires the 
existence of an O and a more committal metaphysical claim that the 
occurrence of the experience involved in a perception of an O 
metaphysically involves the presence of O. But only the platitude is 
compatible with the Humean Principle, correctly understood in 
metaphysical terms. Or so the argument goes.  
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 In a similar way, Steward (2011: 141) notices that the disjunctivist is unlikely 
to be satisfied by the kind of reconciliation proposed by Strawson.  
70
 In fact, it seems to me that the success of the Strawsonian defence of the causal 
theory is conditional on the assumption that the description of perception in 
relational terms does not reflect the metaphysics of perception at all: perception 
can be fundamentally a causal concept only if perception doesn’t metaphysically 
require, for its occurrence, the existence of the distal cause.  
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This worry can be related to a widespread dissatisfaction with the 
formulation of relationalism in terms of constitution. What does it mean to 
say that perception is partly constituted by the object? Is there anything 
more to it than that the platitude ‘S perceives O’ logically entails the 
existence of O? Such scepticism is expressed once again by Strawson, in his 
response to Snowdon, whose relational view he writes off as a ‘non starter’ 
(Strawson 1998: 314): 
It is not clear to me how Snowdon conceives of this […] 
relation. He seems to suggests that when a subject, for example, 
sees an object, the visible object is somehow, partly constitutive 
of the experience. Again it is not quite obvious how to 
understand this. But the plainest gloss on it is the following. If a 
subject S sees an object O, then S’s experience is accurately 
described in the words ‘S sees O’. But the truth that S sees O 
logically requires the existence and presence of O. It would be 
logically impossible for that experience to occur without the 
presence of O. So the relation between experience and object is 
certainly non-accidental: it is logical. (Strawson 1974: 313) 
Strawson sees the claim that the object is a constitutive part of 
perceptual experience as a way of characterizing the relation occurring 
between object and experience, when the experience is a genuine 
perception, alternative to the causal relation. The latter, according to 
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Strawson, is a non-starter because it fails to characterize the nature of the 
relation between the object and the perceptual experience. It fails to do so 
because, as we have seen, a logical relation holds only between things 
capable of truth and falsity, and hence not between the object and the 
perceptual experience themselves, but descriptions of them. But a logical 
relation between descriptions of entities remains silent with respect to the 
nature of the relation between these entities.  
This seems an accurate, or at least a very plausible, way of 
understanding Snowdon, who in the paper to which Strawson responds, 
presents the notion of constitution as ‘a way to specify a noncausal relation 
in which objects can stand to experiences when those experiences amount to 
perceptions of those objects’ (Snowdon 1998: 302). Moreover, in his paper 
‘Perception, Vision and Causation’, where he first introduces disjunctivism 
as part of his strategy to undermine arguments for the casual theory of 
perception, Snowdon presents disjunctivism as follows: 
The disjunctive picture divides what makes looks ascriptions 
true into two classes. In cases where there is no sighting they are 
made true by a state of affairs intrinsically independent of 
surrounding objects; but in cases of sightings the truth-
conferring state of affairs involves the surrounding objects. 
(Snowdon 1980: 186) 
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Saying that look ascriptions are made true by either states of affairs 
intrinsically independent of surrounding objects or by states of affairs 
involving surrounding objects is compatible with the fact that in both cases 
there is the very same kind of experience, namely a metaphysically 
independent state of affairs that doesn’t involve the object. The difference is 
that sometimes, when we make look-statements, we are in fact referring to 
things that not only are experiences, but are ‘sighting[s]’, genuine 
perceptions. That is to say, those experiences are also correctly described as 
perceptions and what makes this description true is a more complex state of 
affairs that involves the experience and its surroundings. Although Snowdon 
claims that a look-statement may be true in virtue of ‘two distinct sorts of 
states of affairs’ that have ‘a quite different nature’ (Snowdon 1990: 120), it 
is not clear how these two states of affairs are different, beyond the platitude 
that, in order for one to successfully perceive O, an O must be present; the 
state of affairs we have to consider is one that includes the presence of such 
an object.  
It is not clear whether Snowdon is committed to the claim that the 
only interesting relation between the object and perception is a relation of 
logical entailment. It might be that he thinks that the logical entailment is all 
he needs to counter the causal theory, so, in the passages above, he only 
subscribes to a relation of logical entailment, even though he is inclined to 
accept a stronger, metaphysical dependency between the object and 
perception. But what Snowdon exactly commits to is irrelevant to our 
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current discussion. We do not need to take Snowdon to be representative of 
relationalism: despite his clear inclination towards relationalism, Snowdon 
has never explicitly engaged in a discussion of relationalism—understood as 
a view about the phenomenal character of experience—and his interest in 
disjunctivism is not primarily motivated by a defence of relationalism. So, 
even if Snowdon defends disjunctivism, it is not clear that he is committed 
to relationalism as well.
71
  
 The relationalist is committed to more than the simple claim that 
there is a logical relation between perception (suitably described) and the 
object perceived. She is committed to saying that the object is a 
metaphysical constituent of the phenomenal character of perception. This is 
not to say that there is an interesting relation that obtains between two 
entities: the object and the experience. Talking in these terms—as Snowdon 
(Snowdon 1998: 302) does—suggests that there is an experience that is 
independent from the object and could in principle exist in its absence. If 
understood this way, it is not clear what exactly the specification that the 
relation is a relation of constitution adds: thus understood, the act of 
perception and the object remain metaphysically distinct. Relationalism 
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 Martin notices that, for Snowdon’s purposes, i.e. undermining a line of 
argument against the causal theory of perception, disjunctivism may take a form 
that mirrors Williamson’s treatment of knowledge, which is ‘consistent with (but 
does not strictly demand) a view on which the subjective component of one’s 
mental life, all aspects of what it is like for one to be as one is, are comprised of the 
common states, beliefs and appearances, while the states present in only certain 
cases, knowledge or perception, while of explanatory importance in other realm, 
play no role in determining the conscious life’ (Martin 1997: 97). This would be 
inconsistent with relationalism (that Martin calls ‘Naïve Realism’), as this seeks to 
give an account of phenomenal character.  
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claims that perception is a relation. Perception amounts to becoming aware 
of an object, property, or event: it is the obtaining of a relation. The fact that 
the object constitutes the perception is thus an obvious implication of the 
fact that perception is a relation to the object and no relation may exist 
without its relata, which thus constitute it.  
The following passage by Fish is representative of this idea, shared by 
relationalists, that perception is itself a relation with the object rather than 
being an occurrence that bears some interesting relation to the object:  
The distinctive feature of naive realism72 lies in the claim that, 
when we see the world, the subject is acquainted with the 
elements of the presentational character—the mind-independent 
objects and their features—where ‘acquaintance’ names an 
irreducible mental relation that the subject can only stand in to 
objects that exist and features that are instantiated in the part of 
the environment at which the subject is looking. (Fish 2009: 14) 
Thus, it is not an option for the relationalist to claim that the Humean 
Principle is compatible with relationalism. What other options are available 
to the relationalist, then? It might be easier to see the available options if we 
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 As we saw in the first chapter, what I have labelled here ‘relationalism’ 
corresponds to what many philosophers call ‘naïve realism’. My choice reflects the 
importance I attribute to stressing that the view in question construes perception 
itself as a relation.  
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consider what exactly are the supposed inconsistent claims that the 
relationalist needs to reconcile:  
1* Humean Principle (metaphysical version): events that are 
causally connected are metaphysically distinct existences; 
2* Causal Intuition: the distal object plays a role in the causal 
process leading to perception.  
3* Relationalist commitment: The object partly constitutes the 
phenomenal character of the experience, so that the occurrence 
of the perception requires the existence of object.  
The relationalist commitment and the metaphysical version of the 
Humean Principle are indeed incompatible, unless one denies that the object 
plays any role in causing the perceptual experience, which seems very 
difficult to do. A way to deny (2*), however, would be to say, following 
Davidson (1967), that objects are not in the business of causing, because 
only events can be causes. Thus one might say that there is no contradiction 
because what plays a constitutive role, as relationalism has it, is the object, 
while what causes the experience is an event involving that object, such as 
its surface reflecting light in a certain way, which exists independently of 
the perceptual occurrence. What does the causing (an event) is not a 
constitutive element (an object).  
Chapter 5: Philosopher’s Hallucinations 
 
 
 
218 
 
 Irrespective of whatever we take the metaphysics of causation to be 
and of how we evaluate the specific merits of this response, it cannot be the 
relationalist’s final say on the matter. Among things one can see, there are 
not only objects, but events too. And the relationalist is committed to 
claiming that, in the case of the perception of events, the event also partly 
constitutes the phenomenal character of the experience (Soteriou 2010; 
2013: 89). But one could hardly deny that the event seen is among the 
causes of S’s seeing the event, as events are indeed in the business of 
causing. So we may take ‘object’ here as a placeholder for whatever is the 
object of perception—be it an event, a property; an object or whatever 
else—and accept (2*).  
But should we accept (1*)? Should we accept that it applies 
unconditionally across the board and that perception is not an exception to 
it? One way of challenging the Humean Principle is offered by Child 
(1992). His strategy is in some ways similar to Strawson’s strategy against 
the logical version of the Humean Principle, inasmuch as he presents 
ordinary cases where things are taken to be causes of other things, although 
they are also constitutive parts of them. Child argues that there are many 
occurrences that are both related by a causal relation and by a metaphysical 
relation of constitution, such as cases of events that are part of a bigger 
event and also the cause of it. An example of this is the bombing of Pearl 
Harbour as both the cause of the Pacific War and a part of it (Child 1992: 
310). The Pacific War is not metaphysically independent of the bombing of 
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Pearl Harbour: it wouldn’t be the event that it is considered to be if the 
bombing of Pearl Harbour wasn’t part of it. However, it remains true that 
Pearl Harbour caused the Pacific War. This example shows that there are 
some counterexamples to the Humean Principle. Even if there might be 
cases where it applies, it cannot be applied across the board. Cases where a 
portion of an event is also a cause of the event itself are immune to Humean 
Principle. 
Child suggests that we should understand perception along these 
lines, treating the relation of constitution as a part–whole relation, where the 
object is a component or part of the perceptual experience. The problem 
with this analogy is that there is a difference between the case of Pearl 
Harbour and the Pacific War and the case of a perception and the object 
perceived. An aspect of our understanding of the bombing of Pear Harbour 
as part of the Pacific War is that we think of the Pacific War as unfolding 
over a period of time that starts with the bombing of Pearl Harbour. On the 
contrary, we do not think that the event of perception begins at the time the 
object perceived begins to exist. The object one perceives may have ceased 
to exist hundreds of years before the occurrence of the perception. A famous 
example of this is perception of stars that have extinguished by the time 
their light reaches us: we do not think that the perception began when the 
star was formed, nor do we think it began at the time the star emitted the 
light that travels towards us and is eventually seen. This is true even if we 
consider events, rather than objects. When one sees a comet crossing the 
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sky, we do not think that the seeing begins at the time the comet passes 
close to the sun, heats up, and begins to emit gas—again an event which 
occurs at least a few minutes before the light from the burning reaches 
Earth. This indicates that the part–whole model is not particularly helpful 
here.  
Although Child’s suggestion that the relation between perception and 
its object is a part–whole relation may be imperfect and partly misleading, it 
does indeed show that there are counterexamples to the Humean Principle. 
Perception might be one of these exceptions, although not exactly for the 
reasons proposed by Child. It is not difficult to see what the relationalist 
could say to support the claim that perception represents an exception to 
which the Humean Principle doesn’t apply. The Humean Principle certainly 
can’t apply to relations and relational states. It would be ridiculous to claim 
that a relation could exist independently of its relata. A relation doesn’t 
obtain without its relata, so it cannot be metaphysically independent of 
them. Accepting the Humean Principle across the board would be 
tantamount to denying the possibility, for any relation, of its being caused 
by one of its relata. But it is not clear why we should deny this. On the 
contrary, there is no difficulty in accepting that an object causes a 
perception and that, nonetheless, the perception is a relation to this object 
and, as such, metaphysically depends on it.  
Still, one might think that there is a deeper intuition about the Humean 
Principle that needs to be true of relations and relational states too. We can 
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grant, one might argue, that an object causes something whose existence 
constitutively depends upon the object that did the causing. But if we want 
to make sense of the idea that there is genuine causation between the object 
and its effect, i.e. the perceptual experience, it must be the case that the 
relation involving the object that is caused obtains only in virtue of the 
obtaining of something else, whose existence is independent of the 
existence of the cause. In other words, it seems that we can grant that the 
obtaining of a relation to an object (S perceives O) is among the effects of 
that object only if this relation obtains in virtue of the occurrence of an 
effect which is, in turn, metaphysically distinct from its cause (and hence 
could obtain in the absence of the object).  
But relationalism doesn’t seem to have any difficulty in meeting this 
constraint. In fact, we have seen in this chapter that relationalism is 
perfectly compatible with the idea that there is something that is caused by 
the object of perception and that could exist even in the absence of the 
object. An opponent of relationalism would see this as evidence that 
perception, although understood as intrinsically relational, needs to involve 
a non-relational occurrence, an experience whose existence is 
metaphysically independent of the object.  
The relationalist can retort that it might well be that a weaker version 
of the metaphysical Humean Principle holds for perception and that we 
must assume that the relation to an object that perception is obtains only in 
virtue of the obtaining of another occurrence which is itself metaphysically 
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independent of its causing object. However, there is no need to identify this 
metaphysically independent occurrence with an experience. Why should one 
introduce a further mental occurrence, an experience, when there is already 
an occurrence, in virtue of which the perception occurs, that is 
metaphysically independent of the object perceived? This occurence is the 
neural state. We have seen that there doesn’t seem to be any reason to reject 
the possibility that exactly the same neural state that occurs when one 
perceives an object may occur in the absence of the object when one 
hallucinates, and indeed relationalists can accept this. Thus the obvious 
thing to say for the relationalist is that the object causes the neural state, an 
effect that is metaphysically independent of the object. In virtue of this 
neural state, one has a perception of the object, which is the obtaining of a 
relation to the object, and is thus metaphysically dependent on the existence 
of the latter. The perceptual relation is itself an effect of the object, but it is 
so only in virtue of the brain state. There is no reason, then, to think that 
relationalism cannot accommodate the Humean Principle properly 
understood.  
 
5.7 Where Does This Leave Us? 
I have discussed what principle, claim, or intuition might underwrite the 
acceptance of premise (2#) in the revised argument from hallucination. On 
the one hand, I have considered local supervenience as a possible 
motivation for (2#). Such a principle, however, can appeal only to 
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physicalists, and most importantly, it requires acceptance of a very 
committal and controversial version of physicalism, that many who are 
otherwise attracted to physicalism would reject. It is also more committal 
than (2#), as it begs the question against relationalism, while (2#) could in 
principle be accommodated by relationalists. Thus local supervenience is far 
from being the fairly uncontroversial principle on which the acceptance on 
(2#) may rely. Far from being in a position to motivate (2#), local 
supervenience is often argued for using arguments that assumes (2#).  
On the other hand, one might think a good candidate for motivating 
(2#) is ‘experiential naturalism’the idea that experience is subject to 
physical and psychological causes (if the latter are disjoint from the former). 
‘Experiential naturalism’ is widely accepted as a methodological 
assumption for both theoretical and empirical work and rejecting it would 
be quite demanding;
73
 however it doesn’t entail (2#). I then considered the 
possibility that experiential naturalism might succeed in delivering (2#) if 
paired with another assumption, the ‘same proximate cause, same 
immediate effect’ principle. I have argued that this principle is not less 
problematic than local supervenience, and it equally begs the question 
against relationalism. 
Finally, in the previous section I considered a line of argument that is 
meant to undermine the relationalist’s response to the causal argument. The 
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 Although demanding, it is not impossible to reject ‘experiential naturalism’; 
and Martin mentions the early sense-datum theorists, some phenomenologists, such 
as Merleau-Ponty (1943) and Valberg (1992) as examples of philosophers who 
reject it.   
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relationalist argues that, even if the distal object causes the perception, it 
may also play a constitutive role in determining its nature. If it is true that 
nothing that figures in the causal chain of a thing can be one of its 
metaphysical components, then the causal argument is rehabilitated. I have 
argued that even this argument fails because, even if it were true for most 
things involved in causal processes, this cannot be true of relations and 
relational states of affairs.  
Although it doesn’t presuppose physicalism, SC/SE has practically the 
same consequence as local supervenience: they both entail that the neural 
activation is sufficient for the occurrence of a phenomenal character of a 
certain kind, all other relevant factors remaining unchanged. The difference 
is that supervenience secures this conclusion in all possible worlds (or in 
nearby possible words, depending on the strength of the supervenience 
claim), while SC/SE secures it only given the current psychophysical laws. 
Therefore, both supervenience and SC/SE are used to mount independent 
arguments from hallucination against relationalism, which do not make use 
of IND. However, I have argued that these arguments fail. 
The first lesson to be learned from this discussion, then, is that the 
most promising version of the argument from hallucination against 
relationalism remains the traditional one, in which IND plays a pivotal role. 
IND remains central to assessing the tenability of relationalism in the face 
of hallucinations. Opponents of relationalism ought to provide motivations 
for IND, and relationalists need to explain how they can accommodate it. 
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This stands in contrast with a recent trend in the debate on the argument 
from hallucination, which tends to take the traditional argument to be 
flawed, while focusing on some version of the causal argument from 
hallucination, seen as the real threat to relationalism.
74
 Proponents and 
opponents of relationalism alike share this attitude. Nudds, for instance, 
notices that: 
Many people find the common kind assumption compelling 
because they accept some version of the causal argument [from 
hallucination]. (Nudds 2013: 274)  
Thus, Nudds seems to suggest, a defence of relationalism should focus 
on responding to the causal argument, rather than assessing the key 
assumption in the traditional argument, i.e. IND. Indeed, Robinson (1994), 
before presenting the causal argument from hallucination that he deems 
successful, discusses an argument along the lines of the classical argument 
from hallucination, but ultimately rejects it as question-begging. He sees the 
argument as relying on a principle that is a close cognate of IND, and spells 
it out as follows:  
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 Although I have presented the argument from local supervenience as 
independent from the causal argument, local supervenience is sometimes used to 
motivate something along the lines of SC/SE or replaces it in an argument with the 
same structure. This is unsurprising, given the similar implications of the two 
principles.  
Chapter 5: Philosopher’s Hallucinations 
 
 
 
226 
 
Things can be qualitatively similar only if they are of the same 
general kind and have the same ontological status (Robinson 
1994: 88),  
only to conclude that it is ‘not so obviously true that it can be used to 
support a controversial conclusion’ (Robinson 1994: 88). Similarly, 
influential discussions of the argument from hallucination incorporate 
elements of the causal argument or the argument from local supervenience 
that make the commitment to IND redundant (Smith 2002: 200; Foster 
2000; Sollberger 2007, 2012). If my diagnosis of the local supervenience 
and SC/SE are correct, however, these are not less, but more controversial 
than IND. Therefore, those more direct ways of arguing against 
relationalism without relying on IND are unsuccessful.  
The second lesson of the present discussion is that the reasons 
implicitly or explicitly put forward to motivate (2#)—experiential 
naturalism, local supervenience, and SC/SE—either fall short of delivering 
it or are themselves largely controversial.  
Does this mean that we should reject (2#)? This would be premature. 
All of the positive motivations considered here fall short of supporting (2#); 
however it is not clear that one can so easily deny it. So far, we have 
established that there is no conclusive argument for (2#), so it is possible for 
one to deny it. But it might turn out that denying it would require one to 
commit to incredible views. Instead of considering what arguments support 
(2#), we now need to consider what would it take for one to reject it. One 
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who wants to reject (2#) needs to offer an alternative picture of what 
happens to the subject after her brain has been stimulated to induce a brain 
state that perfectly matches the brain state of a genuine perception in the 
absence of the relevant distal cause. If the matching neural state doesn’t 
produce an experience that is indiscriminable from the genuine experience, 
what else happens? Is there any credible story for what follows the 
reproduction of the matching neural state?  
One option would be to say that nothing at all happens. With the 
rejection of local supervenience and SC/SE, we have rejected the idea that 
brain activity of a certain kind is sufficient for the occurrence of conscious 
experience of a certain kind. So it might well be that, without the presence 
of the suitable distal object, no conscious experience at all occurs. Maybe 
there is some transmission of (misleading) information, which might 
eventually have behavioural and cognitive effects on the subject, akin to 
cases of blindsight (Weiskrantz 1986; Weiskrantz 1996; Weiskrantz 2009; 
Azzopardi and Cowey 2001).
75
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 Notice that this option, which, as far as I know, has not been defended, is 
significantly different from Fish’s (2009). Fish too maintains that hallucinations 
brought about by neurally matching situations have no phenomenal character 
whatsoever, for reasons I will discuss in the next chapter. However, in his view, the 
lack of phenomenal character in such hallucinations is no reason to deny (2#). For 
Fish, when one has a matching hallucination, it seems to one as if one has a 
conscious experience, with a naïve realist phenomenal character (a character 
consisting in putting the subject in relation to mind-independent objects), even 
though this apparent phenomenology is only an illusion, the by-product of the fact 
that perception and matching hallucinations share behavioural and cognitive 
effects. In the view I suggest here, on the contrary, the hallucinating subject might 
display some behaviour in common with someone veridically blindseeing, such as 
guessing that a certain type of object is in the blinded visual field. However, like 
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The discussion of local supervenience presented in this chapter, 
however, poses serious problems for this line of response. Empirical data 
such as Penfield’s studies show that some brain activity—even if it doesn’t 
exactly reproduce the brain activity of a genuine perception—is sufficient 
for the occurrence of an experience with a phenomenal character of some 
kind—although there is no evidence that it can produce an impersonally 
introspectively indiscriminable conscious experience. If, in general, some 
brain activity is sufficient for the occurrence of some phenomenal character, 
it would be very difficult to explain how a brain state that exactly matches 
the brain state occurring in a genuine perception would fail to produce any 
phenomenal character at all. It is more natural to suppose that the more the 
brain state resembles the pattern of neural activation that occurs when 
genuinely perceiving, the more likely it is that this will generate a conscious 
experience with phenomenal character.  
Even if one accepts that reproducing the mental state is enough to 
produce a conscious experience with phenomenal character, one can still 
resist (2#) by denying that the experience thus produced is introspectively 
indistinguishable from a genuine perception, at least in the impersonal sense 
of indiscriminability required for the argument to succeed (see Chapter 3). 
But what would ground this claim? We saw in the previous chapter that 
hallucinations are introspectively indiscriminable in an impersonal way only 
if the failure to distinguish them cannot be attributed to any interference 
                                                                                                                            
the blindseer, the subject would not take herself to have any conscious experience. 
This means that a lack of phenomenal consciousness in such cases is identifiable.  
Chapter 5: Philosopher’s Hallucinations 
 
 
 
229 
 
having to do with the subject or the conditions of introspection. In the cases 
of ordinary hallucinations scrutinised in the previous chapter, we were 
always able to identify some factors that might be responsible for the 
subject’s failure to discriminate: typically, the fact the subject’s cognitive 
and discriminatory capacity or attentiveness are impaired by a psychoactive 
substance, brain damage, a medical condition, etc. Moreover, whatever 
interference occurs, this is likely to correspond to some neurological 
difference between the hallucination in question and any hypothetical 
perception.  
It was part and parcel of the thought experiment introducing 
philosopher’s hallucinations that nothing is wrong with the subject 
hallucinating and that she is in exactly the same brain state as she would be 
when having a perceptual experience: her cognitive capacities are not 
impaired in any way and she has the same psychological states that 
accompany and support the experience she has in the case of genuine 
perception. Ex hypothesis, then, none of the factors that could explain why 
the subject fails to discriminate her current hallucination from the genuine 
perception of a moment before are present. One would have to indicate 
some other conditions or factors that interfere with the subject’s ability to 
discriminate two otherwise introspectively distinguishable experiences. 
However, it is not clear what these factors could possibly be. What makes it 
the case that the subject fails to discriminate between her current matching 
hallucination and the previous genuine perception? In the absence of a 
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response to this question, the relationalist is not in a position to challenge 
(2#) in a convincing way. Although these are not conclusive reasons for 
(2#), they show that the relationalist would have to answer very pressing 
questions for which no obvious answer is yet available. Therefore, the 
relationalist is better off accepting (2#), at least for the sake of argument, 
and looking somewhere else to challenge the argument from hallucination. 
In the next chapter, I will consider a line of response that can be found in 
Austin’s discussion of the argument from illusion.  
 
5.8 Conclusions 
In Chapter 3, I argued that IND is motivated by the belief, supported by 
what I called the argument from superficiality, that relationalists cannot 
deny IND without also denying the non-negotiable assumption that 
phenomenal characters are superficial. We have seen that relationalists can 
accommodate a difference in phenomenal character between perception and 
an indiscriminable hallucination by appealing to conditions that may 
interfere with the subject’s ability to introspect. Thus, in order to motivate 
IND, one needs to introduce the notion of impersonal indiscriminability. 
This means that both the argument from superficiality and the traditional 
argument from hallucination are successful only if there are hallucinations 
that are introspectively indiscriminable from perception in an impersonal 
sense (IIIHs).  
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In the previous chapter, I argued that there is no empirical evidence 
that can support the actual existence of IIIHs. In this chapter I explored 
potential motivations for claiming that IIIHs are metaphysically possible. 
Although I ultimately accept this possibility, examining the motivations that 
have been putt forward to support the metaphysical possibility of IIIHs 
allowed me to consider the solidity of alternative arguments against 
relationalism. These arguments, which do not rely on IND, and which 
would thus be effective even if the relationalist proved capable of denying 
IND without violating the superficiality constraint, rely respectively on the 
principle of local supervenience and the ‘same proximate cause, same 
immediate effect’ principle. Since both principles beg the question against 
relationalism, these alternative arguments fail. Additionally, I argued that, 
properly understood, the Humean Principle, which may seem to be in 
tension with relationalist commitments, is indeed compatible with them.  
In the absence of alternative arguments from hallucination, the 
opponent must resort to the traditional one. Hence the debate over 
relationalism hinges entirely on whether or not we should accept IND. As 
we have seen, deciding whether IND is to be accepted comes down to 
deciding whether relationalism can deny it, while preserving the 
superficiality of phenomenal characters. This will be the task for the next 
chapter, in which I will argue that relationalists can accommodate the 
superficiality of phenomenal characters while still maintaining that a 
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perception and an indiscriminable hallucination have different phenomenal 
characters.  
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In Chapter 3 I examined the grounds for accepting the key assumption 
in the argument from hallucination, namely the idea that when two 
experiences are introspectively indiscriminable, they have the same 
phenomenal character (IND). I argued that IND only stands a chance of 
being true if we understand ‘indiscriminable’ in an impersonal sense. While 
various explanations appeal to the fact that some conditions can interfere 
with one’s introspective capacity to distinguish experiences with distinct 
phenomenal characters when these are subjectively indiscriminable, such 
explanations are not available in the case of hallucinations that are 
impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from perception (IIIH). Thus 
the relationalist allegedly can’t account for their having the same 
phenomenal character as the perception.  
As I argued in Chapter 4, there is no evidence that any actual 
hallucinations is a case in which no interfering condition could prevent one 
from noticing that the phenomenal character of the hallucination undergone 
is actually different from that of typical perceptions. However, in Chapter 5 
I argued that the relationalist cannot rule out that IIIHs are metaphysically 
possible. The possibility of such hallucinations arises from the consideration 
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that it is possible to have hallucinations brought about by the same neural 
state bringing about a genuine perception.  
It remains to see whether relationalism can account for the fact that a 
hallucination may be impersonally introspectively indiscriminable from a 
perception while not sharing with it the same phenomenal character, without 
thereby assuming that the nature of the phenomenal character is hidden to 
introspection and hence denying that the phenomenal character of 
hallucination is superficial.  
Unless relationalists provide a response to this challenge, we have 
reason to believe that the best account for the indiscriminability of IIIHs is 
in terms of the sameness of their phenomenal characters; hence that we have 
to accept IND as the only credible way to account for the possibility of 
IIIHs. In this chapter I will explore whether the relationalist can answer this 
challenge.  
Before addressing this question, I will consider a different strategy for 
blocking the argument from hallucination. One might be tempted to claim 
that, even if we accept both IND and the possibility of IIIHs, the conclusion 
of the argument still doesn’t follow. I will explore this strategy in the next 
section, only to argue that this strategy faces a problemnamely what 
Martin calls the ‘problem of explanatory screening off’ (Martin 2004: 71), 
originating from a variation of the causal argument from hallucination. As a 
result of this argument, the only strategy available to the relationalist 
remains to reject IND. The screening off worry also precludes certain 
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accounts of the phenomenal character of IIIHs and imposes only a negative 
account of them. According to the negative account of IIIHs, the 
phenomenal character of these hallucinations is parasitical upon the 
phenomenal character of hallucination, for it is exhausted by its being 
introspectively indiscriminable from that of a genuine perception.  
In what follows I will consider some common objections to this 
account and respond to them. A crucial element in the response to many of 
these objections is to understand how relationalists should conceive of 
introspection. With this understanding of the negative account of 
hallucination and of how introspection works, it will be possible to 
appreciate how the relationalist can claim that an IIIH doesn’t have the same 
phenomenal character as a genuine perception without committing to the 
claim that the phenomenal character of hallucination is hidden to 
introspection and hence forsaking the intuition that phenomenal characters 
are superficial.  
 
6.1. An Invalid Argument? 
The relationalist could argue that, even if we accept IND and the theoretical 
possibility of IIIHs, the argument from hallucination is a non-sequitur. Even 
if one agrees that perception and an IIIH have the same phenomenal 
character, it doesn’t follow that the phenomenal character of perception 
cannot be determined by the mind-independent object that we take ourselves 
to be perceiving.  
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There are two strategies that relationalists could pursue to reject this 
conclusion, while accepting all the premises of the argument. The first 
option is to claim that perception and hallucination have one phenomenal 
character (however construed) in common, while perception has an 
additional phenomenal character, to be accounted for in relational terms. 
This proposal is likely to be resisted by most philosophers, who take 
phenomenal characters to be maximally determinate. The intuition 
underlying the widespread acceptance of maximal determination of 
phenomenal characters is the thought that when a perception and an IIIH is 
indiscriminable from a perception, their shared phenomenal character best 
explains their indiscriminability, and if their shared phenomenal character 
explains their indiscriminability, then it’s plausible that this shared 
phenomenal character is sufficient to account for what it is like to 
experience each. Otherwise the perception would have introspectible 
features that would distinguish it from the IIIH, but this is ex hypothesis to 
be excluded. I will discuss in greater detail later on, when considering the 
screening off problem introduced by Martin, why the phenomenal character 
common to perception and hallucination should be sufficient to account for 
what it is like to have both perception and a corresponding IIIH.  
Alternatively, an opponent of maximal determination might suggest 
that the additional phenomenal character of hallucination is not an 
introspectible feature of the perception, and hence not introspectively 
accessible. But this would amount to denying that the phenomenal character 
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of perception is superficial. On top of violating the superficiality condition, 
this strategy would hinder relationalism in its effort to account for the way 
experience strikes us introspectively as being a relation to the object one 
seems to perceive, because the relational phenomenal character would not 
be accessible through introspection, so it couldn’t explain why perception 
strikes us in this way. I will thus grant that phenomenal characters are 
maximally determinate, leave this strategy aside, and focus on the second 
one.  
The second option is to claim that a perception and an IIIH have the 
same phenomenal character, although each is constituted by different bases: 
the former is constituted by the objects we ordinarily take ourselves to 
perceive and the other is constituted by something else. This option requires 
one to think that phenomenal characters can be multiply realized. While 
denying that phenomenal characters are maximally determinate may seem 
preposterous, the claim that phenomenal characters are multiply realized is 
in line with the intuitive understanding of phenomenal characters in terms of 
what it is like to have an experience. It is possible that what it is like to have 
an experience is identical to what it is like to have another experience, 
although what determines the phenomenal character of each experience 
differs.  
This is not dissimilar to an intuitive way of understanding 
observational properties. The lemon and the visually indiscriminable crafted 
soap may be said to have the same observational properties: yellowness, 
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lemon-shaped-ness, and coarseness of surface. Similarly, under this view, 
the veridical experiences of the lemon and the lemon-shaped soap have the 
same phenomenal character. However, according to the relationalist, since 
phenomenal characters are partly constituted by the object of perception, 
they are realised in one case by a relation to the lemon and in the other case 
by a relation to the piece of soap.  
In ‘Particular Thoughts and Singular Thoughts’, Martin discusses how 
intentional theories of experience can accommodate the particularity of 
experience. He argues that intentionalists can ‘embrace the conclusion that 
experiences of identical twins have the same phenomenal character without 
having to deny that individual experiences have particular objects as part of 
their phenomenal nature’ (Martin 2002a: 175) by contrasting the 
‘unrepeatable aspects of its phenomenology, what we might call its 
phenomenal nature’—the particular entities involved in a perceptual 
event—‘with that it has in common with qualitatively the same experiential 
events, what we might call its phenomenal character’ (Martin 2002a: 194). 
The phenomenal nature identifies one specific event (the perception of one 
rubber duck on a particular occasion, rather than its identical twin), while 
the phenomenal character ‘abstracts away from the particulars involved in 
the individual event and just considers the general attributes that the 
particulars exhibit’ (Martin 2002a: 194). 
Similarly, a relationalist could say that two perceptions of two 
qualitatively identical rubber ducks are distinct events, each involving the 
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occurrence of a relation to a particular. However, the phenomenal character 
abstracts away from these particulars, so we can say that the two 
experiences have the same phenomenal characters. Nonetheless, in each 
case, the identical phenomenal character is constituted by the different 
particulars involved in the relation. Such a model, it seems, can be applied 
to IIIHs. An IIIH and the relevant perception have the same phenomenal 
character, although each phenomenal character is realised by the obtaining 
of a relation to a different particular. A theory of this sort is discussed by 
Price (1932: 40).
76
 ‘The Selective Theory’, as he calls it, claims that, when 
one genuinely perceives, one is related to mind-independent physical 
objects, while when one hallucinates, one is related to sense-data.  
If one accepts that phenomenal characters can be multiply realised, the 
Selective Theory is not the only available option. One can maintain that the 
very same phenomenal character is realised, in the case of genuine 
perception, by the obtaining of a relation to mind-independent physical 
objects and, in the case of IIIH, by a representational content, by non-
representational intrinsic properties, or anything else. Therefore, as it stands, 
the argument is a non-sequitur: whatever accounts for and constitutes the 
phenomenal character of an IIIH doesn’t need to account for and constitute 
the phenomenal character of the corresponding perception. To make the 
argument valid, one needs to introduce a further premise that rules out the 
                                                 
76
 Price ultimately rejects the Selective Theories on grounds that have little to do 
with the issues that matter to us in this context, but have rather to do with his 
attempt to account for the causal efficacy that we attribute to sensible objects (see 
Baylis 1950: 456). 
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multiple realisability of phenomenal characters and claims that phenomenal 
characters are maximally determined. A valid version of the argument from 
hallucination, thus, would be the following:  
1.  Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of conscious 
perceptual experiences is to be accounted for in terms of the 
obtaining of a psychological relation to the mind-independent 
objects with which one is perceptually presented;  
2#. In some cases of hallucination, one has an experience that is 
introspectively indiscriminable from an experience one may have 
in a genuine perception;  
3.   In the hallucinatory case, the object one seems to perceive doesn’t 
exist; 
4.  (from 3) In the hallucinatory case, the phenomenal character of 
one’s experience is not accounted for in terms of the obtaining of 
a psychological relation with the mind-independent objects with 
which one is perceptually presented; 
5*. If two conscious experiences are impersonally introspectively 
indiscriminable, they have the same phenomenal character (IND); 
6.    Phenomenal characters are maximally determinate; 
7. A phenomenal character cannot be determined by different 
constitutive bases;  
8.   (from 4, 5, 6, 7) The phenomenal character of a perception has the 
same phenomenal character as the corresponding IIIH and this 
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cannot be determined by the obtaining of a relation to the object 
one seems to be perceiving, as this is not what determines the 
phenomenal character of the corresponding IIIH. 
9.   (from 1 and 8) Relationalism is false.  
Although 6 can be granted, it is not clear that 7 should be. The burden 
of proof is on the proponent of the argument and there doesn’t seem to be 
any immediate reason to deny multiple realisability.  
 
6.2 The Reversed Causal Argument  
As it stands, the argument not only fails to get the spreading step in 
motion; it also fails to impose any constraint on the relationalist’s account of 
the phenomenal character of IIIHs. Unless one rules out the multiple 
realisability of phenomenal characters, it seems that a relationalist can give 
any account of the phenomenal characters of IIIHs they deem fit—in the 
same way that they can give any account they please of the phenomenal 
characters of hallucinations that are not subjectively introspectively 
indiscriminable. However, Martin (2004; 2006) argues that an argument 
related to the causal argument considered in the previous chapter imposes 
certain constraints on the account that relationalists can provide of the 
phenomenal character of hallucinations.  
Martin calls the argument in question the ‘reversed causal argument’, 
as it reverses the order in which the causal argument from hallucination 
considers genuine perceptions and a certain kind of hallucination that he 
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calls ‘causally matching hallucinations’. These are hallucinations that result 
from the stimulation of the same brain state activated when genuinely 
perceiving. At the end of the previous chapter, I granted that hallucinations 
thus produced are IIIHs. Therefore I will use ‘causally matching 
hallucinations’ and ‘IIIHs’ as coextensional terms. I will use the first one 
when I want to highlight the fact that they are brought about by the same 
brain state that brings about a perception (or when reporting Martin’s 
position), and the latter when I need to stress the fact that they are 
impersonally indiscriminable through introspection from the perception they 
causally match.  
While Robinson’s argument states that whatever event happens in the 
veridical case, it should also happen in the case of a causally matching 
hallucination, the reversed causal argument argues that whatever happens in 
the case of hallucination should also be found in the case of perception. 
Martin (2004: 54) presents the argument as follows:  
(1) When S sees a pine tree at t, call this situation v, there is in 
S’s body some complete causal condition just prior to t which 
determined the chance of this event of seeing occurring in v, call 
this condition N; 
(2) It is nomologically possible that N should occur in S even if 
no candidate object of perception is present and conditions 
necessary for the occurrence of a perception are not met, and a 
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hallucinatory experience instead occurs; call one such situation 
h; 
(3) Where two situations involve the same proximate causal 
conditions, and do not differ in any non-causal conditions or the 
occurrence of some kind of effect, then the chances for the 
occurrence of such an effect are the same in both situations; 
(4) No non-causal condition required for the occurrence of the 
effects of N is present in h but absent in v; 
(5) Whatever kind of experience occurs in h, there is the same 
chance of such an experience occurring in v; 
(6) Hence whatever kind of experience does occur in situations 
like h, it is possible that such a kind of experience occurs when 
one is veridically perceiving. (Martin 2004. 53–54) 
In this argument, as in Robinson’s, Martin accepts the possibility of a 
hallucination brought about by the same proximate cause (what Martin here 
calls ‘condition N’) that brings about a genuine perception (premises 1 and 
2). He also accepts something along the ‘same proximate cause, same 
immediate effect’ principle in the qualified form expressed by Foster, which 
allows that the same proximate cause can fail to produce the same 
immediate effect if there are differences in the non-causal background 
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conditions necessary for the occurrence of that effect (3). The difference is 
that Foster imposes what Martin sees as an arbitrary limitation on the 
relevant non-causal conditions, where ‘relevant’ seems to have the specific 
function of excluding the distal object or event from playing a non-causal 
constitutive role (see previous chapter). If we do not restrict the relevant 
conditions in this way, the presence of the object can play a non-causal role 
in determining the nature of perception. As Martin claims, ‘even if those 
objects are implicated in the causes of experience, they also figure non-
causally as essential constituents’ (Martin 2004: 288). 
This is the reason why it is not possible, pace Robinson and Foster, to 
conclude from the stated premises that everything that can be found in 
perception is also to be found in hallucination: we cannot exclude without 
begging the question that the distal object makes a contribution to the effect 
by being a necessary condition for the occurrence of perception, in virtue of 
being a constitutive element of its phenomenal character.  
 However, Martin thinks that, although considerations about the brain 
state shared by perception and causally matching hallucinations cannot 
secure any conclusions about the perceptual case, they can impose some 
constraints on what one can say about the hallucinatory case. The constraint 
imposed is that whatever accounts for the phenomenal character of an IIIH 
has to be something that can occur in the perceptual case too (conclusion 6). 
In order to resist this argument, one would need to show that the absence of 
the relevant object can play a non-causal role in determining the nature of 
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the phenomenal character of hallucination, in the same way that, in genuine 
perceptual cases, the presence of the object determines the nature of the 
phenomenal character of the perception. This would mean rejecting premise 
(4).  
In order to challenge this premise, one would need to say that the 
presence of the object in the perceptual case (i.e. the absence of the absence 
of the object) would prevent the proximate cause from having the effect it 
normally has in the case of hallucination. In turn, this would require one to 
consider the role that the absence of the object plays in the hallucinatory 
case as akin to the non-causal constitutive role that the presence of the 
object plays in perception. That the absence of the object could play this 
role is incredible. The presence of the object may have a constitutive role to 
play in the nature of perception and its phenomenal character, because 
perception is a relation, and as such it requires the existence of its relata to 
occur. But it doesn’t seem plausible to maintain that the experience involved 
in hallucination metaphysically requires the absence of the object, unless 
one claims that hallucinating is being acquainted with the absence of that 
object.  
Notice that the implausibility of this claim doesn’t follow from the 
assumption that one cannot be acquainted with absence. It might well be 
that, in certain cases, one is perceptually acquainted with absence. For 
instance, Soteriou—who is a proponent of relationalism—claims that 
perceptual awareness of absence involves a ‘positive experiential 
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occurrence’ (Soteriou 2013: 128), understood as experience of empty 
regions of space—in which something could be seen, but nothing is actually 
seen. Indeed, this awareness of absence is thought to be ubiquitous and a 
prerequisite to seeing the spatial boundaries of objects. Similarly, being 
aware of intervals of times within which something could be heard but 
nothing is actually heard is crucial for experiencing things like rhythm, 
which involves the alternation of hearing sound and silence (Soteriou 2013: 
116–129).77  
The problem is rather that the claim that the phenomenal character of 
a hallucination is determined by the obtaining of a relation to an absence is 
phenomenologically inadequate and metaphysically implausible. 
Hallucinating an apple is not like hearing silence or seeing an empty space. 
Even if it were plausible to claim that the phenomenal character of the latter 
is partly constituted by the obtaining of a relation to an absence (of sound, 
or of space-filling objects), it is not clear how the phenomenal character of 
the experience of seeming to see an apple can be constituted by the 
obtaining of a relation to an absence. There is a significant 
phenomenological difference between seeing an empty space and 
hallucinating an apple that this proposal fails to capture.  
                                                 
77
 This view stands in contrast to the prevailing idea that we see only present 
objects and scenes, and thus that perception of absence is dependent on having the 
negative belief that something isn’t the case (Dretske 1969; O’ Shaughnessy 2000: 
330). Soterious’ account of experience of absence is dependant on his account of a 
spatial sensory field of visual perception and a temporal sensory field of auditory 
perception. These determine the sense-modality-dependent structural feature of the 
relation of acquaintance involved in perception and contribute to the phenomenal 
character of perceptual experience.  
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Since there doesn’t seem to be any obvious and convincing way of 
rejecting (4), it is difficult to avoid the conclusion of the reversed causal 
argument. Therefore, we must accept that whatever happens in the case of 
hallucination is also to be found in the case of genuine perception: a 
common psychological effect is brought about by the activation of certain 
brain areas in both perception and causally matching hallucination. Notice, 
however, that this conclusion is compatible with relationalism. Saying that a 
common psychological effect occurs in cases of veridical perception and 
causally matching hallucination doesn’t prevent one from saying that, on top 
of the common psychological effect, something else contributes to the 
phenomenal character of perception. However, this imposes certain 
constraints on what can be said to constitute the phenomenal character of 
hallucination: it must be of a kind that can also be found in perception.  
Now the question is: are the accounts of the phenomenal character of 
hallucination proposed above compatible with this constraint? Can one 
adopt a sense-datum, intentional, or qualia account of hallucination and 
coherently say that the phenomenal character of hallucination is also present 
in perception, while still maintaining that the phenomenal character of 
perception is partly determined by the obtaining of a relation to a physical 
mind-independent object? Martin (2004, 2006) argues that one cannot.  
He argues that, if one admits that if a given brain state is sufficient to 
produce an experience with a phenomenal character that is impersonally 
introspectively indiscriminable from a genuine perception, it is not clear 
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why the obtaining of a psychological event is sufficient to account for the 
phenomenal character in the hallucinatory case, while it is not in the 
perceptual case. It seems that the common psychological event screens off 
the explanatory efficacy of the obtaining of a relation to a physical mind-
independent object in accounting for the phenomenal character of 
perception. The result would be a merely nominal relationalism, where the 
obtaining of the relation to an object doesn’t really contribute to the 
phenomenal character of perception, which is fully explained by the 
common episode occurring both in perception and IIIH.  
In formulating the screening off problem, Martin assumes that 
phenomenal characters are maximally determinate: ‘if we are intending to 
give the most determinate and specific account of how things are with a 
subject at a given time’ (Martin 2006: 371), we cannot avoid competition 
arising between what is solely to be found in perception (the obtaining of a 
relation to mind-independent mental object) and what it is to be found in 
both perception and hallucination, whatever that is. As we have seen, this is 
hardly a contentious assumption.  
The screening off problem seems to apply to all the possible accounts 
of hallucination we have considered above. Suppose one gives an account of 
the phenomenal character of causally matching hallucinations in terms of 
the experience’s possession of certain qualitative properties (qualia). If, as 
per the conclusion of the reversed causal argument, the presence of an 
experience with certain qualia is also to be found in perception, ‘the naïve 
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realist aspects of perception [the obtaining of a relation to mind-independent 
objects] [cannot] themselves shape the contours of the subject’s conscious 
experience’ (Martin 2004: 64). The experience’s possession of qualia 
exhausts the explanation of what it is like to have it, even in the case of 
genuine perception. 
The same, it seems, holds if one claims that the phenomenal character 
of hallucination is determined by a representational content or by a relation 
to mind-dependent sense-data. If being related to mind-dependent entities or 
representing certain objects and properties is sufficient for having an 
experience with a certain phenomenal character in the case of causally 
matching hallucinations, the obtaining of a relation to mind-independent 
objects is made explanatorily redundant in the case of genuine perception.  
 
6.3 Attempts to Avoid the Screening Off Problem 
How does the screening off worry bear on the Selective Theory 
discussed by Price and the attempts to provide a positive account of the 
phenomenal character of IIIHs, which I discussed in section 6.1? Let’s first 
consider an account of the phenomenal character of IIIHs in terms of sense-
data.  
A proponent of the Selective Theory could insist that the screening off 
doesn’t affect their view, because, by appealing to the multiple realisability 
of phenomenal characters, they can grant that something happening both in 
perception and hallucination obtains: in both cases the same phenomenal 
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations 
 
 
250 
 
character is present. Moreover, in both cases the phenomenal character is 
constituted by the obtaining of a relation to a certain object. However in 
each case the object to which one is related, which shapes the contours of 
one’s phenomenal character, is a different object: either a lemon or a lemon-
shaped sense-datum. Insisting that the relation to a lemon-shaped sense-
datum should screen off the relation to a real sense-datum would be like 
saying that, since it is possible for one to have an experience that is 
indiscriminable from a lemon, when one only sees a lemon-shaped soap, the 
obtaining of a perceptual relation to the lemon-shaped soap should screen 
off the obtaining of a relation to a real lemon every time I see a lemon and 
prevent it from contributing to the phenomenal character of the lemon-
perception.  
This line of response seems particularly appealing if one conceives of 
sense-data as mind-independent entities. As we saw in the first chapter, 
early proponents of sense-datum theories, such as Moore, Russell, Price, 
and Broad, were not committed to any particular view about the nature of 
sense-data. The notion of sense-data is generally introduced simply to 
circumscribe the kind of things of which one can be perceptually aware, 
without further initial commitment with respect to what kind of things one 
can perceive (see for instance Moore 1926: 54–55). The debate among 
sense-datum theorists takes precisely the form of working out, through 
arguments, the nature of sense-data. In general early proponents of sense-
data tend to think of them as non-physical entities, but also as mind-
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independent (see Martin 2003; 2016 for a discussion). Only later proponents 
of sense-data, such as Robinson and Foster, frame them as mind-dependent 
entities. In particular, Price presents the Selective Theory as committed to 
the mind-independence of sense-data. If sense-data are mind-independent 
objects that exist around us independently of our perception of them, the 
analogy between a lemon-shaped sense-datum and a lemon-shaped soap is 
even stronger.  
However, the analogy between being related to a sense-datum in an 
IIIH and being related to a lemon-shaped soap in an experience of a soap 
that is indiscriminable from a lemon breaks down in the context of the 
reversed causal argument. We do not think that the occurrence of a certain 
brain state is sufficient for the obtaining of a relation to a lemon-shaped 
soap. The obtaining of a relation to a lemon-shaped soap is due to the 
presence of the soap before one and one’s being perceptually related to it. In 
virtue of the reversed causal argument, instead, the occurrence of a certain 
brain state should be sufficient for the occurrence of what determines the 
phenomenal character of the experience.  
If the occurrence of a certain brain state is sufficient for the obtaining 
of a psychological event, one might well insist that the sense-data to which 
one is related exist in the world around us and are ready for one to pick up 
every time one has one’s brain stimulated in a certain way. But this is 
problematic. One is related to these entities only (and every time) one is in a 
certain brain state. This generates a paradoxical situation in which a 
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psychological episode is accounted for in terms of the obtaining of a relation 
to a mind-independent object, but whether or not one is related to this object 
is simply determined by whether one is in the relevant brain state. It is 
unclear how such an object can count as mind-independent. Even if one 
manages to solve the metaphysical difficulties of this proposal, the 
screening off is unavoidable. Since it is sufficient to be in a certain brain 
state to be so related to a sense-datum, an awkward relation to a mind-
independent object should obtain every time one is in that brain state, 
including when a real lemon is in front of one. But if this is the case, the 
relation to a lemon-shaped sense-datum should screen off the role that the 
relation to the real lemon is supposed to play when perceiving a real lemon. 
Claiming that sense-data are mind-independent doesn’t make the screening 
off worry disappear.78  
An intentional or a qualia account of IIIHs cannot escape the 
screening off either: if being in an intentional state with a certain content or 
having an experience with certain intrinsic sensory qualities is sufficient for 
                                                 
78
This poses an additional problem: a proponent of mind-independent sense-data 
needs to make queer metaphysical commitments. She has to claim that the world is 
replete of these strange entities that are there all the time ready to be seen—as Price 
says, an ‘infinitely multitudinous and infinitely complicated swarm of 
miscellaneous sensibilia’ (Price 1935: 46), which might strike many as ‘monstrous 
and incredible’ (Price 1935: 46). It should be noted that Price writes off this 
objection as not particularly effective. According to Price, this view of sense-data 
doesn’t really fall prey of the objection of unduly multiplying entities. The 
Selective Theorist only claims that they exist all the time rather than only when 
sensed, for ‘sense-data certainly exist [and are] found in nature’, ‘for they are 
certainly sensed’ (Price 1935: 46). However, we should resist Price’s assumption 
that sense-data exist in any case, as this relies on the Phenomenal Principle and the 
use that proponents of sense-data make of them—something that relationalists can 
and should reject (see Chapter 2).  
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the obtaining of a certain phenomenal character in the case of a 
hallucination caused by a certain brain state, the same intentional state or 
intrinsic property should be sufficient to account for the phenomenal 
character of the perception brought about by the same brain state.  
More recently, Johnston presented an account that allegedly doesn’t 
fall prey to the screening off worry, despite giving a positive account of the 
phenomenal character of causally matching hallucination.79 Johnson claims 
that:  
Your seeing the scene before your eyes is your being visually 
aware of a host of spatio-temporal particulars instantiating parts 
of such a profile or complex of sensible qualities and relations. 
(Johnston 2004: 135)  
When one hallucinates, one is aware of the uninstantiated properties 
of the very same sensory profile:  
                                                 
79
 It is not entirely clear that Johnston aims to defend a relationalist account of 
genuine perceptions. He never mentions relationalism and his stated claim is to 
defend direct realism, which, as we saw in the first chapter, is less committal than 
relationalism and compatible with intentionalism. However Johnston is often 
considered a relationalist (Conduct 2012; Logue 2014; and Genone 2016 all dub 
him a ‘naïve realist’). This doesn’t seem so far-fetched, considering that he 
explicitly argues against intentionalism and claims that ‘seeing is just having things 
and the visible features of those things disclosed to one’ (Johnston 2004: 172). 
Moreover, although he uses a different terminology, he seems to be committed to a 
substantially relationalist account of phenomenal character, whereby the 
phenomenal character, or ‘sensible profile’, as he calls it, of genuine perception 
amounts to being aware of particulars. So maybe the reason why his direct realism 
is, as he calls it, ‘radical’ (Johnston 2004: 114) is that it entails a commitment to 
relationalism. 
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When we hallucinate we are aware merely of the structured 
qualitative parts of such sensible profiles. Any case of 
hallucination is thus a case of ‘direct’ visual awareness of less 
than one would be ‘directly’ aware of in the case of seeing. 
(Johnston 2004: 137) 
How exactly we understand this proposal largely depends on how one 
understands Johnston’s commitment to the possibility of uninstantiated 
properties. But, however we read this proposal, there is a difficulty that 
Johnston needs to address. It is not clear how one can be related to 
universals. A relational view where one is allegedly related to universals 
would require one to adopt a radically platonic view of universals, where 
these are really thought to exist and can be accessed. Although Johnston 
mentions this worry, he fails to give a satisfactory answer (Johnston 2004: 
141).  
Moreover, one may question the phenomenological adequacy of this 
account. It is part of the phenomenology of the experience that we seem to 
be presented with particulars. How can awareness of universals give rise to 
the experience of seemingly being presented with individuals? And how can 
one explain the indiscriminability of perception and hallucination if the 
former provides awareness of individuals and the latter only of universals? 
Perceptual experience presents objects as spatially located in the visual field 
and as occurring at the time one has the experience. Universal properties are 
thought to be a-temporal and a-spatial abstracts. It is not clear that one can 
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experience a universal at a certain spatial and temporal location without it 
being instantiated. 
Supposing we can find a solution to these problems, I can see three 
possible ways of understanding Johnson’s proposal. None of these provides 
a satisfactory strategy to account for hallucination and avoid the screening 
off worry: 
a) According to one reading of Johnston’s proposal, perception and 
hallucination have the very same phenomenal character, constituted by a 
relation to universals. In the case of hallucination, there is nothing more 
to the phenomenal character than this relation to universals. In the 
genuine perceptual case this phenomenal character is realised by being 
related to the objects that instantiate those universals that figure in the 
phenomenal character. He seems to suggest this reading when he claims 
that ‘hallucination is just awareness of the visible profiles that they 
actually happen to instantiate’ in the corresponding veridical case 
(Johnston 2004: 172) and that in hallucination there is only an 
irreducible phenomenal character, not further explained by other factors; 
while in perception one has the very same phenomenal character, which 
happens to be realised by being related to the object. It should be clear 
by now that this proposal is vulnerable to the screening off worry: if this 
is Johnston’s proposal, he hasn’t provided any reason why what 
accounts for the conscious experience one has in the hallucinatory case 
(awareness of visible profile) should not also suffice to account for the 
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conscious experience one has in the perception brought about by the 
same brain state.  
b) One might alternatively read Johnston as claiming that phenomenal 
characters are multiply realised. So the very same phenomenal character 
is either realised by a relation of awareness to instantiated properties 
(perception), or a relation to universals (IIIH). This reading is supported 
by Johnston’s explicit suggestion that sensible profiles are types, not 
tokens (Johnston 2004: 135). This option seems to fall prey to the 
screening off worry too. If relation to universal is enough to determine 
the phenomenal character of hallucination, why are relations to 
universals not enough for perception too?  
c) According to a third reading, experiences can have multiple phenomenal 
characters. A matching hallucination only has one phenomenal character, 
constituted by awareness of universals. Perception has the same 
phenomenal character, but also has another phenomenal character, 
which is the prerogative of only genuine perceptions, constituted by a 
relation to the individual that instantiates those properties. This third 
reading is also supported by some textual evidence. Johnston suggests 
that when one hallucinates, by being aware of uninstantiated properties, 
one is aware of only one part of the sensory profilethe other part of 
the sensible profile being accessible only through perception, when one 
is aware of the particulars. He also specifies that: 
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[W]e are instead aware of a proper part of what we are aware of 
in the corresponding case of seeing, a sensible profile that is no 
more than a certain layout of qualities. (Johnston 2004: 138; 
emphasis added) 
 This suggests that hallucination only has a partial sensible profile, or 
phenomenal character; but this violates the idea that phenomenal characters 
are maximally determined. Perceptions do not have a unique phenomenal 
character, but rather one that is in common with hallucinations and one that 
is unique to perception. This doesn’t fall prey to the screening off worry 
because the worry runs on the assumption that phenomenal characters are 
maximally determined. However, as we have already seen, claiming that 
perception has more than one phenomenal character commits one to 
rejecting the superficiality of the phenomenal character of perception, which 
is unacceptable.  
 
6.4 The Negative Account of IIIHs 
It seems that none of the positive accounts of the phenomenal 
character of IIIHs is safe from it. However, Martin maintains that there is 
one way to avoid the screening off worry. This is to adopt a negative, 
derivative account of the phenomenal character of IIIHs (or causally 
matching hallucinations). According to him, this is the only way for the 
relationalist to meet the condition imposed by the reversed causal 
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations 
 
 
258 
 
argument—i.e. that the same psychological event occurring in hallucination 
also occurs in perception—without running into the screening off problem.  
Martin argues that the phenomenal character of an IIIH should only be 
characterised in a way that is derivative of the phenomenal character of 
perception: hallucination seems and only seems to be constituted by the 
obtaining of a relation to the mind-independent object that actually 
constitutes the phenomenal character of the corresponding genuine 
perception.  
The phenomenal character of an IIIH is to be accounted for in terms of 
the obtaining of a negative epistemic condition: it must be indiscriminable 
from the phenomenal character of a genuine perception. The phenomenal 
consciousness of IIIHs is provided by their being ‘essentially failure—they 
purport to relate us to the world while failing to do so’ (Martin 2006, p. 
372); and this is the most specific thing one can say about hallucinations. 
 This condition is negative and epistemic because it accounts for the 
phenomenal character of hallucination simply in terms of what cannot be 
known of it: when one has a causally matching hallucination, one is not in a 
position to know through introspection that one isn’t having the kind of 
experience that genuinely relates one to a mind-independent object. The 
phenomenal character of a hallucination, then, is 
nothing more than the obtaining of certain negative 
epistemological conditions and what follows from them: that it 
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is not possible to know through reflection that this is not a 
situation of veridical perception. (Martin 2006: 373) 
This meets the condition imposed by the reversed causal argument, 
because indiscriminability is reflexive. Thus, surely the phenomenal 
character of a genuine perception is indiscriminable from itself. When one 
has a genuine perception, one is not in a position to distinguish its 
phenomenal character from a phenomenal character constituted by the 
obtaining of a relation to a mind-independent object. The event occurring in 
hallucination—characterised in terms of being indiscriminable through 
introspection from a genuine perception—is something that also occurs in 
perception. 
However, this doesn’t generate a screening off problem. There is no 
risk that what accounts for the phenomenal character of hallucination will 
override the explanatory role that relationalists attribute to the object in 
accounting for the phenomenal character of genuine perceptions. This is due 
to the fact that the phenomenal character of hallucination lacks any positive 
autonomous account. Any explanation of the phenomenal character of a 
causally matching hallucination is parasitic on the account given to genuine 
perception, which hence preserves its full explanatory role.  
If this is correct, Dancy’s diagnosis of the debate on disjunctivism 
fails to grasp an important aspect of the disjunctive account of experiences 
required by the relationalist. Dancy complains that disjunctivists take the 
indiscriminability of certain hallucinations from perception to be ‘a matter 
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of definition’, while it is only ‘a contingent matter’ (Dancy 1995: 131), only 
concerning a limited sub-set of hallucinations. On the contrary, he argues, 
they should provide a positive account of the phenomenal character of 
hallucination. Moreover, he claims, disjunctivists unduly attribute a primacy 
to the good disjunct—i.e. perception. This primacy, according to Dancy, is 
simply a result of taking too seriously the way in which the bad disjunct was 
originally formulated by Hinton, in terms of ‘seeming to see’, that makes it 
look derivative of the good disjunct; while in fact ‘there need be no 
suggestion that the worst case be only understood in terms of the better one’ 
(Dancy 1995: 435). Thus, he recommends that the disjunctivist offer a 
positive account of hallucination and abandon any attribution of priority to 
perception.80 However, pace Dancy, adopting those two proposals would 
leave the disjunctivst susceptible to the screening off problem.  
 
 
 
                                                 
80
 In his own words:  
‘[I]n the standard formulation of the account, misleadingly, […] we 
characterize [the second disjunct] solely by saying that it is like what it 
is not. Presumably, however, there may be available a more direct 
characterization of the second disjunct, and in a totally explicit version 
of the theory it would indeed be characterized in that better way. […] 
[A]lthough we may be persuaded to read the disjunctive conception as 
holding two states, a better one and a worse one which is 
indistinguishable from the better one, we could equally well have read 
things the other way round, saying that there are two states, a worse one 
and a better one which is indistinguishable from the worse one. Here the 
apparent primacy state has vanished, leaving only its preferability, 
which was never in doubt. Calling the worse state “seeming to see” 
expressed that primacy, but was inessential to the main purpose of 
responding to the argument from [hallucination]’ (Dancy 1995: 435).  
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6.5 Objections and Clarifications 
A number of objections have been raised against the negative account 
of hallucination. Addressing these questions will help us understand what 
the negative account of hallucination is committed to.  
 
6.5.1 The Scope of the Negative Account 
Sturgeon (2006: 193; 2008: 125) and Conduct (2010) argue that the 
fact that in some cases of hallucinations we know that we are not perceiving 
puts pressure on the negative account. In the light of what we said in 
Chapters 4 and 5, it should be clear why this objection should not worry the 
relationalist in the least. Contrary to what many commentators presume 
(Sturgeon 2006; Siegel 2008; Hellie 2005; 2007; Conduct 2010), the 
negative account of hallucination is not meant to provide sufficient and 
necessary conditions for hallucinations in general. It is only meant to 
provide an account of the phenomenal character of IIIHs in order to respond 
to the difficulties that the reversed causal argument poses for more positive 
accounts of hallucination available for most cases of hallucination.81 
                                                 
81
 This confusion on the scope of the negative view is arguably promoted by the 
fact that Fish—who defends relationalism and proposes a negative view of 
hallucination that he sees as a development of and an improvement on Martin’s 
account—makes no distinction between causally matching hallucination (or IIIHs) 
and other kinds of hallucinations. Fish explicitly presents the negative criterion as 
providing necessary and sufficient conditions for hallucination (Fish 2009: 93–
101). He also claims: ‘[T]he essence of hallucination—what distinguishes 
hallucinations as a class from other mental states—lies in their being 
indistinguishable from veridical perceptions, not in some antecedently identifiable 
feature of the state’ (Fish 2008: 156).  
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Nor is Martin interested in providing, through the negative epistemic 
condition, an account of what makes a mental occurrence a sensory 
experience in general. Martin says a few things that might explain why 
commentators have taken him to be in the business of providing necessary 
and sufficient conditions for some psychological episode to count as a 
sensory experience. He wonders how the negative condition of introspective 
indiscriminability—which, as we have seen, IIIH shares with genuine 
perceptions—‘is employed in the positive account of the notion of 
perceptual experience is general’ (Martin 2004: 301). However, discussing 
how this criterion can feature in an account of sensory experience in general 
doesn’t mean that it offers necessary and sufficient conditions for it. On the 
contrary, he specifies that this only ‘gives one sufficient conditions for 
having visual experience, and not yet any necessary condition’ (Martin 
2006: 392). This is compatible with allowing that those hallucinations that 
are not introspectively indiscriminable from perception still count as 
conscious sensory experiences. If we understand ‘introspectively 
indiscriminable’ in an impersonal sense, the negative epistemic condition 
fails to apply for most, if not all, actual hallucinations (see Chapter 4).  
This doesn’t mean that the relationalist account is incomplete until 
they have found a set of jointly necessary and sufficient conditions for what 
counts as a sensory experience. As a matter of fact, Martin doesn’t think it is 
possible to find one. Renouncing the task of giving necessary and sufficient 
conditions for what counts as sensory experience shouldn’t be seen as a 
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limitation of relationalism, that is, as something that relationalists ought to 
provide, but can’t.  
In Chapter 2, we saw Hinton claiming that ‘experience’ is 
philosophical jargon introduced to capture genuine perception and all those 
mental episodes that seem like perception but are not. Relationalists tell us 
what perception amounts to: it is the obtaining of a psychological relation 
with certain mind-independent objects. However, there is no single way in 
which an episode can seem but fail to be an instance of perception. Hinton 
notices that the second disjunct in the disjunctive claim (‘S sees a flash of 
light or only seems to see a flash of light’) is itself ‘implicitly disjunctive: 
the illusion of a flash of light is the disjunction of cases that are not, but to 
the subject are like, seeing a flash of light’ (Hinton 1967: 218–219). 
Hallucinations are cases of things going wrong, but as Austin noticed, and 
as we considered at length in both Chapters 2 and 4, there are many ways in 
which things can go wrong.  
Notice that Hinton indicated that hallucinations ‘to the subject are like 
seeing a flash of light’: this is significantly weaker than impersonal 
introspective indiscriminability. A mental occurrence can be like perception 
without the subject taking it to be perception. One might object that this is 
too general, as many non-sensory experiences are like perception—dreams, 
experiences under hypnosis, vivid imagining. Again, we should stress that 
this is in no way meant to be a definition of hallucination. A definition of 
hallucination that covers all hallucinations and excludes all cases of dreams, 
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imagery, illusion, and other experiences is probably not achievable—under a 
relationalist paradigm or any other—for the reasons seen in Chapter 4.  
Another objection to the negative account of hallucination that our 
previous discussion allows us to discharge easily complains that the 
negative condition requires the relation of indiscriminability to be 
asymmetrical, but ‘indiscriminability can also be regarded as symmetrical 
and some reasons are needed to exclude that’ (Vega-Encabo 2010: 294). But 
we have seen at the beginning of Chapter 5 that we have reasons to take the 
relation of indiscriminability between perception and hallucination, even 
when involving IIIHs, to be asymmetrical. 
 
6.5.2 The Alleged Need for a Positive Account 
A more serious challenge to the negative view of IIIHs is the 
following. One may worry that a negative epistemic condition specifying 
what cannot be known through introspection fails to capture the 
phenomenology of an IIIH. Smith claims that ‘having some specific 
psychological feature, not entailed by meeting the negative epistemic 
criterion, is necessary in order for an experience to be a hallucination’ 
(Smith 2008: 183).  
Smith doesn’t expand much on this concern, but it seems to me that 
what he worries about is cashed out by Siegel (2008: 218) when she notices 
that the phenomenal character of an experience determines what it is like to 
have that experience, and we can type experiences on the basis of how they 
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strike the subject introspectively. Simply saying what one cannot know 
about the phenomenal character of one’s IIIH doesn’t help us classify 
experiences with respect to whether they are phenomenally similar to the 
IIIH in question or not. When one introspectively accesses one’s conscious 
experience, one should not only be in a negative epistemic position. One 
should also be in a position to know that her current experience (say, of a 
sausage) is not like the experience of something else (say, of a butterfly). 
 The proponent of the negative view of IIIHs, according to Siegel, 
aims to account for the subject’s introspective knowledge that she is not 
having an experience of a butterfly derivatively from the subject’s not being 
in a position to know that she is not having a genuine perception of a 
sausage:  
The difference in character between your sausage-hallucination 
and, say, a hallucination of a butterfly is supposed to be reflected 
in the fact that each hallucination consists in a different fact 
about introspective unknowability. The fact that you can’t know 
by introspection that you’re not veridically perceiving a sausage 
is thus supposed to suffice to make it the case that you are not 
having a butterfly-experience: for example, you are not 
hallucinating a butterfly, and you are not having an experience 
with the character of veridically perceiving a butterfly. (Siegel 
2008: 219) 
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However, Siegel argues, ‘unknowability facts’ (negative epistemic 
facts such as not being in a position to know that one is not perceiving a 
sausage) cannot ground positive epistemic facts (such as knowing that an 
experience is not an instance of perceiving a butterfly). For the negative 
epistemic situation is one I am in every time I cannot know through 
introspection that I am not genuinely perceiving a sausage. But the truth of 
this negative fact doesn’t rule out that I could be having all sorts of 
conscious experience, which for some reason I cannot distinguish from a 
perception. Notice that Siegel, like many other commentators, fails to 
distinguish between simple failure to discriminate and a modal notion of 
indiscriminability—and in particular impersonally indiscriminability. So a 
disjunctivist could reply that the negative condition of being in a situation 
that is impersonally indiscriminable from a genuine perception of a sausage 
is not compatible with having a perception of a butterfly.  
Moreover, to respond to this worry, the relationalist may claim that in 
saying that there is no positive characterization of the phenomenal character 
of an IIIH she means to deny the idea that there are specific properties of the 
experience or a specific event that explains what it is like to have an IIIH. 
However, according to the proponent of the negative view, there is 
something positive we can introspectively know about the phenomenal 
character of IIIHs, namely that ‘they purport to relate us to the world’ 
(Martin 2006: 372). We cannot know through introspection that they 
actually ‘fail […] to do so’. But one might contend that the negative view of 
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations 
 
 
267 
 
hallucination fails to capture this idea. This is true, but again it should be 
noted that the negative epistemic condition should be not seen as a 
necessary and sufficient condition for the obtaining of a hallucination (not 
even if we restrict it to IIIHs).  
The negative condition is only meant to provide the most specific 
available condition for determining the phenomenal character of an IIIH. 
But this negative condition must go together with a positive aspect, i.e. the 
fact that one has an experience that just seems like a perceptual relation to 
an F. As Hinton says, a disjunctive claim of the form ‘S sees a flash of light 
or only seems to see a flash of light’ doesn’t need to be made true by the 
same occurrence, and not even by the occurrence of two different events 
that share certain ‘worn-on-the-sleeves’ properties. It might just be made 
true by the occurrence of an event of seeing a flash of light and something 
that just seems like that (see Chapter 2 of this thesis).  
The problem with this proposal—one might object—is that although 
the relationalist wants to claim that there is positive, yet derivative, 
characterization of the hallucinatory experience, it is not clear that the mere 
impossibility of introspectively discriminating one’s situation from a 
genuine perception stated by Martin’s negative condition can provide this. 
What the relationalist can say in response to this relies on the picture of 
introspection she proposes. However, I will explain what the relationalist 
can say about introspection only after I have presented some other frequent 
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objections to the negative view of hallucination; for the way we should 
understand introspection is crucial to answering those challenges too. 
 
6.5.3 Very Bad Cases and Unsophisticated Hallucinators 
Another way of insisting on the need for a positive characterization of 
the phenomenal character of IIIHs argues that, since the criterion provided 
by Martin is epistemic, it cannot account for the fact that hallucinations are 
sensory experiences. This objection relies on the second group of 
counterexamples that I mentioned in section 6.4.1. These counterexamples 
are meant to show that the negative epistemic criterion is too inclusive, for it 
is also met by mental occurrences that are not introspectively 
indiscriminable from perception. According to Smith:  
In virtue of meeting the negative epistemic criterion very bad 
cases are lumped together with hallucinations, and their non-
sensory character is not recognised. Alternatively, the sensory 
character of hallucinations is not recognised, since they are 
characterised in a way that applies to the non-sensory very bad 
cases. (Smith 2008: 186) 
Smith provides the following three examples of very bad cases: 
dreams, hypnosis, and what he calls ‘tachiscopic cases’. These are cases in 
which, in an experimental setting, a subject faces a white screen upon which 
a tachiscope projects an image for a few milliseconds. Due to the short time 
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations 
 
 
269 
 
of exposure to the image, subjects are inclined to believe that an image has 
being shown even when it has not and they are only imagining so.  
Smith thinks it that it would be ‘unusual’ for these cases to be cases of 
sensory experiences, but he doesn’t explain why this is so. It is debatable to 
what extent dreams are cases of conscious experience. Even if we identify 
certain criteria that distinguish between conscious sensory experiences and 
dreams (such as, for instance, that conscious sensory experience requires 
being awake), as we saw in Chapter 4 the distinction between dreams and 
hallucination is not clear-cut: there are at least some borderline cases for 
which it is difficult to decide whether they are cases of hallucinations or 
dream (I am thinking in particular of hypnagogic and hypnopompic 
experiences). Yet we may grant that paradigmatic cases of dreams should be 
distinguished from paradigmatic cases of hallucinations. Similarly, one 
might wonder whether it is clear that one doesn’t hallucinate when being 
hypnotized, but we can also grant for the sake of argument that one might, 
when hypnotized, have all the relevant beliefs to put one in a position in 
which one is unable to tell that one is not perceiving an F without having 
the relevant conscious sensory experience.  
It is more controversial to claim that in the tachiscopic case one 
doesn’t have any sensory experience, but rather only visualizes or imagines 
an image on the screen. And similarly to the case of dreams, the distinction 
between imagery and hallucination, as we saw in Chapter 4, is not so clear-
cut either. But we may concede to Smith, at least for the sake of the 
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argument, that when one falsely reports seeing an image in the tachiscopic 
case, one doesn’t have a conscious sensory experience. Smith’s objection is 
that, although these are not cases of sensory experience, they are cases that 
are indiscriminable from a perception. Thus, the negative epistemic 
condition that is supposed to determine the phenomenal character of IIIHs is 
met by all these non-sensory cases too. And thus, by failing to distinguish 
IIIHs from cases where it only epistemically seems to one as if one is 
perceiving, the relationalist fails to capture the sensory nature of 
hallucinations.  
A first response availalbe to the relationalist to these alleged 
counterexamples is that the notion of indiscriminability in play in the 
negative epistemic condition is impersonal, while cases of experience under 
hypnosis, dreams, or any other situation in which one cannot tell that one is 
not perceiving are not impersonally indiscriminable through introspection. 
We have seen that in order to establish that an experience is impersonally 
indiscriminable from perception, one should rule out that interfering 
conditions prevent one from noticing that one’s experience is actually 
phenomenally different from genuine cases of perception. Being hypnotized 
and being asleep are precisely cases where conditions that could prevent one 
from distinguishing one’s experience from genuinely sensory experiences 
are present. It is also reasonable to suppose that the short time span of the 
stimulus (or the apparent presence of the stimulus) in the tachisopic case 
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interferes with one’s capacity to introspectively discriminate. Thus, the 
negative condition for IIIH doesn’t apply to these cases.  
At this point, in the current dialectic, opponents of the negative view 
of hallucination criticize either the notion of impersonal indiscriminability 
or its use with respect to experiences and knowledge through introspection 
(Smith 2008; Siegel 2008; Farkas 2006). However, we have already seen, in 
Chapter 3, that the proponent of the argument from hallucination needs to 
introduce this notion in the first place in order to secure the spreading step 
of the argument from hallucination. Only if we understand 
indiscriminability in an impersonal way do relationalists face difficulty in 
accounting for the indiscriminability of certain hallucinations (IIIHs) 
without assuming the sameness of phenomenal characters and yet without 
violating the superficiality condition. The problem for the relationalist is not 
that the notion of impersonal indiscriminability is incoherent. If the notion is 
incoherent, the very argument from hallucination, and the screening off that 
leads relationalists to give a negative account of IIIHs, doesn’t even get off 
the ground. One can just say that perception and hallucination have different 
phenomenal characters and that whatever account(s) one give to 
hallucination doesn’t affect the relationalist account of perception. The 
problem for the relationalist is that it is not clear that she can give a coherent 
account of IIIHs that doesn’t understand impersonal indiscriminability 
through introspection in terms of the sameness of phenomenal characters. I 
have to postpone an answer to this challenge until the end of this chapter, 
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after having reviewed other common objections to the negative account of 
hallucination.  
However, as Martin (2006) himself recognizes, invoking an 
impersonal notion of indiscriminability as part of the negative epistemic 
condition doesn’t suffice to respond to the worry presented by Smith. We 
can better see the extent of the problem faced by a proponent of the negative 
view of hallucination if we consider a phenomenal zombie duplicate. A 
phenomenal zombie would have the same cognitive and behavioural 
response as someone perceiving an apple, without having any sensory 
experience. In this case, the relationalist cannot invoke the distinction 
between the impersonal and personal notions of indiscriminability, as we 
can imagine a case of IIIH where the brain of the phenomenal zombie is 
activated in exactly the same way as in the genuine perception of a 
conscious subject, but the upshot of this brain state is the possession of 
certain beliefs without any conscious sensory experience. It seems that, in 
light of the negative epistemic condition, someone having an IIIH would be 
in the same situation as the phenomenal zombie (this objection is also 
developed by Siegel 2008 and further discussed by Sturgeon 2008). Thus, 
the negative account of hallucination fails to explain how IIIHs are genuine 
sensory experiences.  
It seems, thus, that, in the light of the negative epistemic account, 
hallucinations can lack a phenomenal character, although they seem to have 
one. Before considering what a relationalist could say to this objection, I 
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want to consider another objection, which helps us to see where the 
difficulty lies for the proponent of the negative view of hallucination and 
what she can say in response. As is the case for the objection I considered in 
the previous sub-section, the key to a satisfactory answer lies in the way 
relationalists should account for introspection.  
The further objection is once again discussed by Siegel (2008: 213). 
Siegel argues that the negative epistemic condition fails to account for the 
possibility of cognitively unsophisticated creatures such as dogs having 
hallucinations. Suppose a dog has a hallucination of a sausage. The dog 
lacks the cognitive capacities required to make judgments, and in particular 
she lacks a notion of experience, so she is unable to formulate the 
introspective judgment that her experience is not an experience of a 
butterfly. The dog’s hallucination, then, would be indiscriminable from an 
experience of a butterfly (or a tuna, a submarine, or anything else). Each 
kind of hallucination had by the dog would count as indiscriminable from 
any possible genuine perception.  
One might try to respond to this challenge by invoking two precisions 
I made earlier. The first is the idea that there is indeed something the dog is 
positively aware of through introspection when having an IIIH: she has an 
experience that seems just like that of a sausage (but she is not aware that it 
is not). However, since the dog doesn’t have the capacity to reflect on her 
experience, she cannot have any introspective judgment about her 
experience whatsoever. But this doesn’t mean that her experience doesn’t 
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have any phenomenology to it: it just seems to her as if she were genuinely 
perceiving a sausage. The second precision again appeals to impersonal 
indiscriminability: we can make suppositions regarding the experience the 
dog undergoes, even if she doesn’t have the relevant introspective 
capacities. The condition of being impersonally introspectively 
indiscriminable from the perception of a sausage can apply to the dog’s 
hallucination even if she lacks any introspective capacity, in the same way 
as a patch of colour can count as perceptually indiscriminable from red even 
if the subject for which the patch of colour is indiscriminable from red is 
blind.  
However, this line of response is not satisfactory. Critics (in particular 
Siegel 2008) have argued that the appeal to introspective indiscriminability 
may at best explain what we take, from a third-person perceptive, the 
experience of the dog to be like. It doesn’t illuminate what it is like for the 
dog to have an IIIH.  
 
6.6 The Phenomenal Character as a Ghost  
Fish (2009) responds to some of these and other worries82 by biting 
the bullet and agreeing that IIIHs (or, for Fish, all hallucinations, since he 
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 Among the motivations that lead Fish to revisit Martin’s negative account of 
(causally matching) hallucinations is the dog problem formulated by Siegel (2008: 
213). However, what he seems to take as more pressing motivations, and with 
respect to which his account is allegedly a significant improvement over Martin’s, 
are an objection raised by Sturgeon (2006: 364–365) regarding the difficulty of 
understanding Martin’s clause ‘through reflection’ (which he uses in the same 
sense as I have here used ‘through introspection’) in the formulation of the 
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doesn’t distinguish between different notions of indiscriminability and aims 
to apply the negative account to all hallucinations)83 lack any phenomenal 
character whatsoever, while granting that this doesn’t deprive the 
hallucinator’s state from having a proper phenomenology. Fish revisits the 
negative condition for IIIHs introduced by Martin in terms of the cognitive 
and behavioural effects that the hallucination shares with a corresponding 
perception. A hallucination is indiscriminable from a perception inasmuch 
as it produces the same sets of beliefs and behaviours that perception 
produces:  
We can interpret the requirements placed on hallucination [by 
the screening off problem] as insisting (1) that a hallucination 
must not fail to produce any judgments or beliefs that would 
have been produced by a veridical perception of the relevant 
kind and (2) that a hallucination must not produce any beliefs or 
judgments that would not have been produced by a veridical 
perception of the relevant kind. With this in mind, we can see 
that a hallucination will be indiscriminable from a veridical 
perception of a certain kind if and only if it produces the same 
                                                                                                                            
negative condition, and an objection raised by Farkas (2006) against the use of the 
notion of impersonal indiscriminability. However, we should not be moved by 
these two motivations, for we have already seen that (1) it is indeed possible to 
make sense of the idea of impersonal indiscriminability through introspection and 
(2) it is the proponent of the argument from hallucination in the first place who 
needs this notion.  
83
 Clearly this exposes Fish to the objection (that didn’t apply to Martin’s 
account) raised in section 6.4.1.  
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beliefs or judgments that a veridical perception of that kind 
would have produced. (Fish 2009: 94) 
We can reconstruct Fish’s reasoning as follows. The phenomenal 
character of perception is determined by the obtaining of a relation to the 
object one seems to perceive, but in hallucination there is no suitable object 
to which one can be related. Thus, we must conclude that hallucination 
doesn’t have any phenomenal character whatsoever, for phenomenal 
characters are the kind of things that require the obtaining of a relation to 
the object one seems to see.  
This proposal unsurprisingly encountered severe resistance and was 
seen as definitive confirmation of how far relationalists can go in their 
denial of obvious intuitions about phenomenal characters. It strikes many as 
simply incredible that (certain) hallucinations don’t have any phenomenal 
character at all, as Knight eloquently voices: 
[On this view] we can believe we are having an experience with 
a specific character when that experience has no character at all! 
On this view we are not aware of anything when we hallucinate; 
we are only the state of seeming to have such awareness. Such 
empty seemings are strange, and many philosophers have found 
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disjunctivism so conceived a bitter if not impossible pill to 
swallow. (Knight 2013: 3)84 
Fish would probably respond to this by claiming that we have no 
compelling reason to assume that hallucinations have a phenomenal 
character. What we have to explain is the fact that they are indiscriminable 
from perception. But this, he would argue, can be perfectly explained in 
terms of the cognitive and behavioural effects that the two share. Having the 
same cognitive effects generates the impression in the subject that she is 
having an experience with phenomenal character: ‘The phenomenal 
character of hallucination is simply a ghost generated by my belief that I am 
seeing something’ (Fish 2009: 98).  
How can this possibly be a response to the objection raised by Smith 
and Siegel? This seems only to aggravate the position of the disjunctivist by 
making it very clear that the negative account of hallucination doesn’t 
ensure the presence of a phenomenally conscious occurrence and that the 
costs of this proposal outweight the benefits of preserving relationalism (see 
Pautz 2013).  
Fish insists that denying that hallucinations have phenomenal 
characters doesn’t prevent them from being phenomenally conscious. What 
we need to account for, in order to secure the intuition that hallucinations 
                                                 
84
 It should be noted that Knight mistakenly attributes this view to Martin. This 
indicates, I believe, a widespread tendency among commentators to assume that the 
only coherent way to spell out the negative view of hallucination is to adopt Fish’s 
option and deny that IIIHs have phenomenal character altogether.  
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are phenomenally conscious, and in order to explain their indiscriminability 
from perception, is the fact that they have a ‘felt reality’. This is a term that 
he borrows from Siegel (2008: 213) without much explanation, but which I 
assume roughly corresponds to what in Chapter 4 I called a ‘sense of 
reality’. And this, Fish maintains, is explained in turn by the fact that he has 
certain beliefs:  
[I]f subjects believe or judge that a state of a certain kind is 
present, then it will be for the subjects as though they are in such 
a state, even in situations in which they are not. This explains 
how my definition of hallucination is able to account for the fact 
that hallucinations have a felt reality, even though it also insists 
that the hallucination itself lacks phenomenal character. (Fish 
2009: 98) 
This should be enough, according to Fish, to silence the objection that 
the negative view of hallucination makes a subject of hallucination 
equivalent to a phenomenal zombie. Moreover, he notices that there is 
something it is like for the subject who has the hallucination in virtue of the 
fact that there is something it is like to have the range of beliefs one has 
(Fish 2009: 99, n 19). It seems, then, that the apparent sensory conscious 
phenomenology is due to cognitive phenomenology: the subject of 
hallucination is the victim of a meta-cognitive error, as she takes a mental 
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occurrence with one kind of phenomenology (a set of beliefs) for a mental 
occurrence with another kind of phenomenology (a sensory perception).85  
Fish also maintains that his proposal offers a suitable response to the 
‘dog problem’: although the dog doesn’t have the capacity to formulate 
beliefs, her experience produces certain behavioural effects, and these are 
enough to explain in which sense her hallucination can be indiscriminable 
from perception. Both when she sees a sausage and when she hallucinates 
one, she starts drooling, while she doesn’t do so when she sees a butterfly.  
Denying that hallucinations have any phenomenal character might 
also be seen to offer a neat answer to the challenge that the superficiality 
constraint poses to the relationalist. A relationalist can explain why an IIIH 
doesn’t have the same phenomenal character as perception without 
committing to the claim that the phenomenal character of hallucination is 
hidden to introspection and thus not superficial with respect to it. Recall the 
argument from superficiality I introduced in Chapter 3:  
1. Some hallucinations are IIIH; 
2. An IIIH is phenomenally conscious; 
3. (from 2) IIIHs have a phenomenal character; 
4. Phenomenal characters are superficial. 
                                                 
85
 See Dokic and Martin 2012 for a further attempt to develop, drawing on 
empirical data, an account of hallucination in terms of meta-cognitive mistakes. 
According to their proposal, however, perception and hallucination share the same 
affective phenomenology (which, according to them, constitute the felt reality of 
experiences), rather than the same cognitive effects. Although this account is very 
plausible in many cases of hallucination, it is less plausible in the case of IIIHs.  
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5. If phenomenal characters are superficial, the phenomenal character 
of an experience is accessible (at least in principle) through 
introspection (superficiality constraint); 
6. Relationalism claims that the phenomenal character of an IIIH is 
different from the phenomenal character of a perception; 
7. (from 6) For the relationalist, the phenomenal character of an IIIH 
is different from what it introspectively seems to be: its real nature 
is hidden to introspection; 
8.  (from 2 and 7) Relationalism is committed to the claim that the 
phenomenal character of an IIIH is not superficial;  
9. (from 4 and 8) Relationalism is untenable because it denies the 
superficiality of phenomenal characters. 
Fish can block the argument by denying premise (3): he is committed 
to claiming that the fact that experience is phenomenally conscious doesn’t 
entail that it has a phenomenal character.  
Despite this advantage, however, there are many reasons for being 
unsatisfied with accounting for the indiscriminability of hallucination from 
perception in terms of the sameness of cognitive and behavioural effects. 
One might still be persuaded that the phenomenology of a conscious 
experience can be fully captured by a set of behaviours and beliefs (see 
Vega-Encabo 2010: 190) and that accounting for how an IIIH strikes us in 
terms of a meta-cognitive mistake consisting in taking cognitive 
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phenomenology for sensory phenomenology is phenomenologically 
accurate.  
There is a further problem with this proposal that becomes evident 
only once we have clear in mind that the negative account of hallucination 
is supposed to apply only to IIIHs. It seems that if the genuine perception 
has a sensory phenomenology, while the corresponding IIIH has only a 
cognitive phenomenology that one takes to be sensory, the two episodes are 
not impersonally indiscriminable through introspection in the way I 
discussed in Chapter 3: a meta-cognitive error seems like the kind of error 
that can be explained in terms of something’s interfering with one’s 
introspective capacities. Thus, Fish’s proposal is off the mark and fails to 
properly address the argument from hallucination and the argument from 
superficiality. It may be a valid account for (some of) the ordinary actual 
hallucination, but it doesn’t do anything to counter arguments that focus on 
philosopher’s hallucinations, i.e. IIIHs. 
Moreover, as Pautz (2013) notices, the viability of this proposal 
depends on how satisfactorily one can counter traditional arguments against 
Rosenthal’s ‘higher-order thought theory’ of consciousness, from which the 
idea that consciousness of hallucination is a by-product of cognitive 
attitudes derives. Conterexamples in which one has a hallucination but no 
cognitive and behavioural effects (as is the case for very unsophisticated 
animals) have been proposed (Siegel 2008). Martin (2013) notices that one 
consequence of Fish’s proposal is that it is impossible for me to have the 
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same hallucination as a dog, since the dog will never be in a position to have 
certain beliefs.  
However, here I want to press another objection that is more relevant 
to the concerns I am dealing with in this chapter. Martin (2013) argues that 
Fish is not immune to the screening off problem, contrary to what Fish 
(2009: 109–111) claims. Fish acknowledges that it might seem that, since 
higher-order beliefs suffice to furnish an IIIH with felt reality despite the 
lack of phenomenal character, they should suffice to furnish the 
corresponding genuine perception with felt reality too. Yet he contends that 
the property of having certain cognitive effects is not subject to the 
screening off worry, because it is an ‘inhered’ property, which depends upon 
the perception’s possession of phenomenal character:  
A hallucination has a felt reality—despite the fact that the 
hallucination itself lacks a phenomenal character—because the 
hallucinator falsely believes that he is enjoying a veridical 
perception. But having such a belief—believing that one’s 
current mental event is a veridical perception of a certain kind—
can be sufficient to account for the felt reality of such an event 
only if there is already a felt reality to the event that the subject 
judges himself to be in. Hallucinations have a felt reality 
because, when we hallucinate, we take ourselves to be 
perceiving, and perceptions themselves have a felt reality. And, 
of course, the explanation of the felt reality of veridical 
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perception cannot be an explanation of the same kind or we 
would be locked in a regress. So, if veridical perceptual 
experiences did not have phenomenal character in the first 
place—phenomenal character that makes it the case that there is 
something it is like to be in such states—then the relational 
property of being indiscriminable from such an experience 
would not explain why we think that there is something it is like 
to be in a state that instantiates that relational property. (Fish 
2009: 109–110) 
As Martin (2013) notes, if the felt reality of hallucination is the result 
of the hallucinator’s beliefs and behaviours, as Fish (2009: 98) explicitly 
claims in the passage quoted above (the fact that ‘subjects believe or judge 
that a state of a certain kind is present, […] explains how my definition of 
hallucination is able to account for the fact that hallucinations have a felt 
reality’), then, since the very same beliefs are also present in a perception, 
these beliefs and behaviours should be enough to give rise to the felt reality 
of perception too. The only difference between the perceptual and the 
hallucinatory case is that in one case the beliefs are true and the behaviour 
appropriate. But this doesn’t make the false beliefs occurring in the 
hallucinatory case derivative of the beliefs one has when perceiving. 
Therefore, if in both perception and hallucination there is felt reality, and 
this can be fully explained in the case of hallucination in terms of the 
subject’s possession of certain beliefs, Fish has done nothing to explain why 
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the same beliefs shouldn’t suffice to explain the perception’s possession of 
felt reality—thus screening off the alleged explanatory power of a positive 
phenomenal character constituted by the relation to certain objects.  
However, here Fish insists that the felt reality of perception is not 
provided by a set of beliefs that are the upshot of experience; rather it is a 
feature of the conscious experience itself: presumably what accounts for it is 
the fact that perception has a phenomenal character realised by the obtaining 
of a relation to certain objects. But the fact remains that the hallucination 
also has a felt reality, and in this it is impersonally indiscriminable from the 
corresponding genuine perception—and this is entirely explained by the 
presence of certain beliefs that are also present in perception. But then it still 
remains the case that the beliefs can explain why one takes oneself to be 
perceiving and why one’s experience can seemingly have a felt reality, 
which should still screen off any explanatory role from the positive felt 
reality of perception, however this is accounted for. Fish claims that the felt 
reality of perception cannot be explained in the same way as the felt reality 
of hallucination (i.e. in terms of the subject’s possession of certain beliefs), 
or else ‘we would be locked in a regress’. But he doesn’t offer any reason 
why it would be a regress to explain the felt reality of perception in terms of 
the presence of a set of beliefsthe very same beliefs one has in an IIIH, 
only in this case, true. The fact that in one situation one holds a false belief 
doesn’t make one’s situation explanatorily parasitical on a situation in which 
the belief turns out to be true.  
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The negative account of hallucination offered by Fish is negative in 
the sense that it is committed to claiming that hallucination has no 
phenomenal character whatsoever. But the seeming presence of a 
phenomenal character is characterised in terms of the obtaining of positive 
conditions shared with the perceptual case. This deprives Fish of any right 
to claim that his account is not susceptible to the screening off problem. For 
what puts the account offered by Martin in a position to avoid the screening 
off problem turns on characterising the phenomenal character of 
hallucination merely in terms of the subject’s inability to distinguish through 
introspection her current situation from a genuine perception. Thus, it seems 
that the relationalist should provide an account of impersonal 
indiscriminability through introspection, which is not reduced to the 
possession of certain beliefs and behaviours.  
It remains to be seen whether such an account can face the objections 
I have introduced earlier and can account for the impersonal 
indiscriminability of IIIHs without violating the superficiality constraint. I 
have anticipated that a response to the challenges made by commentators 
such as Smith and Siegel essentially turns on a disagreement about the way 
in which we should understand introspection and its connection with 
phenomenal characters. In the next section I will introduce this response and 
discuss how it can help to tackle those objections. I will then move on to 
discussing how the negative account of hallucination can help us understand 
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how relationalism can accommodate the intuition that phenomenal 
characters are superficial.  
 
6.7 Introspecting 
Martin (2006) argues that one can properly address the objections 
raised above, in particular the dog and zombie problems, in the context of a 
discussion of the self-awareness of sensory experience. He argues that the 
opponent’s claim that the negative epistemic condition can suffice to 
account for the phenomenal character of IIIHs and that one should instead 
appeal to positive sensory features  
is forced upon us […] if we accept a certain picture of the 
relation between phenomenal consciousness on the one hand, 
and self-awareness of our cognitive states of response to 
phenomenal consciousness on the other. That is, one may 
conceive that the facts about phenomenal consciousness are 
fixed independently of whether a subject has any perspective on 
his or her own conscious states and is thereby self-aware of 
them. (Martin 2006: 377) 
 It is tempting to think of the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience as something one becomes aware of independently of the higher-
order introspective perspective one has on it. According to this picture, in 
making introspective judgments about the phenomenal character of an 
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experience, one acquires knowledge of something we are already aware of 
independently of those judgments. We have already considered this view 
multiple times in this thesis. We saw in Chapter 1 how this picture supports 
the idea that the phenomenal character of experience should be 
characterised in terms of qualitative intrinsic properties (qualia). We also 
saw in Chapter 3 how this view of self-awareness motivates a restricted 
version of infallibilism: independently of our making introspective 
judgments about them, we are pre-judgmentally, directly aware of our 
experiences.  
It seems to me that this picture of the relation between phenomenal 
character and one’s awareness of it is motivated by the idea that one cannot 
be perceptually aware of the object of one’s experience if one is not aware 
of the phenomenal character of that experience. It is the phenomenal 
character of the experience that reveals what one is perceptually aware of. 
This assumption forces on us the idea that we must be aware of the 
phenomenal character of our experiences independently of higher-order 
introspective judgments. For very often one is not in a position to formulate 
higher order introspective judgments on the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience, yet one is perceptually aware of things. According to this 
picture, our perceptual awareness of the things around us depends on our 
awareness of the phenomenal character of the conscious experience we 
have. But do we have reasons to embrace such an assumption? 
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Such an assumption implies that one is aware of the phenomenal 
character of one’s experience prior to and independently of one’s perceptual 
awareness of the objects of perception. But the discussion of the 
transparency of experience in Chapter 1 suggests the contrary. We have seen 
that, although we may become aware of features of the conscious 
experience itself, when we direct our introspective attention towards it, we 
are aware of those features only in virtue of being aware of the properties of 
the object we perceive (or seem to perceive). We do not seem to be in a 
position to engage in the introspective activity of attending to the 
phenomenal character of our own perceptual experience without attending 
to the objects of which we are perceptually aware. As Soteriou (2013) 
notices, this suggests that the activity of introspectively attending to one’s 
experience depends on the activity of perceptually attending to and looking 
at the objects with which one is perceptually presented: 
In the case of veridical visual perception it appears to be 
impossible to comply with the following request: introspect 
those properties that determine what your experience is an 
experience as of, but make sure you don’t look at anything. 
(Soteriou 2013: 193) 
What distinguishes looking at something from introspectively 
attending to the experience one is undergoing, Soteriou argues, are the aims 
or the outcomes of that activity. When introspecting, one aims to acquire 
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knowledge not only about what is in front of one, but also about how things 
seem to one to be perceptually. And one does acquire beliefs about one’s 
experience and how this strikes one, rather than beliefs about what is there 
to be seen. When one introspects one looks at what one is perceptually 
presented with ‘with the intention of discovering something about the 
experience one is undergoing’ (Soteriou 2013: 196). It is in this sense that 
we should understand Martin’s claims that ‘a subject’s perspective on his or 
her own experience is not distinct from their perspective on the world’ 
(Martin 2006: 404). Notice that, in order to be introspectively aware of the 
phenomenal character of one’s experience by intentionally looking at the 
objects of perception in order find out something about the features of 
experience itself, a certain cognitive sophistication is required: one needs to 
have at least an implicit theory of mind and a concept of experience in order 
to switch one’s attention from what one is perceptually aware of to one’s 
experience. Whether this introspective activity is judgmental is an open 
question, but it seems that one can in principle perform this attentional 
switch without formulating judgments. However, it remains the case that 
creatures that do not have a concept of experience lack the capacity to 
introspect their experience.  
But what happens when one hallucinates? When one hallucinates one 
is not looking at anything. However, one behaves as if one is looking at 
something and introspecting one’s experience, and when one introspects 
one’s hallucinatory experience, when one seems to be looking at those 
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objects and features, one seems to see with the intention of knowing 
something about one’s experience, although one is not looking at them, 
because looking at something requires one to maintain cognitive contact 
with those objects—which in turn requires that those objects be present. 
This explains why, as the disjunctivist maintains, when one hallucinates, one 
is not only wrong about the access the subject seems to have to the 
surrounding environment. One is also wrong with respect to the access one 
seems to have to one’s own experience. One seems to be in a position in 
which one can direct one’s attention towards the object with which one 
seems to be in cognitive contact, with the aim of gaining knowledge about 
what the experience of these objects is like. This kind of introspective 
access to the phenomenal character of one’s experience seems to be the kind 
of introspective access that requires one to look at the objects perceived, 
which in made possible by perceiving those objects. As Soteriou claims:  
[I]n the case of successful perception the subject has available to 
her the kind of introspective access to her experience that she 
seems to have, because she has available to her the kind of 
perceptual access to objects of experience that she seems to 
have. (Soteriou 2013: 205)  
By contrast, when one hallucinates, one doesn’t have the kind of 
introspective access one seems to have to one’s experience because one 
doesn’t have the perceptive access to the object of one’s experience that one 
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seems to have. It is in this sense that we should understand the idea that the 
phenomenal character of a hallucination is derivative of perception: it is 
because one seems to have a perception, and thereby a perspective on the 
world, that one can engage in that activity of introspectively directing one’s 
attention to the objects one seems to perceive with the aim of finding out 
something about the features of one’s own experience itself. But the access 
one has to one’s own experience is misleading because one doesn’t have the 
perceptual access to the world one seems to have. When one introspects 
one’s own hallucinatory experience, one seems to have the kind of 
introspective access that one has when one genuinely perceives something, 
when one has a perspective on the world. But what one comes to know, 
then, about the phenomenal character of one’s hallucination, is just that it is 
indiscriminable from the phenomenal character one can introspectively 
discover when one actually perceives something.  
Martin suggests that the deeper disagreement between disjunctivists 
and their opponents lies in a disagreement about the relation between 
phenomenal character and introspective access to it. But, if my diagnosis is 
correct, there seems to be an even deeper disagreement concerning the 
direction of the explanation between having a perceptual perspective on the 
world and having an introspective perspective of one’s conscious 
experience. The opponent of the relationalist thinks that one needs some 
kind of awareness of the phenomenal character of one’s experience in order 
to have a perceptual perspective on the world. Drawing on considerations 
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about the transparency of experience, the relationalist maintains that the 
subject’s introspective perspective on her own experience depends on her 
perceptual perspective on the world.  
 
6.8 Response to Critics and How to Preserve Superficiality 
How does this picture of introspection bear on the objections that have 
been raised to the negative view of hallucination that I considered above? 
And how does it bear on the way relationalists can try to accommodate the 
superficiality of phenomenal characters?  
The first criticism I considered insisted that the negative condition 
doesn’t suffice to capture the sensory conscious aspect of experience. 
Martin points out that this idea is motivated by a view of the relation 
between phenomenal character and introspection whereby introspecting 
amounts to tracking and taking notice of a phenomenal character that exists 
and is somehow present to us independently of our introspective perspective 
on it. The idea underwriting this picture is that one cannot count as having a 
conscious experience if one is not aware, independently of one’s higher-
order introspective capacities, of what it is like to have one’s experience, i.e. 
of one’s phenomenal character. The relationalist is committed to denying 
both claims. One’s access to the phenomenal character of one’s experience 
is not required in order to have a sensory experience. On the contrary, one 
becomes introspectively aware of one’s conscious experience only in virtue 
of becoming perceptually aware of certain objects. The phenomenal 
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character comes to be present to one’s awareness only in virtue of one’s 
being perceptually aware of certain objects. There is no immediate 
introspective awareness of phenomenal character of the type proposed by 
Giustina and Kriegel (forthcoming) (see Chapter 3 for a discussion of their 
proposal).  
The proposed account of introspection also helps to shed light on the 
suggestion I made earlier in response to an objection directed by Smith and 
Siegel to the negative account of hallucination. I suggested that the 
epistemic negative condition contains a positive element to it that helps 
determine the phenomenal character of the IIIH, in such a way that it 
doesn’t turn out to have the same phenomenal character as all those 
experiences that one cannot introspectively discriminate from it. This 
positive, but yet derivative element is the fact that, in an IIIH, one seems to 
perceive an F. We have seen that one could object that the negative 
epistemic condition in terms of impersonal indiscriminability doesn’t 
deliver this positive element. Now we can see why it does. The negative 
condition imposes a condition about the possession and awareness of the 
phenomenal character of an IIIH. But introspective access to the 
phenomenal character of one’s experience depends on the perceptual access 
that one has or seems to have on the world. So awareness of the phenomenal 
character of an IIIH (accounted for in terms of being in a situation that is 
introspectively distinguishable from one’s perception) depends on the 
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perspective one seems to have on the world (the fact that one seems to see 
F).  
These considerations help us understand what a relationalist should 
say in response to the dog objection too. Since the dog presumably lacks a 
theory of mind and a concept of experience, it is not capable of 
introspecting on its experience. Therefore, it doesn’t have introspective 
access to the phenomenal character of its experience: it cannot step back 
from attending the environment and reflect on the features of its own 
experience. However, ‘how we conceive of their experience is such that, 
were a creature so to experience and be self-conscious, they would thereby 
be able to articulate judgments just as we in fact do’ (Martin 2006: 395). We 
can attribute the notion of impersonal introspective indiscriminability 
because, although such creatures cannot introspect, we conceive of their 
experience such that it would have a certain introspectible phenomenal 
character, were the creature to be equipped with introspective capacities.  
The objection to this response was that this still doesn’t specify what 
kind of experience the dog has. But this objection relies on the assumption 
that one needs introspective awareness on the phenomenal character of 
one’s experience in order to have a perceptual perspective on the world. I 
have argued that this is not the case. On the contrary, one needs a 
perspective on the world in order to exercise introspective capacities. 
Moreover, I have argued that having a hallucination amounts to seeming to 
have a perceptual perspective on the world. Seeming to be perceptually 
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related to a sausage is what makes the dog’s hallucination impersonally 
indiscriminable from the perception of a sausage.  
Now that I have briefly addressed some of the familiar objections to 
the negative view of hallucination, it is time to consider how this proposal 
can help tackle the challenge I set in this thesis. Does the negative view of 
hallucination equip the relationalist with the means to account for the 
impersonal introspective indiscriminability of perception without assuming 
that they have the same phenomenal character and yet without violating the 
superficiality condition?  
If the phenomenal character of an IIIH is only determined derivatively 
from the phenomenal character of hallucination, one who denies that a 
perception and an IIIH share the same phenomenal character is not 
committed to the claim that the real nature of the phenomenal character of a 
hallucination is hidden to introspection. That relationalism is committed to 
the claim that the real nature of the phenomenal character of hallucination is 
hidden was premise (7) in the argument from superficiality. This was 
presented as something that follows from (6): the fact that relationalism 
claims that the phenomenal character of an IIIH is different from the 
phenomenal character of a perception. (7) seems to follow from (6) because 
if no difference between phenomenal characters is detectible through 
introspection—and ex hypothesis no difference from perception is 
detectable in the case of a hallucination that is impersonally indiscriminable 
through introspection from a perception—but yet the two experiences are 
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claimed to be different with respect to their phenomenal character, it seems 
that the only explanation is that what differentiates the phenomenal 
character of the IIIH from that of perception is something that goes beyond 
introspection.  
The negative view of hallucination helps us see that (7) doesn’t 
necessarily follow from (6). The relationalist can claim that the IIIH doesn’t 
have the same phenomenal character as a perception not because it has some 
non-introspectible property that distinguishes it from the phenomenal 
character of perception. The phenomenal character of an IIIH is different 
from that of a perception because it doesn’t amount to the obtaining of a 
psychological relation to the objects one seems to perceive. However, it 
doesn’t have a hidden nature: all there is to it is the fact the experience 
cannot be distinguished from a situation in which one is so related to the 
objects one seems to see. This brute indiscriminability fact is accessible 
through introspection.  
If the relationalist is not committed to violating the superficiality 
condition while denying that a perception and a corresponding IIIH have the 
same phenomenal character, the proponent of the argument from 
hallucination loses the motivation she had to support its crucial premise: 
IND. Thus, the argument from hallucination fails to show that relationalism 
is untenable.  
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6.9 Conclusions 
In this chapter I first considered a strategy to resist the argument from 
hallucination. The relationalist could appeal to the principle of the multiple 
realisability of phenomenal characters and claim that the same phenomenal 
character is present in a perception and a corresponding IIIH, albeit in each 
case realised on different bases: in one case a relation to the object one 
seems to perceive, in the other case something else—a relation to sense-
data, an intentional content, qualia…  
However, following Martin, I argued that, if one embraces this 
strategy, whatever account of the IIIH one proposes is liable to screen off 
the explanatory role that the relationalist attributes to the objects of a 
perception that causally matches the IIIH. Therefore, Martin suggests, the 
relationalist should seek to account for the phenomenal character of 
hallucination in purely negative terms: all there is to the phenomenal 
character of an IIIH is the fact that it is impersonally indiscriminable 
through introspection from perception.  
I considered some of the most well-known objections to this account 
of hallucination. Most of these objections seek to argue, in different ways, 
that the negative epistemic condition doesn’t suffice to account for the fact 
that hallucinations are sensory conscious experiences. I then considered a 
revision of the negative account proposed by Fish, who seeks to account for 
the indiscriminability in terms of sameness of cognitive effects in order to 
counter some of the objections to Martin’s negative account. I argued that 
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accounting for the indiscriminability in terms of the sameness of cognitive 
effects, as Fish advocates, doesn’t offer a valid answer to many of these 
objections, but most importantly is subject to the screening off worry.  
I argued that we should understand the disagreement over the negative 
view of hallucination against the background of a deeper disagreement 
about (1) the relation between phenomenal character and introspection and 
(2) the relation between having a perceptual perspective on the world and 
having an introspective perspective on one’s experience. Opponents of the 
negative view assume that (1) one can be immediately aware of the 
phenomenal character of one’s experience and that the presence and pre-
judgmental awareness of this phenomenal character is prior to and 
independent of the higher-order introspective access one has to them. They 
are led to think so because they believe that (2) being perceptually aware of 
something requires one to be (in an immediate way) introspectively aware 
of the phenomenal character of one’s experience. On the contrary, drawing 
on the transparency of experience, the relationalist argues that (1) the 
phenomenal character doesn’t exist independently of one’s introspective 
awareness of it and that (2) having introspective access to our experience 
depends on our perceptual access to the world. I then discussed how the 
picture of introspection that I recommended can help counter some familiar 
objections to the negative account of hallucination. 
Finally, I argued that the negative view of hallucination can provide a 
response to the challenge posed to relationalism by the superficiality of 
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phenomenal characters. If the phenomenal character of an IIIH is only 
determined by its being impersonally indiscriminable through introspection 
from a perception, the relationalist doesn’t commit to claiming that the 
nature of the phenomenal character of hallucination is hidden to 
introspection. All there is to the phenomenal character of an IIIH is 
accessible through introspection: it is just the fact that one cannot 
introspectively distinguish one’s situation from that of seeing something. 
But this is clearly different from the phenomenal character of perception, 
which is determined by a relation to certain objects—a phenomenal 
character that is clearly not present in hallucination.  
As we have seen in Chapter 3, the intuition that the phenomenal 
characters are superficial, together with the suspicion that it is not possible 
to deny IND without committing to denying the superficiality of the 
phenomenal character of hallucination, is the only valid motivation for IND, 
the crucial premise in the argument from hallucination. Thus, by explaining 
how the relationalist can coherently claim that IIIH doesn’t have the same 
phenomenal character as the corresponding experience, I complete my 
defence of relationalism in the face of the argument from hallucination. The 
long journey leading through this vindication of relationalism required us to 
dispel several widespread misconceptions that hinder the debate in 
relationalism and the argument from hallucination.  
First of all, the relationalist commitment that the phenomenal 
character of perception is partly constituted by the objects one seems to 
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perceive is often regarded with suspicion. It is believed that the phenomenal 
character of experiences cannot incorporate objects, as these go beyond the 
scope of what the notion of phenomenal character is designed to capture: the 
introspectively accessible aspect of experience, which by definition 
abstracts away from positing the existence of objects around us (or at least 
this is what some theorists suppose to be the case). I argued in Chapter 1 
that nothing in the notion of phenomenal character rules out the position 
adopted by relationalism: on the contrary, the transparency of experience 
and its manifest relationality support such an account of perception. In the 
light of the model of introspection I recommended in this chapter, whereby 
having an introspective perspective on the phenomenal character of one’s 
experience depends on having a perceptual perspective on the world, it 
becomes clearer why it is misleading to think that the phenomenal character 
of experience should make possible to abstract away from the objects one 
perceives, in a way that precludes a relationalist account.  
Another source of confusion in the current debate concerns the nature 
and structure of the argument that is meant to threaten relationalism. 
Although it is widely accepted that the argument from hallucination poses 
problems to relationalism, it is not always clear how it does so. Recent 
debates have focused on specific versions of the argument, such as the 
causal argument from hallucination. This argument originates from the 
assumption that hallucinations that causally match perceptions are possible. 
It is believed to be possible to reproduce the neural state one is in when 
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perceiving an object, in the absence of that object. In virtue of the 
undeniable link between the brain and the mind, it is argued, we should 
conclude that exactly the same brain activity would produce exactly the 
same experience one has when one perceives, which hence must not depend 
upon the existence of the object.  
 I argued in Chapter 5 that this argument fails, because it relies on the 
assumption that brain activity of a certain kind is sufficient for the 
occurrence of a conscious experience of a certain kind. But this assumption 
can be motivated only by a commitment to either the local supervenience 
principle, or the ‘same proximate cause, same immediate effect’ principle, 
both of which beg the question against relationalism and face several 
objections. The most that considerations about the possibility of causally 
matching hallucinations can do is to impose upon the relationalist the 
adoption of a negative account of hallucination. However, this is not a 
problem for relationalism. The negative view of hallucination is often 
depicted as an unwelcome ad hoc solution, a bullet which the proponent of 
relationalism needs to bite. On the contrary, a negative view of hallucination 
is precisely what is needed to solve the crucial challenge that hallucinations 
pose to relationalism: denying the indiscriminability principle (IND), 
without denying the superficiality of phenomenal characters.  
It is understandable why, despite the ‘same cause, same effect’ 
principle and local supervenience clearly being controversial claims, recent 
discussions of relationalism have focused on versions of the argument on 
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hallucination relying on either of these, rather than focusing on the 
traditional argument from hallucination hinging on IND. As I argued in 
Chapter 2, this traditional argument is best seen as a refinement of the 
traditional argument from illusions and conflicting appearances. Despite 
being widely and often tacitly assumed, opponents of relationalism have so 
far failed to present any convincing argument to support its acceptance.  
Chapter 3 fills this crucial gap and identifies the intuition underwriting 
IND: the intuition that, in virtue of its superficiality, the nature of a 
phenomenal character must be accessible through introspection. Framing 
the debate over relationalism in terms of a deeper disagreement over the 
superficiality of phenomenal character and, as I further argued in this 
chapter, its relation to introspection allowed me to identify what is really at 
stake in the debate over relationalism, what one needs to commit to in order 
to challenge relationalism and what resources the relationalist has to 
respond to this challenge.  
Although this poses a serious challenge for the relationalist, in the 
form of what I called the superficiality constraint, this also imposes more 
constraints upon the proponent of the argument from hallucination, so much 
so that it becomes far more difficult than what it is generally thought to 
support different premises of the argument and make the argument from 
hallucination work. In particular, the argument from hallucination cannot 
succeed without a proper discussion of what it takes for a hallucination to 
count as indiscriminable from perception, nor can it without a better 
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understanding of how different notions of indiscriminability allow for 
different explanations of the indiscriminability. Ultimately, I argued, the 
argument from hallucination has a chance to be successful only if its 
proponent can make space for the notion of impersonal indiscriminability. 
This reverses the terms of the current debate, where it is often assumed that 
the negative view of hallucination needs to accept a notion of impersonal 
indiscriminability, and such a notion is deemed problematic. I argued that 
there is a viable notion of impersonal indiscriminability through 
introspection, but even if there weren’t, this would be first and foremost a 
problem for the proponent of the argument from hallucination, rather than 
for the proponent of the negative view of hallucination.  
Another often neglected but important fact that focusing on the 
superficiality constraint highlights is that hallucinations are not a uniform 
class of mental occurrences and do not necessarily deserve all the same 
account. The only thing they have in common is that they bare some 
resemblance with perception and often are confused with perception. Most 
importantly, not all hallucinations pose problems to relationalism. Those 
that pose a challenge to relationalism are only those that are impersonally 
indiscriminable from perception through introspection. As I argued in 
Chapter 4, there is as of yet no empirical ground available to demonstrate 
that any documented hallucination fits this condition.  
This dispels another taxing misconception that hinders the debate on 
relationalism: relationalism shouldn’t be evaluated on its capacity to account 
Chapter 6: Introspecting Hallucinations 
 
 
304 
 
for the phenomenology of ordinary hallucinations, as relationalism is a 
claim about the phenomenal character of genuine perception, and virtually 
any account of various sorts of ordinary hallucinations is available to 
relationalists. It would be an interesting research project to see how we 
should better account for hallucinations. In the light of the discussion I 
carried in this thesis, it is safe to predict that a one-size-fits-all account of 
hallucinations will not be available. However, this research project goes 
beyond the scope of the assessment of relationalism and is independent of it.  
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